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Abstract 
In this thesis, using a finance lens, we investigate various aspects of political 
actions of the Chinese National Social Security Fund (CNSSF). The thesis comprises 
three empirical papers. In the first essay, we analyze the trading behavior of the 
CNSSF that operates in a highly political environment. We show that the CNSSF 
adopts a rebalancing strategy that maintains both portfolio liquidity and growth 
opportunities. Further, we find direct and indirect evidence that the CNSSF actively 
intervenes in the stock market by providing liquidity to mutual funds in distress. This 
liquidity provision can be primarily explained by public information quality. Most 
notably, CNSSF can profit by assisting distressed mutual funds, especially if such 
liquidity provision relates to private information. In addition, this bailout-like 
behavior is not speculative and can positively improve the performance of the 
distressed mutual funds. 
In essay 2, we propose a new measure of the policy information advantage 
available to the CNSSF. Specifically, we assess the impact of this policy-linked 
“information advantage” on stock performance. Our results show that in the short run, 
there is a positive and significant information advantage-stock performance linkage. 
Moreover, our findings support the view that CNSSF promotes the absorption of 
inside information into prices. In contrast, in the long run, the policy information 
advantage of the CNSSF negatively decreases the firm operation performance. Finally, 
we document that there is an information network spillover of the information 
advantage across the Chinese mutual fund industry, which also affects mutual fund 
performance.  
In the third essay, we propose a smooth non-parametric estimation to explore the 
safety-first portfolio optimization problem. As an empirical application, we simulate 
optimal portfolios and display return-risk characteristics using the CNSSF strategic 
stocks. We obtain a non-parametric estimation calculation formula for loss (truncated) 
probability using the kernel estimator of the portfolio returns’ cumulative distribution 
function, and embed it into two types of safety-first portfolio selection models. We 
numerically and empirically test our non-parametric method to demonstrate its 
accuracy and efficiency. Cross-validation results show that our non-parametric kernel 
estimation method outperforms the empirical distribution method.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze the existence and impact of the political 
actions of a large government backed institutional investor - the Chinese National Social 
Security Fund (CNSSF). This thesis comprises three empirical essays that address different 
aspects of the CNSSF and its impact on the Chinese financial markets. The papers are 
presented in chapters 2, 3, and 4. The first paper addresses the trading motivations of the 
CNSSF and its bail-out role in the Chinese mutual fund industry. The second paper explores 
the identification of the political information advantage held by the CNSSF and its impact 
on firm performance. In the third paper a smooth nonparametric optimization method is 
proposed and applied to the strategic stocks of the CNSSF in the safety-first framework. The 
papers are flanked by overall introduction and conclusion chapters. The first chapter 
provides a background for, and establishes the importance of, studying the CNSSF. Further, 
this chapter presents an overview and motivation for each of the studies, followed by a brief 
commentary on their individual contributions to the literature. Chapter 5 provides an 
over-arching conclusion, draws together key themes evident across the essays and identifies 
areas for future research. 
 
1.1. General Background and Motivation for studying the CNSSF 
The CNSSF is part of the Chinese pension fund system. It is a strategic reserve fund for 
the Chinese social security system designed to provide for a range of social security needs 
for an ageing population in China.
1
 The CNSSF is an investment fund with funds that are 
sourced from the financial allocation of the ministry of finance. The assets arise from a 
variety of sources including government allocations, the sale of state-owned enterprises and 
other state funds including state lottery fees and investment income (Leckie and Pan, 2006).  
There is disagreement in the literature regarding what the CNSSF really represents. On 
one hand, the CNSSF meets the most important criteria of a government-backed investor 
proposed by Bortolotti et al. (2015). Even though 40 percent of the CNSSF assets are 
invested in risky assets, Bortolotti et al. (2015) assume the CNSSF is a pension fund and 
excludes it from the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) list. However, the CNSSF does not 
recognise any liabilities to beneficiaries, leading Knill et al. (2012) to treat the CNSSF as a 
SWF.  
In this thesis, the CNSSF is treated as a state-sponsored investor and we relate our work 
                                                        
1 For more detailed introduction, please see Leckie and Pan (2006). 
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to the studies on SWFs and American pension funds. Notably, there are no redemptions from 
the CNSSF; hence, in this regard the fund is less constrained than a typical mutual fund. 
Pollet and Willson (2008) argue that investment constraints significantly affect institutional 
investors’ trading decisions. Similarly, Ben-David et al. (2012) emphasize that investment 
constraints explain the difference in trading behavior between hedge funds and mutual 
funds.
2
 Hence, it is insightful to study the trading strategies of a fund like the CNSSF that is 
not subject to conventional investment constraints, such as redemptions or margin calls, but 
is subject to government policy constraints on risk limits and portfolio composition.
3
 
Philosophically, the objectives of government backed investors differ fundamentally from 
the “rationality” model of wealth-maximization investors, such as mutual funds. Similarly 
the objectives of public vs private pension funds in the US differ, (Woidkte, 2002). These 
differences will impact management incentives and hence decisions.  
It is rare to see research on the impact of political constraints on investment decisions. 
The unique nature of the CNSSF presents us an “ideal” setting to examine the motivations of 
an institutional investor with government backing, that will be rich with political 
considerations. In contrast to American Social Security Fund (ASSF), whose surplus is 
strictly limited to investment in government bonds, the CNSSF has become China’s leading 
institutional investor not only in size, but also in stature and influence in China’s mutual 
fund industry (Leckie and Pan, 2006). The Fund is expected to reach $1.8 trillion in 2030, 
becoming the third largest social security fund worldwide (Leckie and Pan, 2006). Figure 
1-1 provides an historical picture of its emerging influence, where Panel A shows the time 
series pattern of total assets and realized returns of this fund, while Panel B provides a 
comparison of CNSSF realized returns versus the Shanghai index, over our window of 
interest. 
The existing literature on the CNSSF is scarce and limited to the introduction of the 
CNSSF, its regulatory problems and, the institutional defects of the Chinese social security 
system (see for e.g., Leckie and Pan, 2006; Zheng, 2007; and Du and Du, 2011). The 
research presented in this thesis is the first to carry out formal analysis to allow a better 
understanding of the political actions of the CNSSF. 
                                                        
2 There is a growing body of literature on the portfolio management motivations under different constraints. For liquidity 
management, see Fortune (1997); Scholes (2000); Vayanos (2004); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005); Massa and 
Phalippou (2005); Jotikasthira et al. (2009); Brown et al. (2010); Manconi et al. (2010); Shawky and Tian (201); Huang 
(2013); while for risk management, see Vayanos (2004); Kacperczyk and Seru (2007); Kempf and Ruenzi (2008); 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); Andonov et al. (2013).  
3 The CNSSF is managed and operated by the National Council for Social Security Fund (SSF). The core investment 
policy is “Safety Priority and Prudent Investment” based on a philosophy of “Valuable Investment, Long-term Investment 
and Responsible Investment” (SSF, 2010). 
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Figure 1-1: The Chinese National Social Security Fund: 2001-2011 
This figure displays the historical performance of the Chinese National social Security Fund (CNSSF). Panel A plots the time series of the total assets (billion Yuan) and realized return (%) of 
the CNSSF. Panel B plots the time series of the realized return of the CNSSF and the market return (Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index return). The series ranges from 2001 to 2011. 
Total asset and realized return data are collected from the CNSSF annual report. Market return data are retrieved from the CSMAR data base.  
Panel A: Total assets and realized return Panel B: CNSSF and Shanghai stock exchange composite index performance 
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Figure 1-2: Quarterly Plot of CNSSF Equity Holdings 
 
Panel A CNSSF total holding values divided by market capitalization 
 
Panel B CNSSF average holding weights (holding volume divided by outstading shares) 
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1.2. Paper 1: Superman in the Dark: Trading behavior of the CNSSF 
1.2.1 Paper 1: Overview and motivation  
The CNSSF can exploit its informational advantage to obtain positive abnormal returns 
(Liu and Tang, 2011) in Chinese stock markets.
4
 This action is inconsistent with the passive 
investor hypothesis (Bortolotti et al., 2015). Liu and Zhang, (2011) find that there is a 
significant and positive domestic market response to CNSSF portfolio holding information. 
Figure 1-2 plots the quarterly evolution of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite index 
and CNSSF equity holdings to illustrate the CNSSF’s active management process. Panel A 
displays CNSSF total holding values divided by market capitalization and Panel B shows the 
CNSSF average stock holding weights measured by holding shares divided by outstanding 
shares. This figure shows that the CNSSF considerably increased its holdings from early 
2005 to quarter 2, 2006 when the Chinese government initiated some major market reforms 
(split structure reform
5
 and exchange rate reform). While these reforms helped spur a bull 
market, the CNSSF actively decreased its stock positions. In quarter 3, 2007, the CNSSF 
substantially decreased its market exposure while the market index peaked. During the crisis, 
the CNSSF stabilized its equity holdings – there is very little variation from the 4th quarter 
of 2007.
6
 The graph is consistent with the CNSSF displaying good timing and asset 
reallocation ability. However, the extent to which this activity was fortuitous or reflects skill 
is an open question.  
In this first thesis paper, we use CNSSF portfolio holdings and trading activity to 
explore its trading motives before and after the financial crises. We also explore the linkage 
between the CNSSF and Chinese domestic mutual funds from the perspective of liquidity 
provision trades. This issue is particularly important during times of financial market turmoil 
where liquidity provision is a major focus when the markets are suffering from evaporating 
liquidity (Nagel, 2012). In this context, we hypothesize that the CNSSF is the last resort for 
institutions (especially for mutual funds) in the Chinese stock market. Preliminary data 
supports our contention. Figure 1-3 shows quarterly series of rescued and distressed mutual 
fund ratios.
7
 We find that immediately before the financial crisis, the distressed mutual fund 
                                                        
4 The Chinese stock market was first established to recapitalise and restructure state owned enterprises. The state still holds 
the controlling shareholding in many organisations and has the dual role of regulator and blockholder. The firm’s objective 
is not always the maximisation of shareholder wealth. Allen et al (2012) provide an overview of the political nature and 
characteristics of the Chinese financial market. 
5 Prior to the reform, shares could be classified as either restricted or freely-tradable. Post reform, all shares can be traded 
on the exchange. 
6 We measure the crisis period from 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q1. 
7 A distressed fund is defined as fund experiencing two consecutive quarters of fund flows less than a threshold (zero or 
-10%)  A mutual fund is considered ‘rescued’ if the CNSSF buys shares from a ‘distressed fund’ within the subsequent 
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ratio, with negative fund flows greater than -10%, increased significantly; however, during 
the financial crisis, the distressed mutual fund ratio with fund flows less than zero climbed. 
In both cases, the rescued ratio is stable, on average 78% (66%) for funds with fund flows 
less than zero (-10%) These representations are consistent with our hypothesis that the 
CNSSF effectively provides liquidity to distressed mutual funds.  
Figure 1-4 provides further motivation for our analysis. Panel A (Figures 1-4) plots the 
quarterly pattern of aggregate mutual fund distress (where distress is defined as 2 quarters of 
fund outflows less than a given threshold, 0%). In essence this graph shows that leading into 
Quarter 1, 2006 and at the beginning of the financial crisis (Q3, 2007), aggregate distress of 
mutual funds is high. Panel B (Figures 1-4) plots the quarterly pattern of liquidity provision 
trading undertaken by the CNSSF. The plot is consistent with the CNSSF acting as a 
liquidity provider as the crisis unfolds (picking up in Q3/Q4, 2007). However, there exists 
no formal analysis testing whether the liquidity provision trades can improve the 
performance of mutual funds in distress or if it is a pure speculative strategy. Accordingly, 
the analysis seeks to answer this open question. 
The idea to discuss the bail-out trade between the CNSSF and mutual funds is inspired 
by recent literature that evaluates interactive behavior between different types of managers, 
especially mutual funds that experience extreme fund flows. Specifically we draw on 
literature that analyses: investors trading against fire sales from mutual funds (Coval and 
Stafford, 2007; Chotibhak et al., 2012); hedge funds profiting from distressed mutual funds 
(Chen et al., 2008); mutual fund managers benefiting from providing liquidity to such 
distressed funds (Zhang, 2009); and firm managers capturing seasoned equity offerings 
(SEO) from mutual funds with huge inflows (Khan et al. 2012).  
We expect that liquidity provision, from the CNSSF to distressed mutual funds, is 
significantly affected by information quality. More specifically, we argue that liquidity 
provision, based on private information, plays a significant role that materially affects the 
financial performance of the CNSSF. Our work is related to studies that examine the impact 
of information quality on the stock picking choices. Fund managers’ stock-selection skill 
stems from information quality in the market that separates them from imitators (Zhang, 
2009, Da et al. 2011). Ng (2011) shows that, for a stock, higher information quality is 
associated with lower systematic risk and that the reduction in the cost of capital due to this 
association is economically significant. Further, inspired by Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), 
                                                                                                                                                                          
two quarters. The rescued ratio is measured by the number of rescued funds divided by the number of distressed funds. 
Distressed ratio is measured by the number of distressed funds divide by the number of equity funds.  
15 
 
who emphasize the impact of mutual fund managers’ private information on their allocation 
decisions, we test the impact of the CNSSF’ private information on its performance. 
 
1.2.2 Paper 1: Contribution 
This first thesis paper adds new knowledge to the literature that analyses the impacts of 
constraints on trading behaviors. A body of literature supports the premise that investment 
constraints significantly affect institutional investors’ trading choice (Pollet and Willson, 
2008). Hence, it is insightful to study the trading strategies of a fund that is not subject to 
conventional investment constraints, such as redemptions or margin calls, but is subject to 
government policy constraints on risk limits and portfolio composition.8 It is rare to see 
research on the impact of political constraints on investment decisions. In this paper we 
compare the trading motives of the CNSSF, who operate in a political environment 
(Bortolotti et al., 2015) with other types of managed funds with different constraints. 
Further, contrasting the existing literature, that tests if state-sponsored investors can earn 
abnormal returns (see, Knill et al., 2012; Kotter and Lel, 2011; Bortolotti et al., 2015), we 
offer new analysis that explores if a state sponsored investor can play a ‘last resort’ role in 
the stock markets, analogous to role that central banks play in banking systems. We also 
check the relation between liquidity provision behavior and information quality. We first 
document the relation between liquidity provision behavior and public information quality to 
help understand the CNSSF’s choice of stocks to provide liquidity.  
 
 
                                                        
8 The CNSSF is managed and operated by the National Council for Social Security Fund (SSF). The core investment 
policy is “Safety Priority and Prudent Investment” based on a philosophy of “Valuable Investment, Long-term Investment 
and Responsible Investment” (SSF, 2010). 
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Figure 1-3: Quarterly Plot of Rescued Mutual Fund Ratio and Distressed Mutual Fund Ratio 
A distressed fund is defined as fund experiencing two consecutive quarters of fund flows less than a threshold (zero or -10%)  A mutual fund is considered ‘rescued’ if the CNSSF buys shares 
from a ‘distressed fund’ within the subsequent two quarters. The rescued ratio is measured by the number of rescued funds divided by the number of distressed funds. Distressed ratio is 
measured by the number of distressed funds divide by the number of equity funds. 
Panel A. Quarterly Plot of Rescued Mutual Funds Ratio and Distressed Mutual Fund Ratio (Fund flow less than Zero) 
 
year Rescued ratio (%) Distressed ratio (%) 
2005 98.75 21.61 
2006 84.27 23.59 
2007 66.53 16.38 
2008 70.48 44.15 
2009 74.82 48.63 
2010 77.94 49.12 
2011 71.79 47.19 
Grand Average 77.80 35.80 
 
Panel B. Quarterly Plot of Rescued Mutual Funds Ratio and Distressed Mutual Fund Ratio (Negative fund flow great than -10%) 
 
year Rescued ratio (%) Distressed ratio (%) 
2005 100.00 3.78 
2006 84.65 15.60 
2007 68.49 12.13 
2008 65.63 5.37 
2009 45.25 5.76 
2010 52.12 6.48 
2011 47.22 3.20 
Grand Average 66.24 7.64 
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Figure 1-4: Chinese Mutual Fund Aggregate Distress and Liquidity Provision Trading by the CNSSF 
This figure plots the Chinese mutual fund aggregate distress and liquidity provision trading by the CNSSF from 2005 Q1 to 2011 Q4. Panel A plots quarterly mutual fund Aggregate Distress. We 
calculate the quarterly percentage fund-flow for each equity mutual fund. A mutual fund is considered to be in distress if it experiences consecutively two quarters fund outflows less than a 
given threshold (0% in this graph). Aggregate Distress, is defined as an asset-under-management-weighted average of: i) percentage outflows from mutual funds in distress; and ii) zero for 
mutual funds not in distress. Panel B plots quarterly Liquidity Provision Trading of CNSSF. We use turnover adjusted Liquidity Provide Trade (LPT). LPT is defined as the dollar value of 
fire-sale stocks purchased by the CNSSF at the end of the quarter, divided by the total purchases made by the CNSSF during the quarter. Fire-sale stocks are those sold by mutual funds in 
distress.  
Panel A. Quarterly Plot of Chinese Mutual Fund Aggregate Distress Panel B. Quarterly Plot of Liquidity Provision Trading by the CNSSF 
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1.3. Paper 2: Political information advantage, firm value and information network 
1.3.1. Paper 2: Overview and Motivation  
The typical nature of a government institutional investor produces a likely conflict 
arising from the dual purpose associated with its decision objectives. On the one hand, it 
aims to pursue wealth maximization like mutual funds and other types of institution 
investors. On the other hand, its government linkage, among other things, requires a 
consideration of political intervention, social welfare (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), tunneling 
effects (Johnson et al., 2000), and agency conflicts (Banerjee, 1997). These alternative 
perspectives lend naturally to potential countervailing influences. Hence, canvassing the 
impact of the activities of government-backed investors on firm value is a loaded question.  
It is widely believed, within the local investment community, that the CNSSF has 
privileged information on the government macro control and industry policy, especially 
when state-owned enterprises dominate the Chinese stock market (Allen et al., 2012).
9
 
From a research perspective, the CNSSF concentrates on the domestic market
10
 and its 
domestic focus conveniently creates a closed environment, allowing us to more cleanly 
identify the impacts of policy information content on the value of firms. In addition, 
domestic government-backed investors have more impact on firm values than foreign 
investors (Bortolotti et al., 2015). The CNSSF’s portfolio allocations reflect its political 
connections (Li et al., 2015). Its investment strategies are not limited to wealth 
maximization but are placed more on safety-first, value-oriented and long-term investment 
(Impavido et al., 2009). Specifically, Knill et al., (2012) argue that the government creates a 
monopoly-type environment to safely protect its assets at home. Hence, the special structure 
and unique role of the CNSSF in the Chinese market allows us to reliably assess how the 
CNSSF policy information advantage can be impounded into the asset prices (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980).  
Accordingly, the aim of thesis paper 2 is to test the impact of the CNSSF’s policy 
information advantage on firm value and to identify if there is a spillover of this advantage 
to networks in the Chinese mutual fund industry. 
The national council for the social security fund is in charge of the CNSSF management. 
However, few studies realize or recognize that the national council for social security funds 
                                                        
9 Huang et al. (2014) state the importance of policy information and document that an individual fund manager with a 
government background outperforms his/her peers in the Chinese stock markets. 
10 This is unlike the Chinese sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), such as China international capital corporation (CICC) and 
state administration of foreign exchange, who diversify their assets globally. 
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only directly invests about 60 percent of the CNSSF’s total assets in risk-free assets. The 
management of the risky assets held by the CNSSF is outsourced to the top fund firms. 
These fund firms also manage portfolios independent of the CNSSF. However, there exists a 
clear separation between the mutual fund management and the CNSSF portfolio 
management teams within the same fund firm. This division manifests through many facets 
of the organizational structure, including exclusive investment teams, offices, auditors and 
dealers. This dualistic management setting (Cici et al., 2010) helps to create a convenient 
setting to identify the holding difference between the CNSSF and mutual funds in the same 
fund firm and to further capture the CNSSF’s motivations. Accordingly, we argue that these 
unique conditions allow us to reasonably infer that performance/risk deviations between the 
CNSSF versus mutual funds in the same fund firm are, other things equal, driven by the 
policy information advantage. Consequently, the deviations between the CNSSF stock 
holdings and the holdings of mutual funds reflect valuable and unique policy information 
advantage bestowed upon the CNSSF. 
Although there are extensive studies on the government-backed investors, critics have 
emerged. Evidence on the abnormal returns captured by government-backed investors can 
also be found in other institutional investors’ transactions (Klein and Zur 2009; Greenwood 
and Schoar, 2009). Bortolotti et al. (2015) state that a government-backed investor may 
share similar characteristics with other types of institutional investors and thus it is 
necessary to measure the effects of government backed investors by setting other types of 
institutional investors as a benchmark. They find that, although the government-backed 
investors can obtain abnormal returns around announcement dates, the returns are 
significantly lower than the comparable private financial firms. 
Three hypotheses on the state sponsored investors arise with contradictory predictions. 
The superior monitor hypothesis (SMH) is based on the view that the government backed 
investor generally seeks a long-term investment and has incentives to monitor firms. This 
monitoring might increase the value of the firm by improving corporate governance 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Li et al., 2006; Knill et al., 2012). From another angle, the 
political agenda hypothesis (PAH) suggests that differing interests between a 
state-sponsoring investor with noncommercial objectives and other shareholders could 
decrease the firm value (Woidtke, 2002). From yet another perspective, the passive investor 
hypothesis (PIH) points out that government backed investors tend to passively acquire large 
stakes in response to concerns about political opponents. This action implies efficient 
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participation in corporate governance is limited and this can decrease firm value (Bortolotti 
et al., 2015). By controlling the characteristics of the conventional institutional investors, 
our work tries to reconcile these three hypotheses. 
1.3.2. Paper 2: Contribution 
In the spirit of Bortolotti et al. (2015), we open a new angle to gauge the impact of 
government backed investors on firm value both in the short- and long-term. We emphasize 
that in previous studies on “dual-purpose” investors, the major difficulty lies in how to filter 
the effect of mixed types of information (Lemmon et al., 2000). That is, the political purpose 
for a government backed institutional investor is opaque and concealed in a low information 
environment (Leuz et al., 2003). We argue that the separation of the profit motive from the 
institutional role, and the political goal from government role, is a serious omission in the 
debate (Kotter and Lel, 2011; Knill et al., 2012). Different from the existing literature 
concentrating on event study abnormal returns, we propose a new method that uses holding 
differences to calibrate the political goal and its impacts. As such, we argue that the 
deviations of the CNSSF from its counterparts represent valuable information that affects 
asset prices and that the deviations are a reliable proxy for the policy information. This 
information advantage is largely ignored or effectively camouflaged in previous research 
(Cohen et al., 2005; Blocher, 2013; Braverman and Minca, 2014; Hunter et al., 2014). In 
addition, we seek to identify the evidence of mutual funds hunting for the CNSSF’s political 
motivations by network techniques. In the conventional family level network, profitable 
ideas have a natural “spillover” effect across a developing network (Gray et al., 2012). To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to examine the structure of the network, 
within which the CNSSF functions, to analyze spillovers of the CNSSF’s political 
information to mutual funds. 
 
1.4. Paper 3: The CNSSF strategic stocks and non-parametric optimization 
1.4.1. Paper 3: Overview and motivation  
As the leading institutional investor, the CNSSF’s stock holdings are the bellwether for 
the market (Leckie and Pan, 2006; Duan et al., 2010). In the third thesis paper we focus on 
its strategic stock asset. Blake et al. (1999) state that, for pension funds, strategic asset 
allocation (long-run allocation of funds) accounts for most of the time series variation in 
portfolio returns, while market timing and asset selection appear to be far less important.
 
In 
this paper, strategic stock assets refer to those stocks that the CNSSF never sold during the 
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financial crisis. We propose a smooth non-parametric optimization method to detect the 
characteristics of the strategic stocks, which is helpful when exploring the risk management 
motive of the CNSSF. One of the stated objectives of the CNSSF is to ensure safety and 
liquidity. Given the high level of risk aversion adopted by the CNSSF, the safety first 
portfolio selection model provides a powerful tool to study portfolio optimization in the 
financial crisis. 
The literature includes various applications of safety-first selection models including the 
study of, asset-liability management problems (Chiu et al., 2009; 2012), the behavior 
patterns of investment strategies (Li et al.,1998; Li et al., 2010) and, farming land allocation 
problems (Haley, 2012). Several studies also compare the safety-first portfolio selection 
models with mean-variance portfolio selection models (see, for example, Pyle and 
Turnovsky, 1970; Haque and Varela, 2010). Ding and Zhang (2009) investigate risky asset 
pricing models based on the safety-first model. However, these studies show that it is 
difficult to directly solve the safety-first (or chance constrained) formulation. Two key 
problems are identified. First, some scholars investigate the safety-first model under the 
assumption that asset returns follow some special distributional form (for the static case) or 
stochastic process (for the dynamic case). For example, Ding and Zhang (2009) apply an 
elliptical distribution, Ruszczyński (2002) a known discrete distribution and Chiu et al. 
(2012) geometric Brownian motion. However, such assumptions cannot reflect the real 
world since financial markets are complex, and in most cases we know little about the 
distributional form of asset returns. Second, some papers enlarge the loss (truncated) 
probability to its upper bound by applying the Chebyshev inequality, and replace the loss 
probability by its upper bound. A surrogate problem of the safety-first formulation is solved 
by minimizing this upper bound (e.g., Roy, 1952; Chiu and Li, 2009). Other bounds (less 
conservative than the Chebychev ones) have been used to replace the loss probability (see, 
for example, Bonami and Lejeune, 2009, Lejeune, 2011 and Gotoh and Takeda, 2012). 
However, these bounds are only the approximate value of the loss probability.  
It is well known that the nonparametric estimation methods need not make distributional 
assumptions and the computation results are completely driven by market data (Li and 
Racine, 2007). Recently, a section of literature concentrates on the application of 
nonparametric estimation methods to compute financial risk. For instance, Silvapulle and 
Granger (2001), Chen and Tang (2005), Jeong and Kang (2009), Schaumburg (2012) and 
Alemany et al. (2013) study the nonparametric formula for VaR; Scaillet (2004), Cai and 
22 
 
Wang (2008), Chen (2008) and Yu et al. (2010) investigate the nonparametric CVaR 
estimator. However, these papers largely ignore optimal portfolio strategy problems. 
Although in Norkin (1993) and Shapiro (2009), the idea of kernel estimations has been used 
to estimate the probability function in chance constrained frameworks, they do not consider 
the portfolio optimization problem. In paper 2 of this thesis, our work addresses this missing 
link. 
 
1.4.2. Paper 3: Contribution 
In the third paper, we apply a nonparametric method, based on smooth kernel estimation, 
to investigate safety-first portfolio selection problems. Notably, in our models, no 
assumption is imposed on the distributional form of the assets’ returns, nor is the Chebyshev 
inequality used. We make two contributions. First, we study two safety-first portfolio 
optimization problems under the nonparametric kernel estimation framework. Second, 
simulation and empirical results based on the CNSSF strategic stocks show that our NPK 
approach outperforms the EMD estimation method (Haley, 2008). Compared with the EMD 
estimation method, the main advantage is that our NPK portfolio optimization method is 
smooth, retains convergence properties and is computationally tractable. Hence, most 
smooth optimization techniques can be used to solve our models. 
 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
The remaining sections of this thesis are organized as follows.  
Chapter 2 presents presented the first paper that analyses the trading behaviors of the 
CNSSF and especially the liquidity provision from the CNSSF to mutual funds in distress. 
Section 2.1 outlines the research questions. Section 2.2 introduces data and sample selection. 
Sections 2.3 to 2.5 presents the discussion of empirical results and Section 2.6 summarises 
the key finding of the paper. In Chapter 3, paper 2 is presented. This paper identifies the 
political information advantage held by the CNSSF. Section 3.1 details the research 
questions. Section 3.2 outlines methods. Section 3.3 presents the data and sample selection. 
Section 3.4 reports the short term analyses of CNSSF impacting on firm value and the long  
term empirical findings are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 provides results of spillover 
analyses. Conclusions for this paper are discussed in Section 3.7 Chapter 4 represents the 
third paper and documents the smooth nonparametric optimization method. Section 4.1 
introduces the motivations in detail. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the literature. 
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Section 4.3 presents our nonparametric estimation formula of loss probability and constructs 
two types of safety-first criterion portfolio selection models: mean-TSF (Telser Safety-First) 
and mean-VaR models. In Section 4.4 the numerical analyzes of the accuracy and 
effectiveness of the NPK and EMD methods by Monte Carlo simulation are explained. 
Section 4.5 displays the advantage of our NPK method statically and dynamically based on 
real world data. Section 4.6 provides a summary of this chapter. Finally Chapter 5 presents 
overall conclusions and directions for future research 
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CHAPTER 2: Superman in the Dark: Trading behavior of the CNSSF  
2.1. Introduction 
In this paper, our core research goal is twofold. First, using portfolio holdings data, we 
identify the trading behavior of the Chinese National Social Security Fund (CNSSF) with 
political constraints during the financial crisis. Second, we hypothesis that the CNSSF plays 
a central-bank-like role in the stock market by providing liquidity to mutual funds in distress. 
Our empirical results indicate that this ‘bailout-like’ behavior is of mutual benefit to both the 
CNSSF and distressed mutual funds.  
We contend that the CNSSF is like “Superman” in Chinese financial markets, not only 
because of its dominant strength (excellent market stature and timing performance, Figure 
1-2) but also, because of its ability to help “save” the weak (actively bails out distressed 
mutual funds, Figure 1-3). Our analysis of the trading behavior of the CNSSF uniquely 
augments the stock of finance knowledge. 
 
2.2. Research Objectives 
Three related questions are addressed: i) what are the CNSSF’s trading motives? ii) does 
the CNSSF act as a speculator by providing liquidity to mutual funds in distress or trading to 
gain mutual benefits? iii) what role does information quality play in the CNSSF’s investment 
strategy? 
Moreover, the CNSSF, like Superman, does not behave in a fully transparent fashion, 
due to its notoriously opaque trading records, similar to other types of state sponsored 
investors (Bortolotti et al., 2015). The annual reports from the CNSSF do not disclose 
detailed stock holding information. Further, the fund managers of the CNSSF are strictly 
bound by confidentiality and rarely discuss their operations. Fund managers must meet 
criteria set by the CNSSF and be specially licensed. For a given portfolio of the CNSSF, 
there is no public information about the fund manager, asset allocations or performance. As 
such, a certain mystery attaches to the trading behavior of the CNSSF – like “Superman” 
acting in the dark. Therefore, we aim to shine a much needed torch on this unique fund. We 
gather trading information (indirectly) via quarterly and annual reports of listed companies 
to collect holdings data to test trading behavior of the CNSSF.  
With our first research question, the recent financial crisis creates a valuable 
experimental setting to explore trading motives during stressful market times (Anand et al., 
2013). Pino and Yermo (2010) state that social security funds were affected by the financial 
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crisis – both in terms of investment losses and more importantly, because it weakened their 
underlying financial soundness. Accordingly, we compare CNSSF trading motives before 
and during the financial crisis. Our results show that the CNSSF contrasts investment styles 
displayed by mutual funds and hedge funds. The CNSSF also implements a distinctive 
rebalancing strategy. While it sold high risk stocks actively before the crisis, it has bought 
back such stocks during the crisis, effectively maintaining the growth opportunity 
characteristic of the portfolio. This supports the theoretical prediction by Kacprcayk and 
Seru (2007) and is consistent with empirical findings of US public pension funds (Andonov 
et al., 2013). Moreover, the CNSSF was a leading (in the sense of timing) seller of less 
liquid stocks during the crisis, consistent with the view expressed by Brown et al. (2010) 
that managers choose to concentrate their holdings in liquid stocks over periods in which 
they expect future liquidity problems. 
With our second research question, we examine two aspects. On the one hand, we assess 
whether the CNSSF earns positive returns by providing liquidity to mutual funds in distress. 
Generally speaking, uncertainty during times of market stress and tight risk management, 
tend to lower liquidity provision and even cause market liquidity deterioration (Vayanos, 
2004; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2007; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Huang and Wang, 
2009). The CNSSF is the social liquidity provider in the domestic stock markets. It also has 
the responsibility, as the government’s representative, to help prevent excessively volatile 
markets. Our evidence shows that the CNSSF increases its position in stocks, to match the 
selling pressure coming from mutual funds in distress (where distress is defined as two 
consecutive quarters of outflows), thereby sending positive and reassuring signals to the 
market and to stabilize market sentiment. Our results bring new information to the literature 
documenting that the state-sponsored investor creates liquidity for the institutional investors 
in the stock market. It is very similar to a central bank role in a financial crisis aiming to 
stabilize the banking system. We simultaneously provide direct and indirect evidence to 
support the hypothesis that liquidity provision for distressed mutual funds, significantly 
affects the performance of the CNSSF. This hypothesis builds on the combined work of 
Chen et al. (2008) and Zhang (2009). Our work is also related to Shive and Yun (2013) who 
document that hedge funds capture profit after waiting for mutual funds’ outflows. 
On the other hand, we determine if the liquidity provided by the CNSSF can improve the 
performance of the individual mutual funds in distress. This analysis is related to the 
dynamic liquidity preference hypothesis (Huang, 2013) that argues liquidity provision might 
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be a speculation strategy. Based on individual mutual fund level analyses, we find that, for 
the distressed mutual funds, the liquidity provision behavior of the CNSSF significantly 
improves their performance in the next period, even after controlling for market factors. This 
result implies that the CNSSF, as a social liquidity provider, not only makes profits by 
implementing liquidity provision trading, but can effectively improve the performance of 
mutual funds in distress. In this way, the CNSSF is actually a market stabilizer just like the 
role that central banks play as lenders of last resort. 
Our third research question examines the relation between liquidity provision and 
information quality. Zhang (2009) highlights the strategy of liquidity provision to distressed 
funds is difficult to imitate because it requires skill and information to identify exogenous 
fire-sale stocks. We find that public information quality has a significant impact on liquidity 
provision. Furthermore, we emphasize the role of private information in explaining liquidity 
provision trading. We assess the impact of private information on the CNSSF, not only 
because being a government body should afford it a major informational advantage, but also 
because of its timing ability to enter and exit the market. We find that when we control the 
public information influence of liquidity provision trading, private information significantly 
affects the performance of the CNSSF. This is related to the works of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and Jiang et al. (2007), that private information should provide investors with the 
opportunity to earn greater returns and market timing funds tend to use non-public 
information to predict market returns.  
 
2.3. Data Description 
Almost 40 percent of total assets under management by the CNSSF are invested in the 
Chinese stock market. The CNSSF can either be directly invested in assets, or indirectly 
invested through licensed investment managers. Direct investments can only be in bank 
deposits or government bonds. For all other types of investment, the CNSSF needs to 
appoint fund managers and custodians approved by the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security of the People’s Republic of China. As a special client of fund companies, the 
managers of the CNSSF sign entrusted investment contracts to constrain portfolio managers’ 
behavior and provide some guiding principles, for example, value orientated investments, 
long-term investments, long-term evaluation systems, and rebalancing strategies. Although 
the CNSSF portfolio managers enjoy the same research platform as other mutual fund 
managers who focus on the same fund companies, the CNSSF is strictly isolated from other 
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mutual funds products. There are independent investment teams, independent office areas, 
independent monitoring and audit, and independent traders for the CNSSF managers (Yue, 
2012). 
Since detailed investment information is not publicly available, empirical evidence is 
sparse with regard to trading behavior and associated outcomes. Our empirical strategy is to 
trace the trading behavior of the CNSSF using information from the top 10 shareholders list, 
manually extracted from the quarterly and annual reports of listed companies. All data are 
from CSMAR.
11
 The CNSSF has more than 40 different types of portfolios, uniquely 
identified by a three digit number: equity portfolios starting with 1, bond portfolios starting 
with 2, IPO portfolios starting with 5, mixed portfolios starting with 6. We choose to study 
equity portfolios that were created before 2005. This sample allows a comparison before and 
during the financial crisis. These portfolios are numbered 101-112. SSF does not report the 
performance of individual portfolios. In the spirit of Andonov et al. (2012), we use weighted 
average monthly stock returns in the portfolios to estimate the portfolio performance. The 
weight is the holding market value at the end of the previous quarter. Our sample spans 2005 
to 2011 covering the financial crisis period.  
Table 2-1 presents the descriptive statistics for portfolios 101 to 112. Although there is 
some variation in the mean returns across portfolios, the volatility for each fund is similar. 
Table 2-2 reports the quarterly changes of the CNSSF equity holdings. As shown in the table 
the pre-crisis period is specified as 2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2, the global financial crisis 
(sub-prime lending) period is 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q1 and the European debt crisis 2009 Q3 to 
2011 Q4. We note large increases in holdings pre the global financial crisis and decreases 
during the crisis. During the European debt crisis there is a mixed pattern although holdings 
increase from Q2, 2011 onwards.  
                                                        
11 CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting Research) Database is the comprehensive database for Chinese business 
research. CSMAR covers data on the Chinese stock market, financial statements and China Corporate Governance of 
Chinese Listed Firms. 
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Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics of CNSSF Equity Portfolios  
This table reports the descriptive statistics for CNSSF equity portfolios - Portfolio Nos. 101-112. Column (1) is 
portfolio ID. Column (2) reports the number of unique stocks held by the CNSSF over our sample. Column (3) 
is the fund companies managing the CNSSF portfolios. Column (4)-(7) present the summary statistics of 
monthly data from 2005 to 2011.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Portfolios # stock holdings Managed Fund Companies Mean (%) Std Min (%) Max (%) 
No. 101 151 China Southern Asset Management Co., Ltd. 4.21 14.29 -30.43 53.29 
No. 102 137 Bosera Asset Management Co., Ltd. 1.70 10.25 -23.15 32.69 
No. 103 103 Bosera Asset Management Co., Ltd. 1.47 11.25 -29.94 29.20 
No. 104 184 Penghua Fund Management Co., Ltd. 4.55 15.39 -31.24 64.45 
No. 105 69 Changsheng Fund Management Co.,Ltd. 2.93 10.50 -20.58 29.46 
No. 106 244 Harvest fund management Co.,Ltd. 3.24 12.77 -38.28 49.66 
No. 107 187 China Asset Management Co., Ltd. 3.33 15.25 -52.20 38.59 
No. 108 144 Harvest fund management Co.,Ltd. 2.09 10.31 -26.37 27.54 
No. 109 218 E Fund Management Co., ltd 3.83 11.59 -25.46 35.00 
No. 110 171 China Merchants Fund Management Co., Ltd. 3.38 11.81 -21.32 30.62 
No. 111 107 Guotai Fund Management Co., Ltd. 1.90 11.81 -27.43 24.01 
No. 112 58 China International Capital Co., Ltd 1.81 14.30 -29.70 38.02 
 
Table 2-2:  Quarterly Changes in CNSSF Equity Holdings  
This table reports the quarterly changes of CNSSF equity holdings measured as a percentage of total 
holding market value. Colum 1 shows the nature of the selloff quarter.  An activesale quarter is 
determined by quarters when holding values decrease before crisis. A firesale quarter is determined by 
quarters when holding values decrease during crisis and a blank means quarters when holding values 
increase over our sample. In column 3, we show the change, from the previous period, in CNSSF 
holdings (divided by outstanding shares)  
(1) (2) (3) 
 date Change in holdings (%) 
Pre-crisis 2005Q1-2007Q2 0.583 
subprime lending crisis 2007Q3-2009Q1 -0.133 
Europe debt crisis 2009Q3-2011Q4 -0.001 
 
2006Q1 0.249 
 
2006Q2 0.258 
Activesale Quarter 2006Q3 -0.195 
Activesale Quarter 2006Q4 -0.170 
Activesale Quarter 2007Q1 -0.167 
Activesale Quarter 2007Q2 -0.165 
Firesale Quarter 2007Q3 -0.270 
Firesale Quarter 2007Q4 -0.157 
Firesale Quarter 2008Q1 -0.033 
Firesale Quarter 2008Q2 -0.008 
 
2008Q3 0.019 
 
2008Q4 0.054 
Firesale Quarter 2009Q1 -0.008 
Firesale Quarter 2009Q2 -0.012 
 
2009Q3 0.055 
Firesale Quarter 2009Q4 -0.039 
Firesale Quarter 2010Q1 -0.040 
 
2010Q2 0.003 
 
2010Q3 0.061 
Firesale Quarter 2010Q4 -0.019 
Firesale Quarter 2011Q1 -0.040 
 
2011Q2 0.037 
 
2011Q3 0.005 
 
2011Q4 0.031 
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2.4. The CNSSF Trading Motives During the Financial Crisis 
To examine the trading motives of the CNSSF, we model change in CNSSF holdings as 
a function of stock characteristics (Ben-David et al., 2012; Huang, 2013). The model is 
presented in equation (2-1). The dependent variable is the quarterly aggregate change in 
capitalization (scaled by outstanding market capitalization) for each stock 𝑖 by the CNSSF, 
across portfolios 101-112. We include a series of indicator variables as independent 
variables to reflect the trading preferences on these characteristics. 
 
 ∆𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿
𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑡 ∗  𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉
𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑡 ∗  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑄𝑡 ∗
 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐵𝑀
𝑆 𝑆𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝑅
𝑆 𝑆𝑄𝑡 ∗  𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝐵𝑀 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (2-1) 
 
where; 
 
𝑆𝑄 is the selloff quarter indicator. 𝑆𝑄 = 1, if the stock is bought/sold by CNSSF in the 
selloff quarters; otherwise, 𝑆𝑄 = 0. The selloff quarter division is listed in the Table 2. 
 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 1, if stock 𝑖 is in the top half of the illiquidity distribution in quarter 𝑡; 
otherwise 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 0. Stock illiquidity is defined by the average ratio of the absolute 
value of daily returns to dollar volume in the quarter (Amihud, 2002). 
  
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 1, if stock 𝑖 belongs in the top half of the volatility distribution in quarter 𝑡; 
otherwise 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 0 . Volatility is measured by the previous 24 monthly return 
standard deviation up to the beginning of quarter t. 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 1, if stock 𝑖 is in the top half of the size distribution in quarter 𝑡; otherwise 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 0. Size is the market capitalization at the end of the quarter.  
 
𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 1 if stock 𝑖 is in the top half of the book-to-market ratio distribution in 
quarter 𝑡; otherwise 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 0.  
 
𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 1 if stock 𝑖 is in the top half of the high average return distribution in quarter 
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𝑡; otherwise 𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 0. Average return is assessed for the previous six months before 
the beginning of quarter t.  
 
We emphasize the sell-side motive because the expected return premium is affected 
more by sell-side trades (Brennan et al., 2012). The interaction terms involving 𝑆𝑄 and the 
stock characteristic indicator variables are our main focus. Equation (2-1) is also re-tested by 
dividing selloff quarters (𝑆𝑄) into two types as a sub-period analysis. One is active sale 
quarters (𝐴𝑄) before the financial crisis, while the other is fire sale quarters (𝐹𝑄) during the 
financial crisis. We aim to compare different trading motives under different market states.  
Brown et al. (2010) and Huang (2013) propose the liquidity preference hypothesis. This 
hypothesis argues that investors will try to preserve liquidity to meet such needs in the future. 
As a long-term investor and social liquidity provider (Leckie and Pan, 2006), the CNSSF 
might have an incentive to implement a liquidity preference strategy. Hence, we would 
expect a negative relation between the CNSSF holdings and illiquidity preference in the 
selloff quarters. Thus, in the context of Equation (2-1): 
H1 (Liquidity Preference Hypothesis): 𝛽𝐿
𝑆 < 0. 
Speculators are forced to reduce exposure to risky assets in bad times (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009). However, informed investors increase their risky asset holdings when the 
market is in decline (Kacpercayk and Seru, 2007). We use 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 as the stock risk measure 
to assess the risk management preference of the CNSSF with an information advantage (Liu 
and Tang, 2011). A negative coefficient is expected on this variable. More formally in the 
context of Equation (2-1): 
H2 (Risk Management Preference Hypothesis): 𝛽𝑉
𝑆 < 0. 
The CNSSF must adhere to value-oriented and long-term investment principles. We use 
 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 as proxies for mispriced stocks (Fama and French, 1993). If the CNSSF 
are able to identify these opportunities we would expect a positive relation between these 
variables and the change in holdings. More formally in the context of Equation (2-1): 
H3 (Mispricing Hypothesis): 𝛽𝑆
𝑆,  𝛽𝐵𝑀
𝑆 > 0. 
The results from Equation (2-1) are presented in Table 3. Panels A, B and C present 
results corresponding to all sell-off quarters, active sale quarters, and fire sale quarters, 
respectively. 
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Table 2-3: CNSSF Trading and Stock Characteristics 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the random effect panel regression (2-1) for CNSSF holding 
change on a set of indicator variables. The dependent variable is the change in CNSSF’s fund holdings as a 
percentage of market capitalization outstanding. The explanatory variables include indicator variables that 
equal one if the stock characteristics are above median in the quarter, and Sale quarter dummy variables that 
equal one if in the fire sale quarter or active quarter sale, and their interactions. The variables are: Volatility 
(estimated using 24 prior monthly returns), Illiquidity (average Amihud ratio in quarter t), Size (market 
capitalization), Book-to-market (the book value divided by market value at the end of the quarter) and Past 
6-month returns. Lagged Holdings is the ownership in the previous quarter as a control variable. Z values are 
reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The 
sample period is 2005 to 2011. 
  
 Panel A: All Quarters 
Sample 
Panel B: Pre-crisis Active 
Sale Sample 
Panel C: Crisis Fire Sale 
Sample 
Variable  Selloff = SQ Selloff = AQ Selloff = FQ 
Selloff 𝛽 -0.124 -0.106 -0.090 
 
 (-0.762) (-0.461) (-0.534) 
Selloff×Illiquidity Indicator 𝛽𝐿
𝑆 -0.201* 0.073 -0.244* 
 
 (-1.674) (0.436) (-1.928) 
Selloff×High Volatility 
Indicator 
𝛽𝑉
𝑆 
0.088 -0.352** 0.316*** 
 
 (0.811) (-2.269) (2.755) 
Selloff×High Size Indicator 𝛽𝑆
𝑆 -0.204* -0.031 -0.196* 
 
 (-1.658) (-0.185) (-1.913) 
Selloff×High Book-to-market 
Indicator 
𝛽𝐵𝑀
𝑆  
0.027 -0.016 0.017 
 
 (0.243) (-0.099) (0.142) 
Selloff×High Past 6M return 
Indicator 
𝛽𝑃𝑅
𝑆  
-0.385*** -0.430*** -0.167 
 
 (-3.567) (-2.840) (-1.452) 
Illiquidity Indicator 𝛽𝐿 0.231*** 0.122* 0.211*** 
 
 (2.721) (1.869) (2.841) 
High Volatility Indicator 𝛽𝑉 -0.134*** -0.403 -0.209*** 
 
 (-1.757) (-0.732) (-3.106) 
High Size Indicator 𝛽𝑆 -0.033 -0.133** -0.078 
 
 (-0.376) (-1.973) (-1.010) 
High Book-to-market 
Indicator 
𝛽𝐵𝑀 
0.076 0.087 0.084 
 
 (0.989) (1.459) (1.233) 
High Past 6M return Indicator 𝛽𝑃𝑅 0.014 -0.105* -0.119* 
 
 (0.183) (-1.792) (-1.790) 
Lagged ∆𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹  holdings 
(%) 
𝛾 
0.076*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 
 
 (6.549) (7.016) (7.317) 
Constant 𝛼 0.249** 0.209** 0.230** 
 
 (2.146) (2.366) (2.256) 
Obs.  7,392 7,392 7,392 
R2  0.026 0.021 0.018 
Firm FE  YES YES YES 
F  16.40 13.21 10.96 
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Generally, consistent with H1 the results show that liquidity is managed. A negative 
coefficient estimate on the interaction variable with the illiquidity indicator (𝛽𝐿
𝑆) shows that 
the CNSSF sells illiquid stocks in the sell-off quarters (Panel A) and in the fire sale quarters 
(Panel C). This result is in contrast with the previous literature wherein mutual funds and 
hedge funds preferentially sell liquid securities first, when the market experiences a 
pronounced decline, to minimize price impact (Brown et al., 2010; Scholes, 2000; 
Jotikasthira et al., 2009; Fortune, 1997; Manconi et al., 2010). However, the CNSSF 
postpones selling liquid stocks, perhaps showing a liquidity precaution motive consistent 
with the liquidity preference hypothesis of Brown et al. (2000) and/or the goal to capture 
future trading opportunities (Anand et al., 2013; Huang, 2013). Thus, hypothesis H1 is 
supported. 
Brown et al. (2010) argue that if investors could foresee future liquidity shortages, they 
would keep liquid stocks as a precaution. The CNSSF has an incentive to keep liquidity 
during the crisis, consistent with its status as a social liquidity provider. For trading purposes, 
Huang (2013) proposes a dynamic liquidity preference hypothesis to suggest that investors 
keep liquidity allowing them to better exploit future trading opportunities. Our evidence is 
consistent with this hypothesis. Anand et al. (2013) show that buy-side institutions tend to 
tilt trading activity toward liquid stocks. Such behavior can be viewed as a market-timing 
strategy. The dynamic preference for liquidity is more pronounced among funds exposed to 
investor withdrawal risk and funds with superior stock-picking skills.  
Noting that CNSSF cannot be constrained by investor withdrawal risk; it could be 
preparing a liquidity buffer aiming to capture alpha opportunities from mutual funds in 
distress. According to cash-in-the market theory, portfolio liquidity management by market 
participants’ affects asset prices (Allen and Gale, 2005). Allen and Gale (2005) show that in 
an incomplete market, liquidity supply cannot prevent large price fluctuations. There is an 
opportunity cost of holding liquidity and participants can recover this if they can buy assets 
at fire-sale prices. However, as shown in our later analysis, the CNSSF’s liquidity holding 
behavior positively affects its subsequent performance. We argue that this 
liquidity-performance linkage could be due to the CNSSF’s information advantage, 
strengthening the price discovery functions in its liquidity provision trades (O’Hara, 2003).  
The coefficient, 𝛽𝑉
𝑆, shows the CNSSF has opposite trading patterns before and during 
the crisis with respect to controlling portfolio risk. Before the financial crisis, a negative 
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estimated coefficient on the interaction term with volatility indicator (𝛽𝑉
𝑆) shows that the 
CNSSF actively sells high volatility stocks to decrease portfolio risk (Panel B). This result is 
consistent with the CNSSF having ability to anticipate the forthcoming market downturn. 
Thus, H2 – the risk management preference hypothesis is supported. In contrast, during the 
crisis, a positive estimated coefficient on the interaction term with volatility suggests that the 
CNSSF reverts back to holding high volatility stocks (Panel C).  
According to the limits-to-arbitrage theory, speculators are forced to reduce exposure to 
risky assets in bad times or follow a flight to quality/safety (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009). Our findings support the view that good public information lowers holdings in risky 
assets by informed investors. Conversely, bad public information boosts these holdings 
(Kacpercayk and Seru, 2007). Andonov et al. (2013) find similar results in US public 
pension funds. They attribute this to a direct incentive to transfer risk to future generations 
and the distinct regulatory environment pertaining to public pension funds. 
Regarding H3, the insignificant 𝛽𝑆
𝑆 coefficient does not support a size effect in the 
active sale quarters (Panel B). However, CNSSF sells large stocks in all the selloff quarters 
(Panel A) and in the fire sale quarters (Panel C), consistent with the CNSSF holding more 
state owned companies. In addition, H3 is further lacking in empirical support as there is no 
book-to market effect (𝛽𝐵𝑀
𝑆 ) in the selloff quarters (Panel A, B and C). This result suggests 
that the CNSSF adopts a value-oriented long-term investment strategy and prefers not to sell 
underpriced assets easily. Such behavior differs from hedge fund or mutual fund short 
horizon strategies that can sacrifice long-term benefits (Ben-David, 2012). Our findings are 
consistent with the view that valuation-motivated fund managers possess a greater ability to 
value stocks excluding liquidity constraint effects (Alexander et al., 2007). Notably, the 
estimated negative coefficient on the interaction term involving the average return indicator, 
𝛽𝑃𝑅
𝑆 , shows that, in the active sale quarters (Panel A and B), the CNSSF sells the better 
performing stocks. Overall, these results are consistent with the view that CNSSF follows 
safety-first strategies during selloff quarters.  
 
2.5. Is the CNSSF a Speculator Or a Superman In the Dark? 
To address the extent to which there is strategic gaming by the CNSSF with mutual 
funds, we design a regression model to investigate whether the CNSSF profits from 
distressed mutual funds. To this end, we define a mutual fund in distress if it experiences 
two consecutive quarters of outflows (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Zhang, 
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2009). That is 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡,𝑡−1 < 0 .
12
 We calculate quarterly 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡  for each 
mutual fund 𝑗 in quarter 𝑡, as: 
 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−(1+𝑟𝑗,𝑡)𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
   (2-2) 
where 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1 is total net assets under management at the end of the previous quarter, and 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the return over the period. 
We employ an augmented Fama and French (1993) and Liu (2006) model as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑃𝑇𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑃𝑇𝑘,𝑡−1 +
𝛾3𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡    (2-3) 
 
where: 
 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑘,𝑡 is monthly value-weighted average excess return on portfolios numbered 
101-112. 
 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the excess return on the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. 
 
SMBt  is the difference between small and large portfolio returns, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the 
difference between high and low book-to-market portfolio returns (following Fama and 
French, 1993), and 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 is the difference between low and high liquidity portfolio returns (Liu et al., 2011; 
Huang, 2013).  
 
𝐿𝑃𝑇𝑘,𝑡 is defined as fire-sale stock purchases divided by total purchases of portfolio k 
in quarter 𝑡, a proxy for liquidity provision trade (Zhang, 2009). That is: 
 
 𝐿𝑃𝑇𝑘,𝑡 =
∑ (𝑚𝑎 𝑥(0,∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡))i∈𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑡
 (2-4) 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡, Aggregate Distress, is defined as an asset-under-management-weighted average 
                                                        
12 In robustness analysis, we also test the case of 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡,𝑡−1 < −10% and the results are similar. 
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of: i) percentage outflows from mutual funds in distress less than a given threshold; and 
ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress.
13
  
 
 𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = ∑
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑗∗𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡,𝑡−1<0)∗𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑗
   (2-5) 
 
To identify fire-sale stocks we construct a ‘fire sale pressure’ variable (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡). 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is defined for each stock 𝑖 as the sum of all shares that are sold by distressed 
funds in a quarter, divided by outstanding shares in the previous quarter. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ (𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0,−∆𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡)|𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡,𝑡−1<0)𝑗
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
   (2-6) 
Stocks with selling pressure above the 90th percentile in quarter 𝑡 are considered 
fire-sale stocks (Chen et al., 2008; Zhang, 2009).  
Related to the work of Chen et al., (2008) and Zhang (2009), we expect liquidity 
provision trading and aggregate distress (AD) to positively impact CNSSF performance. 
More formally, in the context of Equation (2-3): 
H4 (Speculator Hypothesis): 𝛾1,𝛾2, 𝛾3, 𝛾4 > 0. 
Our analysis of CNSSF trading behavior shows evidence that CNSSF keeps a liquidity 
buffer which can be exploited in future trading opportunities. Table 4 presents the estimation 
results for equation (2-3), allowing further analysis of liquidity preference trading.  
Columns (1) and (2) show results using two alternative definitions of distressed mutual 
funds: funds experiencing two consecutive quarters of outflow greater than 0 and 10%, 
respectively. 
  
                                                        
13 Similar to Chen et al. (2008), we also test equal-weighted average and the results are robust. 
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Table 2-4:  Regression Results for CNSSF Equity Portfolios examining the 
Performance-Liquidity Provision Trading Linkage 
This table reports the outcome of estimating regression (2-3) that investigates the effects of liquidity provision 
trading within CNSSF equity portfolios. Two variations are reported: Column (1) is when mutual funds suffer 
from two consecutive quarters outflow and Column (2) is when mutual funds suffer from two consecutive 
quarters outflow great than 10%. Liquidity provision trading is measured as the dollar value of fire-sale stocks 
purchased by a CNSSF portfolio at the end of the quarter. Fire-sale stocks are identified both in the current 
quarter and in the previous quarter. The pooled sample consists of 554 portfolio-months from 2005 to 2011. 
MKT is the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, SMB is the return on a portfolio that is long 
small stocks and short large stocks, HML is the return on a portfolio that is long value stocks and short growth 
stocks, and LIQ is constructed using the difference between the return on the portfolio with highest transaction 
cost (lowest liquidity) stocks and the return on the portfolio with lowest transaction cost (highest liquidity) 
stocks. Aggregate Distress is defined as an assets-under-management-weighted average of: i) percentage 
outflows from mutual funds in distress less than a given threshold; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress. 
Z values are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  
Variable Coefficient (1) (2) 
MKT 𝛽1 
1.081*** 
(39.02) 
1.004*** 
(14.14) 
SMB 𝛽2 
-0.285*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.0834 
(-0.52) 
HML 𝛽3 
0.159** 
(1.8) 
0.185 
(0.86) 
LIQ 𝛽4 
0.283*** 
(2.46) 
0.0225 
(0.1) 
LPT 𝛾1 
-0.00445* 
(-1.71) 
-0.0314*** 
(-2.93) 
Lagged LPT 𝛾2 
0.00455* 
(1.75) 
0.00802 
(0.73) 
Distress 𝛾3 
-0.0406*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.0292* 
(-1.74) 
Lagged Distress 𝛾4 
0.0424*** 
(4.47) 
0.0310* 
(1.90) 
Intercept 𝛼0 
0.0858 
(1.1) 
0.143 
(0.62) 
Obs. 
Wald 
 
554 
1688.45 
114 
326.6 
p-value  0.00 0.00 
R2  0.7563 0.7585 
 
Contrary to the prediction in H4, we find significant negative effects of liquidity 
provision trading on contemporaneous performance (𝛾1) and positive lagged effects (𝛾2). 
Liquidity provision is a type of buy-and-hold strategy. Its effects will reveal in the lagged 
period when prices begin to recover (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Zhang, 2009). The 
contemporaneous negative effects can be attributed to the momentum effect of stock prices. 
Grinblatt et al. (1995) find that the majority of the mutual funds are momentum investors 
and this feature can exacerbate price over-overshooting, even after the CNSSF has provided 
liquidity. We also find significant negative effects of contemporaneous mutual fund 
aggregate distress (𝛾3) and lagged positive effects (𝛾4). These findings are consistent with 
Chen et al. (2008) who contend that though mutual fund distress has a causal impact on 
hedge-fund profitability, hedge funds could gain more in the future due to a socially valuable 
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liquidity provision. Generally, the results are consistent with the CNSSF implementing a 
strategy deriving benefit from funds in distress.
14
 
On the other side, we carry out individual mutual fund level analyses to identify whether 
these distressed mutual funds benefit from the liquidity provision strategy of the CNSSF. 
Pointing to an individual mutual fund 𝑗 in quarter 𝑡, we define a variable 𝐿𝐵𝐶𝑗,𝑡  to 
measure the liquidity benefit from the CNSSF across 12 portfolios. We measure 𝐿𝐵𝐶𝑗,𝑡 
using the minimum of the market value of stocks sold by an individual mutual fund and 
market value of the net stocks bought by the 12 CNSSF portfolios, divided by total net asset 
value of individual fund 𝑗 in the previous quarter. 
𝐿𝐵𝐶𝑗,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖 𝑛(𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
,𝑁𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹/𝑀𝑖)∗𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1
      (2-7) 
where: 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 is the number of stock 𝑖 sold by the mutual fund 𝑗 in the quarter 𝑡. 
 𝑁𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹 is the number of total stocks, net bought by the CNSSF portfolios across 
No.101-112 in the quarter 𝑡. 
 𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the volume weighted average price of stock 𝑖 in the quarter 𝑡. 
𝑁 is the number of stocks held by the mutual fund 𝑗 in the quarter 𝑡. 
𝑀𝑖 is the number of funds holding the stock 𝑖 in the quarter 𝑡. Here, we implicitly 
suppose the CNSSF uniformly distributes its liquidity provision on these mutual funds. 
In other words, we assume these mutual funds can acquire liquidity provision from the 
CNSSF with equal probability. 
We argue that the liquidity provision measure in Equation (2-4) is a conservative 
estimate, because the CNSSF may consecutively provide liquidity in the quarters following 
the initial occurrence of mutual fund distress. Here, we propose a more reliable measure. We 
define consecutive liquidity provision, 𝐶𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑡 , by summing the liquidity benefit within the 
next two quarters subsequent to the first distress event:  
𝐶𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝐿𝐵𝐶𝑗,𝑡−𝑙
2
𝑙=0 )       (2-8) 
where:  
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy variable. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 1 if the fund outflows  are less than a threshold. 
We set different thresholds. These are 0 and -10%.  
We model the performance of mutual funds once experiencing distress pressure as a 
                                                        
14 It is noted that the results are stronger when distress is defined as two consecutive fund flows < 0. When distress is 
defined as <-10%, lagged LPT is no longer significant. 
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function of the 𝐶𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑡 after controlling funds’ characteristics. 
𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐶𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐹𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐹𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛿7𝐹𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡      (2-9) 
where: 
𝐹𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is the mutual fund 𝑗 performance in quarter 𝑡, measured using CAPM model 
alpha, Fama-French three factor model alpha, Carhart four factor model alpha and LIQ 
five factor model alpha, 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡 is the natural log of total net asset value of a mutual fund 𝑗 in quarter 𝑡.  
𝐹𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗,𝑡 is the expenses of the fund 𝑗 divided by the fund size. 
𝐹𝑇𝑂𝑗,𝑡 is the percentage turnover of the fund 𝑗 in quarter 𝑡. A fund turnover is the 
average of the bought stocks Yuan volume and the sold stocks Yuan volume divided by 
the fund size in the quarter 𝑡. 
𝐹𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡  is the number of quarters since the fund 𝑗  establishment date. The log 
function is applied.  
𝐹𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 is the percentage change from quarter 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 in the fund 𝑗 total net 
assets minus the fund quarterly return. 
We predict that the mutual funds in distress could benefit from the liquidity provision 
from the CNSSF. More formally, in the context of Equation (2-9): 
H5 (Superman Hypothesis): 𝛿2 > 0. 
 We document that the liquidity provision by the CNSSF can significantly improve the 
performance of distressed mutual funds in the next period. Table 5 presents the estimation 
results for Equation (29). Panel A (Columns (1) to (4)) show results for distressed funds 
experiencing two consecutive quarters of outflow less than 0 while Panel B (Columns (5) to 
(8)) for fund flows less than -10%. 
Consistent with the prediction in H5, we find significant positive effects of CLP on the 
next quarter’s performance (𝛿2). This result implies that the CNSSF is not behaving like a 
speculator when it implements liquidity provision trading in the Chinese stock markets but 
can effectively improve the performance of mutual funds in distress, even after controlling 
market factors and fund characteristics. Further, we find the lagged fund performance 
negatively affects the future fund performance, implying a return reversal effect in the 
Chinese fund markets. We also document that fund size, fund expense and age adversely 
affect fund performance, consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2004)  
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Table 2-5:  Regression Results for Individual Mutual Funds examining the Performance-Liquidity Provision Trading Linkage 
This table reports the outcome of estimating regression (2-9) that investigates the effects of liquidity provision trading on the performance of distressed mutual funds. Two 
variations are reported: Panel A (Column (1) to (4)) is when mutual funds suffer from two consecutive quarters outflow and Panel B (Column (5) to (8)) is when mutual funds 
suffer from two consecutive quarters outflow greater than 10%. The CNSSF liquidity provision (CLP) trading is measured as the dollar value of stocks purchased by 12 
CNSSF portfolios within the next two distressed quarters. The pooled sample consists of 3394 fund-quarters from 2005 to 2011. We also select the fund characteristic 
variables as control variables. FSize is the log of total net asset value. FTO is the the average of the bought stocks Yuan volume and the sold stocks Yuan volume divided by 
the fund size. FAge is the log of the number of quarters since the fund establishment. FExp is the expenses of the fund divided by the fund size. Fflow is the percentage 
change in the fund total net assets minus the fund quarterly return. T values are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Panel A: Fundflowt,t-1<0 Panel B: Fundflowt,t-1<-10% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable CAPM Fama-French Carhart  LIQ CAPM Fama-French Carhart  LIQ 
CLP 0.001** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 
 
(2.162) (2.525) (2.759) (3.168) (2.814) (1.837) (1.732) (2.098) 
lag_FP 0.011 -0.082*** -0.066*** -0.046*** -0.013 -0.094*** -0.079*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.680) (-4.473) (-3.603) (-2.742) (-0.676) (-4.554) (-3.842) (-3.193) 
FSize -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 
(-7.037) (-6.909) (-6.699) (-7.137) (-5.709) (-5.839) (-5.668) (-6.162) 
FExp -2.777*** -1.066*** -1.014*** -0.866*** -2.682*** -1.125*** -1.126*** -1.003*** 
 
(-8.907) (-3.808) (-3.630) (-3.230) (-7.706) (-3.616) (-3.616) (-3.345) 
FTO 0.012*** 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.012*** 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(4.809) (1.019) (1.230) (0.585) (4.247) (0.871) (1.123) (0.647) 
FAge -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 
(-6.613) (-5.103) (-6.310) (-5.095) (-5.764) (-4.850) (-5.978) (-4.996) 
Fflow -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(-1.334) (0.926) (0.610) (0.755) (-1.940) (0.643) (0.391) (0.501) 
Constant 0.223*** 0.166*** 0.171*** 0.163*** 0.202*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.157*** 
 
(9.796) (8.108) (8.353) (8.269) (8.350) (7.198) (7.500) (7.526) 
R-squared 0.073 0.045 0.048 0.045 0.070 0.047 0.050 0.047 
F Stat. 35.23 20.95 22.32 20.81 26.43 17.13 18.36 17.37 
Fund Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
40 
 
 
2.6. What Drives the Liquidity Provision Trades of the CNSSF? 
In this section, we assess the effects of information quality on the liquidity provision 
decision. Ng (2011) defines information quality as an information characteristic of a firm 
that affects the degree of (i) uncertainty over the firm’s value and/or (ii) adverse selection 
when trades in the firm’s stock occur (Verrecchia, 2001; Easley et al., 2002; Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004). To this end, we create a random effects panel regression15 of liquidity 
provision trading on a set of public information quality variables.  
𝐿𝑃𝑇𝑘,𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑄𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑄𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑘,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛼 𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡   (2-10) 
where: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑘,𝑡  is the first proxy for Earning Precision and is calculated as the standard 
deviation of ROA (earnings deflated by average total assets) 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑘,𝑡 is the second proxy for Earnings Precision and is calculated as the standard 
deviation of earnings divided by standard deviation of cash flows from operations over 
the most recent five years (Dichev and Tang, 2009). 
  
𝐴𝑐𝑄𝑘,𝑡, an inverse proxy for accounting accrual quality, is measured by the standard 
deviation of residuals from the cross-section regression as specified below, for each of 
22 industry groups for 5 fiscal years (Francis et al., 2005):
16
 
 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = ∅0 + ∅1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∅2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ∅3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + ∅4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + ∅5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is total current 
accruals, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is cash flow from operations, 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is net 
income before extraordinary items, ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is change in current assets, ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡  is 
change in current liabilities, ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is change in cash, ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is change in debt 
in current liabilities, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is depreciation and amortization expense, ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is 
change in revenues, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross of plant, property and equipment. All variables 
                                                        
15 The random effect approach allows us to include unobserved heterogeneity (Laird and Ware, 1982) into the residuals as 
a proxy for private information of the CNSSF. 
16 Also see Abarbanell et al. (1995); Dechow and Dichev (2002); Francis et al. (2005); Dichev and Tang (2009); and Ng 
(2011). 
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are standardized by subtracting the cross-year mean and dividing by the associated 
cross-year standard deviation. 
 
𝐴𝐶𝑘,𝑡 is Analyst consensus computed as the inter-analyst standard deviation of EPS 
forecasts deflated by stock price at the time when the standard deviation is computed.
17
 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑄𝑘,𝑡  is an aggregate information quality proxy, calculated as the sum of the 
standardized values of 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑘,𝑡 , 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑘,𝑡 , 𝐴𝑐𝑄𝑘,𝑡  and 𝐴𝐶𝑘,𝑡 . These variables are 
standardized by the standard deviation of all firms within each year.
18
  
 
Given that higher standard deviations represent lower information quality, we switch the 
sign of all the proxy variables, such that higher values of the transformed volatility variable 
reflect higher information quality (Ng, 2011). Because smaller firms and firms with less 
analyst coverage are believed to have less information available in the market that affects 
information asymmetry and information diffusion (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hong et al., 
2000), we use 𝐴𝑔𝑒 and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 as control variables to reflect information transparency and 
asymmetry. We expect that CNSSF prefers information precision when it provides liquidity 
to fire sale stocks. More formally, in the context of Equation (2-10): 
H6 (Information Quality Hypothesis): 𝛽5 > 0. 
 
Next, controlling for the impact of public information, we test for CNSSF private 
information effects on performance itself. In the spirit of Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), we 
adopt the combined residuals of the random effect regression 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘,𝑡  from liquidity 
provision trading on public information quality as the proxy for liquidity provision trading 
based on its own private information (𝑃𝑇𝑃𝐼). Accordingly, the following panel regression is 
estimated: 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝜑1𝑃𝑇𝑃𝐼𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑃𝑇𝑃𝐼𝑘,𝑡−1 +
𝜑3𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   (2-11) 
where all the variables are as previously defined.  
Da et al., (2011) state that the value added from trade decisions on mispriced securities is 
dependent on how long it takes for the market to agree with the manager’s view. Therefore, 
                                                        
17
 To compute Analyst consensus, we require that at least three analysts cover the firm. 
18 Since we take the standard deviation of all stocks but leave the year constant, material multicollinearity issues are 
avoided between AgQ, ROA, CFO, AcQ and AC.  
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we make no directional prediction with respect to the coefficients and therefore test them in 
null form, which in the context of Equation (2-11): 
H7 (Private Information Hypothesis): 𝜑1 = 0, 𝜑2 = 0.
19
 
The results for Equation (2-10) are presented in Table 6. Here we see that when mutual 
funds suffer from consecutive outflows < 0 (i.e. Columns (1 and 2), there is a negative 
estimated coefficient on aggregate quality ( 𝛽5 ). Similarly the coefficient on analyst 
consensus is also negative. This result is inconsistent with expectations derived from H5. 
Generally, the market would prefer to provide liquidity by purchasing stocks with higher 
quality information. Further, when the market declines, investors are less willing to provide 
liquidity to the stocks with less accurate information (Ng, 2011) resulting in the 
overshooting of prices. However, the CNSSF could be using its informational advantage to 
capture this type of opportunity and/or they might prefer to trade stocks with more growth 
opportunities. We note that size (𝛽7) positively affects the LPT. This result is consistent with 
expectations as there is less information asymmetry for larger firms.   
Turning to columns 3 and 4, where the definition of mutual distress is more dire (i.e., 
situations in which mutual funds suffer from consecutive outflows of greater than 10%), the 
CNSSF prefers higher quality information when trading stocks to provide liquidity. Now, 
consistent with H5, the estimated coefficient on aggregate quality, 𝛽5, is significantly 
positive as are 3 of the 4 individual quality measures (𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4). Once again, as expected, 
the size of listed companies positively affects the LPT. It seems that, in cases of very 
distressed funds, the CNSSF is primarily concerned with providing liquidity via large stocks 
with quality information. This result potentially reflects the quality of holdings of the 
distressed funds, as we would expect the more distressed funds to be holding lower quality 
stocks. However, we do see that younger firms are preferred, and this characteristic might 
well reflect the CNSSF’s information advantage over newer firms. 
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Table 2-6: Regression Results for CNSSF Equity Portfolios examining the Liquidity Provision Trading-Information Quality Linkage 
This table reports the outcome of estimating the random effect regression (2-10) that investigates the effects of public information quality on social liquidity provision trading by the CNSSF in equity portfolios. The 
pooled sample consists of 185 portfolio-quarters from 2005 to 2011. Two variations are reported: Column (1) and (2) are when mutual funds suffer from two consecutive quarters outflow and Column (3) and (4) are 
when mutual funds suffer from two consecutive quarters outflow great than 10%. Public information quality is the equal weighted sum of proxy variables of companies in which the CNSSF decides to increase holdings 
when they are fire-sold. ROA is the negative of the standard deviation of the ratio of earnings to total assets. CFO is the negative of the standard deviation of earnings scaled by the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations. Accruals quality is the negative of the standard deviation of the residuals from regressions of total current accruals on cash flow from operations in the prior, current and following years; change in revenues; 
and gross plant, property and equipment. Analyst consensus is the inter-analyst standard deviation of net income forecasts scaled by their average value. Aggregate quality is the sum of standardized earning precisions. 
For Accruals quality and Analyst consensus, the standardization is done by dividing each individual proxy by the standard deviation of the proxy for all firms within the period. Additional control variables are the age 
of the companies defined as the natural logarithm of (1+AGE) and size defined as the natural logarithm of market value. Z values are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively.   
Variable Coefficient 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Fundflowt,t-1<0 Panel B: Fundflowt,t-1<-10% 
ROA  𝛽1 
0.142 
(0.49) 
 -1.849*** 
(-3.14) 
 
CFO 𝛽2 
-1.270 
(-0.57) 
 20.548*** 
(6.51) 
 
Accruals Quality 𝛽3 
-1.441 
(-0.27) 
 32.804*** 
(4.73) 
 
Analyst consensus 𝛽4 
-0.141*** 
(-3.03) 
 0.976*** 
(4.39) 
 
Aggregate quality 𝛽5 
-3.796** 
(-2.02) 
-5.106*** 
(-5.46) 
10.187*** 
(4.04) 
1.621* 
(1.66) 
Age 𝛽6 
3.580 
(1.20) 
5.225** 
(1.82) 
-17.824*** 
(-5.61) 
-12.566*** 
(-3.62) 
Size 𝛽7 
5.448*** 
(6.92) 
5.161*** 
(6.59) 
160.894*** 
(12.83) 
141.116*** 
(9.87) 
Intercept 𝜇 
0.750 
(0.10) 
-2.956 
(0.39) 
70.705*** 
(7.55) 
51.260*** 
(5.23) 
Wald  116.07 104.55 207.92 109.84 
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  0.1630 0.1471 0.4602 0.2886 
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 Table 2-7 presents the results from estimating equation (2-11) for the two alternative 
definitions of distressed funds: (a) fund flow < 0 in column (1) and (b) fund flow < -10% in 
column (2). As the results are consistent for both levels of distress, the discussion that 
follows will not distinguish them. First, we see that there is a significant negative relation 
between PTPI and the performance of CNSSF (𝜑1), but a significant positive relation 
between lagged PTPI and performance (𝜑2). These results suggest that when mutual funds 
are in distress, the CNSSF benefits from trading based on its own information; however, 
only in the subsequent period. The estimated positive coefficient on the variable “lagged 
distressed” is also consistent with the benefits of trading with distressed funds being realized 
in the subsequent period.  
Our findings are consistent with Christoffersen et al. (2008) who documents that active 
management delivers both cheaper trades and better subsequent performance. Our results 
provide indirect evidence that rational managers have the option not to trade stocks when 
they do not have an informational advantage (Da et al., 2011). Hence, the CNSSF can 
impose greater weight on stocks with more growth opportunities. Size of listed companies 
also positively affects the LPT. This analysis addresses the importance of information 
transmission, consistent with the findings of Da et al. (2011). That is, liquidity provision 
appears more important for funds trading large stocks with low private information events 
where there is little adverse selection risk (Easley et al., 2002; Da et al., 2011). 
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Table 2-7: Regression Results for CNSSF Equity Portfolios examining the Performance-Private Information Linkage 
This table reports the outcome of estimating regression (2-11) that investigates the effects of liquidity provision trading by the CNSSF in equity portfolios based on their private information. Two variations are reported: 
Column (1) is when mutual funds suffer from two consecutive quarters outflow and Column (2) is when mutual funds suffer from two consecutive quarters outflow greater than 10%. The dependent variable 𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐹𝑘,𝑡 
is monthly value-weighted average excess return on portfolios numbered 101-112. Liquidity provision trading based on their private information (PTPI) is defined as the residuals from regressions of liquidity provision 
trading on public information quality, including earnings precision and accruals quality. The pooled sample consists of 554 portfolio-months from 2005 to 2011. MKT is the excess return on the value-weighted market 
portfolio, SMB is the return on a portfolio that is long small stocks and short large stocks, HML is the return on a portfolio that is long value stocks and short growth stocks, and LIQ is constructed using the difference 
between the return on the portfolio with highest transaction cost (lowest liquidity) stocks and the return on the portfolio with lowest transaction cost (highest liquidity) stocks. We use Distress as an indirect proxy to 
describe mutual fund sentiment affecting the performance of the CNSSF. Aggregate Distress is defined as an assets-under-management-weighted average of: i) percentage outflows from mutual funds in distress less 
than a given threshold; and ii) zero for mutual funds not in distress. Z values are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variable Coefficient 
(1)  
Fundflowt,t-1<0 
 
(2) 
Fundflowt,t-1<-10% 
 
MKT 𝛽1 
1.009*** 
(25.1) 
0.930*** 
(7.22) 
SMB 𝛽2 
-0.288 
(-1.26) 
-1.562* 
(-1.74) 
HML 𝛽3 
-0.580*** 
(-5.88) 
-0.753 
(-1.48) 
LIQ 𝛽4 
0.460** 
(1.95) 
1.699* 
(1.76) 
PTPI 𝜑1 
-0.061*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.871*** 
(-3.07) 
Lagged PTPI 𝜑2 
0.064* 
(1.70) 
0.886** 
(2.38) 
Distress 𝜑3 
-0.234*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.415** 
(-2.18) 
Lagged Distress 𝜑4 
0.240*** 
(2.83) 
0.442** 
(2.03) 
Intercept 𝛼0 
0.630 
(1.17) 
1.945 
(0.61) 
Wald  819.56 93.00 
p-value  0.00 0.00 
R2  0.6282 0.5191 
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2.7. Summary 
Chapter 2 analyzes the trading behavior of the CNSSF – a fund that operates in a 
highly political environment. We show that the CNSSF adopts a rebalancing strategy 
that maintains both portfolio liquidity and growth opportunities. Further, we find 
direct and indirect evidence that the CNSSF actively intervenes in the stock market by 
providing liquidity to mutual funds in distress. This liquidity provision can be 
primarily explained by public information quality. Most notably, CNSSF can profit by 
assisting distressed mutual funds, especially if such liquidity provision relates to 
private information. In addition, this bailout-like behavior is not speculative and can 
positively improve the performance of the distressed mutual funds. 
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CHAPTER 3: Political information advantage, firm value and information 
network 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the existence and impact of the policy 
information advantage held by the CNSSF, a government backed institutional investor. 
More specifically, we assess if the policy information advantage can impact firm 
values via short term market reaction and long term operational performance. We also 
analyze the networks that exist between the teams that manage the risky assets of the 
CNSSF portfolios and the broader managed fund industry in China. Our analysis 
examines the spillover of the policy information advantage to the information network 
in the investment industry. 
 
3.2 Research objectives 
We propose two research objectives in this paper. First, we test the CNSSF’s 
policy information advantage on the firm value after controlling for its 
return-pursuing motivations. Second, we identify the spillover of the CNSSF’s policy 
information across the information networks in the Chinese mutual fund industry. 
To address the first objective, we measure the difference between the portfolio 
holdings of the CNSSF and the mutual funds. This measure is used as a proxy for the 
CNSSF’s policy information advantage. The inspiration for this variable design comes 
from the peer deviation literature (Gupta-Mukherjee, 2013) and also aligns quite 
reasonably with the intra-family level network literature (Nanda et al., 2004; Gaspar 
et al., 2006; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008; Simutin, 2013)
1. The peers’ decisions are 
important inputs when a fund manager reallocates his portfolios (Celen and Kariv, 
2004; Gupta-Mukherjee, 2013). Thus, a fund’s “abnormal” decisions, whether they 
relate to over- or underweighting a stock in the portfolio, implies something about the 
manager’s own information exploration ability (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; 
Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Tang, 2013). Of key 
importance is that it is a risky and costly behavior if a fund manager foregoes valuable 
family-level information. Our particular contribution to the peer deviation literature is 
                                                        
1 Our research is related to but different from studies on “active” shares (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; von 
Reibnitz, 2015). These studies resort to identify the “active” deviations by choosing the passive benchmarks 
matched on mutual fund objectives (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Gupta-Mukherjee, 2013; Jiang et al., 2014). 
However, we argue any fund manager in the same family is not a stand-alone entity and previous benchmark 
methods undervalue the peer effects. In addition, the CNSSF does not passively implement a tracking index 
strategy but rather tends to pursue a strong anti-market-cycle approach (Li et al., 2014). 
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that we compare two peer groups, separated through the lens of a regulatory imposed 
divide. Therefore we introduce a new dimension to the question of how to measure a 
government backed portfolio manager’s motivations. However, since the CNSSF and 
mutual fund managers enjoy the same research platform in a given fund management 
company, in effect they face equivalent information sources. Moreover, fund 
companies in China adopt a centralized management structure. If we assume that a 
fund company induces a community or network, this centralized network (Massa, 
2003; Goyal et al., 2006) tends to create similar “best idea” stock-picking choices 
(Cohen et al., 2009; Pomorski, 2006, 2009; Jiang et al., 2014), especially when the 
valuable investment opportunities are limited (by scale) in the market place (Berk and 
Green, 2004). As such, these factors provide a strong control over the traditional 
opportunities available to the dual peer groups, thereby allowing a cleaner test of our 
“policy information advantage hypothesis”. 
We have mixed conclusions of the CNSSF’s policy information advantage on the 
firm value. For the short-term analyses, we find that there is a positive and significant 
relation between the policy information advantage and stock performance. Further the 
CNSSF actively promotes the inside information that is reflected in the asset prices 
consistent with price discovery. The policy information advantage also impacts 
systematic risk. In the long run, we find the CNSSF’s political motivations show a 
significantly negative relation with the firm operation performance. This is consistent 
with the PAH and PIH supported by Bortolotti et al., (2015). However, the CNSSF’s 
transactions with political purposes can increase the firm’s debt to asset ratio. A high 
debt to asset ratio shows higher borrowing capacity and is consistent with Bortolotti et 
al., (2015) who shows government backed firms can increase the likelihood of 
achieving loans from state-owned banks. 
Exploring our second objective, our target is to identify the role of the CNSSF 
influence in the Chinese mutual fund industry. The information network framework 
(Goyal et al., 2006) allows us to expand our analysis to determine if the policy 
information advantage can transmit to other funds either within the network or outside. 
We select the CNSSF as the center in the network and adopt ‘portfolio holdings 
overlap’ as a proxy for the connections between mutual funds and the CNSSF. We 
emphasize that it is the community or network that has considerable influence over 
the information production and dissemination (Cao and Xia, 2006; Ozsoylev, 2005; 
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Ozsoylev and Walden, 2011; Pareek, 2012). According to limited attention theory 
(Merton, 1987; Huang et al. 2007), if skilled mutual fund managers can capture the 
CNSSF’s political information, there will be information spillovers across the 
network. 
Our work, within the information network framework, shows that there are 
information spillovers across the information network in the Chinese mutual fund 
industry and that this spillover affects the performance of mutual funds. Our findings 
are consistent with the arguments of the word-of-mouth effect (Hong et al., 2005). It 
is difficult to stop information spillover among the mutual fund industry, even if there 
is strict divide between a mutual fund and the CNSSF portfolios. As such, we provide 
empirical evidence that the information networks drive the asset prices (Ozsoylev and 
Walden, 2011). Next, sitting close to the network structure, we show that the 
CNSSF’s political information positively benefits the mutual funds in the same fund 
management company as the CNSSF portfolios. This finding is highly relevant to the 
hot debate over the value of active management in the mutual fund industry. Although 
several studies state that actively managed funds fail to beat passive benchmarks,
2
 
these disheartening results trigger persistent arguments about the fund managers’ 
stock-picking skills.
3
 In this paper we identify that fund managers have the ability to 
collect useful information from this information network (Cohen et al., 2005), 
specifically from government backed investors. In contrast, mutual funds who are 
outside the CNSSF’s fund management network cannot obtain positive benefits. This 
result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Stein (2008), who states that the 
information is useful only when this is clustered around the network center. We 
provide evidence that if the investors are far from the center the information may have 
adverse impacts. This concept is omitted by previous studies. 
 
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. Overview 
There are approximately 40 CNSSF portfolios managed by the top 15 fund 
management companies in China. These portfolios have different investment 
                                                        
2 See, Jeson, 1968; Daniel et al., 1997; Berk and Green, 2004; Fama and French, 2010. 
3 For example, best ideas (Pomorski, 2009; Cohen et al., 2009), consensus wisdom (Cohen et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 
2014), value-oriented motivation (Alexender et al., 2007), private information (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007; Easley 
et al. 2010; Amihud and Goyenko, 2010), and portfolio concentration (Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Huij and Derwall, 
2011). 
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objectives, such as equity, bond, mixed, index and IPOs. Instead of estimating the 
aggregate performance of the CNSSF, we follow the constituent stocks actively 
invested by the CNSSF. By adopting this “micro” level approach, we can better 
quantify the potential benefits from the policy information advantages of the CNSSF, 
since (somewhat perversely) focusing on well-diversified portfolios obscure the 
measurement of a fund manager’s investment skill (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). 
More specifically, for a given stock, we measure the portfolio weight deviations 
between a CNSSF portfolio and the weights of this stock held by all the mutual funds 
in the same fund company across all the portfolios. The idea here is that the average 
portfolio weighting taken across all such relevant portfolios represents a reliable 
benchmark that “washes away” other “noisy” idiosyncratic factors that could affect 
individual portfolio decisions. We label this deviation the CNSSF policy information 
advantage (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴). Moreover, we sort all the stocks in our sample by the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
metric and then assess whether/to what extent the stocks with high 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 outperform 
the stocks with low 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. To provide a “deep dive” into the multi-dimensional ways 
in which the information advantage could manifest, we examine the relations between 
the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and: momentum, price synchronicity and systematic risk. We also study 
changes in the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴).  
We model a stock’s future excess return as a function of 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴), 
controlling for relevant firm characteristics. Quarterly “abnormal” returns for each 
stock are calculated using several alternative models: CAPM, Fama-French three 
factor model, Carhart four factor model and Liquidity five factor model. To further 
investigate the degree of the informational market efficiency, we extend the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
(𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴) prediction horizon from one quarter to twelve quarters.  
Next, we model the long term effects of CPIA on the firm value. We use return on 
assets (ROA), sales growth (SG), quick ratio (QR), debt to assets (DtoA) and Tobin’s 
Q (TQ) as measures of long term value across a three year period. 
Finally, we aim to assess whether and to what extent the CPIA is “transmitted” to 
the mutual funds in the same fund management company or that it might even travel 
across different companies via some form of information network effect. Borrowing 
some useful techniques from the information network literature, we designate that a 
connection exists between a CNSSF portfolio and a mutual fund if they hold in 
common at least one same stock in a given quarter. We distinguish whether a mutual 
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fund comes from the same fund management company linked to a CNSSF portfolio. 
In this latter analysis, consistent with Hong et al., (2005) Glode et al., (2012 and 
Kacperczyk (2014), mutual fund performance is modelled as a function of the CNSSF 
information network, controlling for fund company characteristics. 
 
3.3.2 Quantifying the CNSSF Policy Information Advantage (CPIA)  
In line with Pomorski (2006, 2009), we assume that surrounding a mutual fund  
is a community or an information network. Suppose that there are 𝐶 = {1,2, … 𝑐} 
CNSSF portfolios and 𝐹 = {1,2, … 𝑓} fund management companies in our sample. 
We borrow some terminology from graph theory. Specifically, there is an edge 𝑔𝑐,𝑚 
between the CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 and a mutual fund 𝑚, if they hold the same stock 𝑖 
in the period 𝑡  (Pareek, 2012). From these edges, we conceive an information 
network connecting the CNSSF and mutual funds. The collection of the CNSSF 
portfolios and the edges yield an information network 𝐺 (Goyal et al. 2006). Let 
𝑁𝑐(𝐺) = {𝑚 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑔𝑐,𝑚 ≠ 0} be the set of mutual funds who have connections with 
the CNSSF Portfolio 𝑐  in the network 𝐺 . 𝜂𝑐(𝐺) = |𝑐(𝐺)|  is the number of 
connected mutual funds of the CNSSF Portfolio 𝑐, which is referred as the degree (of 
connection). Later, we will separate these mutual funds (m) connected to the CNSSF, 
portfolio 𝑐  by classifying the mutual funds into two groups. First an ‘inside 
connected fund’ is a mutual fund that belongs to the same fund management company 
as Portfolio 𝑐 and invests in stocks that are included in the CNSSF portfolio. Second 
an ‘outside connected fund’ is a mutual fund that belongs to a fund management 
company with no direct link to the CNSSF but invests in stocks that are included in 
Portfolio 𝑐 . We seek to identify the extent to which the speed of information 
dissemination impacts the funds’ performance across all classifications.  
Given the collection of components just described, we can turn now to measuring 
the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. Unlike Pomorski (2006, 2009) and Cohen et al. (2005), who focus on an 
individual fund manager’s “best idea” stock-picking ability, consistent with the logic 
and motivation presented above, we choose to emphasize the aggregate policy 
information across all the CNSSF portfolios. Our measure is actually to highlight a 
dispersion concept among CNSSF portfolios (Jiang and Sun, 2014). Thus, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 is 
defined as: 
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 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = √
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐 )2𝐶𝑐=1 4 (3-1) 
where: 
 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐  is the stock 𝑖  weight in the CNSSF portfolio 𝑐  investment universe, 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 =
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑐 𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑗
.  The CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 𝑆𝑖
𝑐 shares of stock 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖 
is the closing price of stock 𝑖 in the end of quarter 𝑡. 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐  is the stock 𝑖 weight in the fund, at company level, where the CNSSF 𝑐 
resides. In a fund company 𝑓𝑐, as a whole, this company holds 𝑆𝑖
𝑓𝑐 shares of 
stock 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖 is the closing price of stock 𝑖 in the end of quarter 𝑡. 
Then we have the holding weights on the fund company level as 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐 =
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑆𝑗,𝑡
𝑓𝑐𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑗
5. 
𝑁 is the number of stock holdings across all the CNSSF portfolios in a given 
quarter 𝑡. 
 
Consequently, we define the change
6
 in 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (CCPIA) as: 
 
 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 (3-2) 
 
Our method is similar to Jiang and Sun (2014). In both papers, fund managers with 
an informational advantage are treated as a (homogeneous) investment group. In 
reality, the CNSSF exercises a more disciplined investment strategy than counterpart 
mutual funds. We expect robust and reliable inferences after controlling the demand 
pressure (Gompers and Metrick, 2001) and the herding behavior effects (Sias, 2004)
7
. 
Such effects could push prices far from equilibrium, such that poorly measured 
deviations would be contaminated by non-informational advantage drivers. 
The 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 value for stock 𝑖 this period is expected to have a positive effect on 
performance of stock 𝑖  next period. Formally, we have our policy information 
advantage hypothesis. 
                                                        
4 We also use an alternative measure to highlight a “consensus wisdom” concept among CNSSF portfolios (Jiang 
et al., 2014; Kacperczyk et al., 2014). This is 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐 )𝐶𝑐=1  and the results are largely similar. 
5 We also use the shares of a stock held by CNSSF or mutual funds divided by its total outstanding shares as 
another proxy. Our results are robust and upon requests. 
6 We also test percentage change of 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and results are robust. Results are upon requests.  
7 We winsorize the funds in a quarter at 1% level based on the fund flows. Fund flow is the percentage change 
total net assets minus the fund quarterly return. 
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H1: There is significant relation between the CNSSF policy information advantage 
and stock values. 
We expect that 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 can predict a stock’s performance. For a preliminary view, 
consider Figure 3-1 (Panel A), which shows the market level 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 time series from 
Q2 2005 to Q2 2014. We average across stocks’ 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 in each quarter to have 
market level 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  and compare it with market cycle (represented by the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen 300 Index). Notably, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 displays a reasonable degree of variability, 
fluctuating with the market cycle. With a rising market in 2007–2008, the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 also 
expands.  This variation implies that the CNSSF displays an aggressive attitude to 
capture profit.  In Table 3-1, we list descriptive statistics of yearly market level 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. We find after 2008, the dispersions between the CNSSF and fund companies 
have gradually decreased.
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Figure 3-1. Descriptive Statistics of 𝐂𝐏𝐈𝐀 time series. 
This figure depicts the quarterly average CPIA in the Chinese stock markets and the Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 
Index time series from Q2 2005 to Q2 2014. We calculate the standard deviation between the holding weights of 
the CNSSF portfolios and the mutual fund companies on a given stock. 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = √
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐 )2𝐶𝑐=1 . 
Where 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐  is the stock 𝑖 weight in the CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 investment universe. 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐  is the stock 𝑖 weight in 
the fund company level where the CNSSF 𝑐 lives in. The holding weights are calculated by 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑆𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑗
. 
Where, 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 is the stock 𝑘’s closed price at time 𝑡. 𝑆𝑘,𝑡 is the stock holdings in number of shares. Market level 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 is the average of 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 across stocks.  
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Table 3-1 Statistics on yearly 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 
This table reports the yearly statistics of 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 in the Chinese stock markets and the Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 
Index time series from 2004 to 2014. We calculate the standard deviation between the holding weights of the 
CNSSF portfolios and the mutual fund companies on a given stock. 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = √
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐 − 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐 )2𝐶𝑐=1 . Where 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑐  is the stock 𝑖 weight in the CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 investment universe. 𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝑓𝑐  is the stock 𝑖 weight in the fund 
company level where the CNSSF 𝑐 lives in. The holding weights are calculated by 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑆𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑗
. Where, 𝑃𝑘,𝑡 
is the stock 𝑘’s closed price at time 𝑡. 𝑆𝑘,𝑡 is the stock holdings in number of shares. Market level 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 is the 
average of 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 across stocks.  
Year N Mean Std Min Max 
2004 22 44.992 39.104 3.635 141.421 
2005 255 8.268 11.764 0.224 100.000 
2006 345 3.996 3.799 0.019 22.909 
2007 281 7.020 9.708 0.089 79.924 
2008 190 10.969 13.477 0.178 94.608 
2009 281 7.997 9.131 0.062 107.148 
2010 405 5.265 8.489 0.008 103.663 
2011 341 8.285 14.960 0.066 103.955 
2012 394 7.389 10.879 0.081 100.979 
2013 552 4.794 5.275 0.093 41.355 
2014 400 4.700 4.348 0.026 24.573 
 
The information network can extend from an intra-fund management company to 
the entire mutual fund industry. To measure the connection strength 𝑔𝑐,𝑚 between a 
CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 and a mutual fund 𝑚, we employ three alternative proxies. The 
first proxy is the number of overlapping stocks held by a CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 and 
mutual fund 𝑚 divided by the number of stock holdings in this mutual fund 𝑚. We 
denote this overlapping number of stocks metric, 𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑚, by:  
 𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑚 =
#{𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖|𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖∈{𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑐∩𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑚}}
#𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑚
 (3-3) 
The second proxy is the sum of overlapping holding weights through the holdings 
of the CNSSF 𝑐 and mutual fund 𝑚 (Elton et al. 2007). We define this overlapping 
weights metric 𝑂𝑊𝑐,𝑚 as:  
 𝑂𝑊𝑐,𝑚 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝜔𝑖,𝑐 , 𝜔𝑖,𝑚)𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖∈{𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑐∩𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑚}  (3-4) 
where 𝜔𝑖,𝑐 and 𝜔𝑖,𝑚 are the holding weights of the stock 𝑖 in the CNSSF portfolio 
𝑐 and in the mutual fund 𝑚 investment universe, respectively.  
We recognize that there are some potential biases with the previous metrics. They 
ignore how much effort a mutual fund manager might expend in uncovering valuable 
information held by the CNSSF. For example, consider two mutual funds 𝑚1 and 
𝑚2. They are both heavily exposed to one stock 𝑖, relative to a CNSSF portfolio 𝑐. 
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Specifically, their holding weights of stock 𝑖 are 𝜔𝑖,𝑚1 = 60% and 𝜔𝑖,𝑚2 = 80%, 
versus 𝜔𝑖,𝑐 = 10%.  In both cases, 𝑂𝑊𝑐,𝑚  is still 10%, and so while they are 
different in exposure, the OW metric ignores this. To address this issue, metric three is 
given by: 
 𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑐,𝑚 = ∑ ((𝜔𝑖,𝑐 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑚) 2⁄ ))𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖∈{𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑐∩𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑚    (3-5) 
According to the Limited Participation/Participation Costs perspective (Merton, 
1987; Huang et al. 2007), we predict, the stronger is 𝑔𝑐,𝑚  is, the easier the 
information flows from a CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 manager to mutual fund manager 𝑚, 
especially when they are in the same management company. Accordingly, we predict 
a positive relation between 𝑔𝑐,𝑚 and mutual fund future performance.  
 
3.4. Data 
Although the CNSSF has become the most important institutional investor in 
Chinese stock markets, its portfolio stock holdings are still very opaque. While the 
national council for social security fund discloses, overall, the CNSSF financial 
statements in its yearly report, we have little knowledge about detailed stock holdings 
and performance of each portfolio managed by fund management companies. 
However, we can trace the CNSSF stock holdings from the listed companies in the 
Chinese stock markets, since these companies disclose their top 10 outstanding 
shareholders in quarterly reports. In line with Li et al. (2014), we estimate the CNSSF 
stock holdings in this way. If a CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 shows up in the list of a company, 
we calculate the holding value of this stock (number of shares held times the price at 
the beginning of the quarter 𝑡). Then we have the holding weights of the CNSSF 
portfolio 𝑐 in quarter 𝑡. CNSSF has more than 40 different types of portfolios, 
uniquely identified by a three digit number: equity portfolios starting with “1”, bond 
portfolios starting with “2”, and so on. We choose to study equity portfolios from 
Portfolio No.101-118.
1
 Our sample comprises 1311 unique stocks (22 in 2004 to 400 
in 2014) traded by 18 CNSSF portfolios. 
Table 3-2 summarizes CNSSF basic information. The table shows that the 18 
equity portfolios are managed by 15 distinct fund management companies. Column 4 
reports the establishment date: 12 portfolios (No. 101-112) starting in 2004 and 2005 
                                                        
1 We are grateful for the Security Times in China for calculating the CNSSF stock holdings. Security Times is one 
of the top three security media outlets in China. It founded in 1993 and is managed by People’s Daily.  
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and 6 portfolios (No. 113-118) starting in 2011. Column 2 displays the number of 
unique stocks traded by each portfolio.  
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Table 3-2. The CNSSF basic information 
This table introduces the basic information of 18 CNSSF portfolios in our sample. Column 1 is the portfolio ID. 
Column 2 is the unique stocks traded by each portfolio. Column 3 is the fund management company. Column 4 is 
the CNSSF portfolio establishment date. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CNSSF 
Portfolio 
Number of unique stock 
holdings 
Fund Management Company 
First 
Date 
No. 101 172 
China Southern Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
Q3 2004 
No. 102 185 Bosera Asset Management Co., Ltd. Q3 2004 
No. 103 133 Bosera Asset Management Co., Ltd. Q3 2004 
No. 104 225 Penghua Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q3 2004 
No. 105 135 Changsheng Fund Management Co.,Ltd. Q3 2005 
No. 106 279 Harvest fund management Co.,Ltd. Q3 2004 
No. 107 232 China Asset Management Co., Ltd. Q3 2004 
No. 108 220 Harvest fund management Co.,Ltd. Q3 2004 
No. 109 260 E Fund Management Co., ltd Q2 2005 
No. 110 280 
China Merchants Fund Management Co., 
Ltd. 
Q1 2005 
No. 111 142 Guotai Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q2 2005 
No. 112 96 China International Capital Co., Ltd Q2 2005 
No. 113 21 Dacheng Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q4 2011 
No. 114 132 Penghua Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q2 2011 
No. 115 69 GF Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q3 2011 
No. 116 74 HFT Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q4 2011 
No. 117 41 
China Universal Fund Management Co., 
Ltd. 
Q4 2011 
No.118 87 Yinhua Fund Management Co., Ltd. Q2 2011 
59 
 
 
3.5 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
In table 3-3, we present the descriptive statistics showing stock selection 
preferences for, and differences between, the CNSSF and equity mutual funds We 
compare the differences across five categories: stock characteristics, stock alphas, 
stock synchronicity, stock systematic risks and long-term operation performance. We 
find that the investment stake (measured by holding shares divided by the total 
outstanding shares) of the CNSSF is more than the fund companies by 1.44%, and the 
CNSSF holds smaller size companies. This means the CNSSF holds the upper 
position to take controlling rights of a firm. In contrast, Bortolotti et al. (2015) reports 
that SWFs prefer lower stake and larger size stocks. In addition, we document that the 
CNSSF’s holdings have younger age, lower book to market ratio (BtM), but higher 
turnover ratio, implying the CNSSF likes growth stocks that may attract more 
momentum trades. With respect to other types of investors, the ownerships of 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), retail investors (retail) and other 
financial investors (OF), that overlap with the CNSSF, are all slightly lower than the 
ownership overlap between the CNSSF and the mutual funds. We find that the 
abnormal returns of stocks held by the CNSSF are significantly lower than that held 
by mutual fund management companies. This finding supports the discount 
hypothesis proposed by Bortolotti et al. (2015), where the the performance of state 
sponsored investors is poorer than their counterparts, the private financial investors. 
Interestingly, the price synchronicities are lower reflecting that the CNSSF promotes 
more firm-level information that impacts stock prices. We have mixed results about 
systematic risks. The risks loaded on the market premium (MKT) and size factor 
(SMB) are higher for the CNSSF but the value factor (HML), momentum factor 
(UMD) and liquidity factor (LIQ) are lower. Turning to the long-term performance, 
the CNSSF holds stocks with lower return on assets (ROA), sales growth (SG) and 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) and; with lower liquidity, measured by quick ratio (QR) and; lower 
leverage proxied by debt to asset ratio (DtoA). These descriptive statistics are 
consistent with findings of Bortolotti et al. (2015).
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Table 3-3. Comparisons in investment preferences between the CNSSF and fund 
management companies  
This table presents the difference in investment preference between the CNSSF and mutual fund management 
companies. We pool quarter (yearly) data to compare stock characteristics (long-term operation performance). 
We use model adjusted alpha, synchronicity, and beta depict stock short term performance, stock relation with the 
market trend, and systematic risk. Size is quarterly market value. BtM is the book value in the end of previous 
quarter divided by quarterly market value. Turnover is the quarterly turnover rate. Age is the number of quarters 
of a stock since the listed date. Stakes is the shares held by the CNSSF or equity mutual funds divided by total 
outstanding shares in a quarter. QFII is the shares of a stock held by QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors) divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. OF is the shares of a stock held by other institution 
investors, mainly including future firm, insurance firm, bank, security firm, divided by total outstanding shares in 
a quarter. Retail is shares of a stock held by retail investors divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. The 
proxy variables for long term firm value are ROA, SG, QR, DtoA and TQ. ROA is the return on the assets. SG is 
the percentage sales growth relative to the previous sales. QR is the quick ratio that is cash and equivalents 
divided by current liabilities. DtoA is the total debt to total assets ratio. TQ is the Tobin’s Q that is market valued 
divided by total assets. *** , ** , *Statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.  
 
 
CNSSF 
 
Fund Families 
 
Difference in Means 
  Mean Mean Difference T-Value 
Stock Characteristics 
Stakes (%)   2.232   0.789   1.443 92.373*** 
Size (billion Yuan)   9.077   26.962   -17.885 -22.484*** 
BtM    0.832   0.914   -0.082 -2.597*** 
Turnover (%)   123.706   104.653   19.054 16.846*** 
Age (Quarters)   33.878   35.162   -1.284 -5.227*** 
QFII (%)   0.472   0.528   -0.056 -2.745*** 
OF (%)   1.705   1.807   -0.102 -1.857* 
Retail (%)   2.440   2.574   -0.133 -1.719* 
Stock Alphas 
CAPM Alpha   0.098   0.216   -0.118 -6.600*** 
Fama-French Alpha   -0.016   0.165   -0.181 -5.591*** 
Carhart Alpha   -0.010   0.185   -0.195 -5.608*** 
LIQ Alpha   -0.015   0.155   -0.170 -3.528*** 
Stock Synchronicity 
CAPM    -0.975   -0.923   -0.052 -3.514*** 
Fama-French   -0.380   -0.323   -0.056 -5.195*** 
Carhart    -0.302   -0.230   -0.072 -6.886*** 
LIQ    -0.218   -0.135   -0.083 -7.859*** 
Stock Systematic Risk 
MKT   0.961   0.905   0.056 2.841*** 
SMB   2.279   0.986   1.293 2.731*** 
HML   -0.440   -0.203   -0.237 -1.845* 
UMD   0.219   0.480   -0.261 -1.434 
LIQ   -0.154   0.221   -0.375 -0.904 
Long-term Operation Performance 
ROA (%)   6.383   7.030   -0.646 -4.967*** 
SG (%)   27.186   1342.581   -1315.396 -0.585 
QR (%)   77.777   74.384   3.393 0.849 
DtoA (%)   46.105   47.933   -1.827 -4.195*** 
TQ (%)   125.630   136.697   -11.067 -4.008*** 
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We also identify the connections between mutual funds and the CNSSF in the 
broader Chinese mutual fund industry. We use the overlap in portfolio holdings to 
define connections. In China, a mutual fund is only required, by law, to disclose its 
entire portfolio holdings in its half-yearly and yearly reports, while in the first and 
third quarterly reports, mutual funds merely disclose the top ten most heavily 
weighted stocks in their portfolios. To control for this bias, we search for the 
undisclosed stock holdings of a mutual fund from the top 10 shareholder list of a 
listed company. If this fund is in the list of a listed company, but this company is not 
disclosed by this fund, we add the company to the holdings of the mutual fund. To 
control for demand pressure (Gompers and Metrick, 2001), we delete the mutual 
funds experiencing extreme fund inflows or outflows.
1
  
In table 3-4, we show the descriptive statistics for the inside connected funds and 
the outside connected funds. We aim to make comparisons between the connected 
funds to understand the network characteristics centered by the CNSSF. We have 516 
outside connected funds and 156 inside connected funds from 68 fund management 
companies. The connected strength is measured by the number of overlapping stocks 
(𝑂𝑁) and overlapping weights (𝑂𝑊 and 𝑂𝑊𝐴). We find the connected strength 
between the CNSSF and mutual funds outside the fund companies is stronger than the 
connection between the CNSSF and inside funds. This result implies that the outside 
mutual funds lean more on the CNSSF’s investments for the development of portfolio 
composition . We also note the outside funds perform worse than the inside funds. 
This means the information dissemination speed affects the performance of mutual 
funds. Outside funds tend to be those with smaller size, higher fund turnovers, 
younger age, higher expenses and higher fund flows. This finding implies outside 
funds tend to be more able to detect the information held by the CNSSF. 
We assign the holding weights of both mutual funds and the CNSSF to the stock 
performance data. The stock data are from China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) Database. Our sample spans Q2, 2004 to Q2, 2014, thereby 
covering pre, during and post financial crisis. 
                                                        
1 We winsorize the funds in each quarter at 1% level based on fund flows, measured as the percentage change total 
net assets minus the fund quarterly return.  
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Table 3-4. Comparisons in connected strength  
This table presents comparisons in connected strength. We classify mutual funds as inside or outside 
connected funds. An inside connected fund is a mutual fund that belongs to the fund management company that 
also manages the CNSSF portfolios and invests in stocks that are included in the CNSSF portfolio. An outside 
connected fund is a mutual fund that belongs to a fund management company with no direct link to the CNSSF 
but invests in stocks that are included in the CNSSF portfolio. In order to measure the connection strength 
between the CNSSF and mutual funds, we use overlapping number of holding stocks (𝑂𝑁), sum of overlapping 
weights (𝑂𝑊), sum of average of overlapping weights (𝑂𝑊𝐴) as proxy variables. We use four variables to 
measure the fund quarterly performance. These are the CAPM model alpha, Fama-French three factor model 
alpha, Carhart four factor model alpha and LIQ five factor model alpha. FSize is the total net asset value. FTo is 
the the average of the bought stocks Yuan volume and the sold stocks Yuan volume divided by the fund size. Age 
is the the number of quarters since the fund establishment. Expense is the expenses of the fund divided by the 
fund size. Fund flow is the percentage change in the fund total net assets minus the fund quarterly return. *** 
Statistical significance at 1%. ** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%. 
    
  
Inside    
  
Outside    
  
Difference in Means 
  N Mean N Mean Mean T-Value 
  Connected Strength 
𝑂𝑁   2159 12.386   7202 32.369   -19.983 -44.197*** 
𝑂𝑊   2159 11.356   7202 27.548   -16.192 -38.936*** 
𝑂𝑊𝐴   2159 24.815   7202 68.772   -43.957 -35.723*** 
  Fund Performance 
CAPM Alpha   2158 0.105   7180 0.045   0.060 7.258*** 
Fama-French Alpha   2158 0.080   7180 0.012   0.068 8.129*** 
Carhart Alpha   2158 0.087   7180 0.016   0.072 8.393*** 
LIQ Alpha   2158 0.089   7180 0.016   0.073 9.465*** 
  Fund Characteristics 
Fundsize (Billion Yuan)   1626 4.783   6397 3.147   1.636 12.925*** 
FTo (%)   1625 87.543   6384 113.790   -26.247 -9.419*** 
FAge (Quarters)   2159 2.781   7202 2.428   0.353 16.635*** 
FExp (%)   1626 0.973   6395 1.072   -0.099 -5.897*** 
Fundflow (%)   1626 38.926   6397 45.598   -6.672 -0.324 
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3.6. Policy Information advantage and firm short term performance 
3.6.1 Policy information advantage and abnormal returns 
To examine the relation between the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and future stock return, we model the 
performance of a stock (𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡) as a function of the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and firm characteristics as 
control variables. In our regression, the dependent variable 𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly 
performance on stock 𝑖. Stock performance is measured using various abnormal 
return measures. The abnormal returns are calculated using the CAPM, Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model, Carhart (1997) four factor model and liquidity five 
factor model (Liu, 2006). The five factor model has a general specification as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 =
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +
𝛽𝑖,𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (3-6) 
 
where, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 is the stock 𝑖 daily return for day 𝑡 minus the risk-free rate. 
𝑅𝐹,𝑡 is the 1-year deposit rate as the proxy for risk-free rate. 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡  is the excess return on the market, proxied by the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen 300 index return. 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the return difference between small and large capitalization stock 
portfolios. 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the return difference between high and low book-to-market ratio 
portfolios. 
𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 is the return difference between high and low past return stock portfolios.  
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 is the return difference between high and low liquidity stock portfolios. 
Liquidity is measured by the Amihud ratio (2002), which is the absolute value of 
daily return divided by daily volume measured in Yuan.  
𝛼𝑖 is the proxy for the quarterly stock performance 𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 from LIQ five factor 
model.  
 
To identify the relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 in quarter 𝑡 and stock performance in the 
following quarter 𝑡 + 1 the cross-sectional regression is designed as follows: 
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𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 (3-7) 
 
where, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the CNSSF policy information advantage on stock 𝑖.  
𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the lagged performance, reflecting performance persistence. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly market value of stock 𝑖 (natural log transformation). 
𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the book value in the end of previous quarter divided by quarterly 
market value.  
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly turnover rate. 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the number of quarters since the listing date (natural log transformation).  
Three variables are included to control for the roles of other types of investors:  
𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is stock 𝑖  shares held by QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors) divided by total outstanding shares in quarter 𝑡. 
𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is stock 𝑖 shares held by other institution investors, divided by total 
outstanding shares in quarter 𝑡. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡  is stock 𝑖  shares held by retail investors divided by total 
outstanding shares in quarter 𝑡. 
 
Table 3-5 (Panel A) reports the multi-variable regression results for 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. The dependent variable is the model adjusted abnormal returns. As reported 
in columns (1) to (4), we find a positive and significant relation between 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝐴 and 
CAPM abnormal return (columns (1)); Fama-French three factor model abnormal 
return (columns (2)); Carhart four factor model abnormal return (columns (3)); and 
LIQ five factor model abnormal return (columns (4)). In columns (5) to (8) we report 
results from the multi-variable regressions when 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 is replaced with the 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
in equation (3-7). Here we find that there is a positive and significant relation between 
the 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 across all abnormal return measures, showing that the one period change 
in the policy information advantage robustly predicts future stock returns. The 
findings, with respect to the abnormal return measures, are consistent with the 
superior monitor hypothesis (SMH). In the short-term the CNSSF can significantly 
promote the firm’s market performance in the subsequent period as a result of the 
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information advantage held by the CNSSF.   
Turning now to the control variables, we find a negative relation between stock 
performance and lagged performance, consistent with reversal effects (Cooper et al. 
2004) of CSNNF stock holdings. There is also negative linkage to stock turnover and 
its future abnormal return (Jiang and Sun, 2014). There is no significant relation 
between the type of investor and abnormal returns. There is a significant positive 
relation between retail investors and abnormal returns, consistent with informed retail 
investors. These investors are included in the top 10 shareholders and may have inside 
information or be speculators with large investments in the company.  
In table 3-5 (Panel B), we adopt sort-based analysis to cross-test our regression 
results. At the beginning of a quarter, we sort all the stocks into four quantiles based 
on the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 values. Then we calculate the weighted average of the 
quarterly performance across the four portfolios. Columns (1)-(4) ((5)-(8)) represents 
the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴) analysis. We find that the abnormal return difference of the stock 
portfolios with high and low 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 is positive and significant. Moreover, we find the 
stocks with high 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  outperform the stocks with low 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 . Overall, the 
numbers in the quantiles monotonically increase with an increase in 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. 
As such, these findings reinforce the positive linkage between policy information 
advantage and future stock performance. 
To examine how quickly the market reflects 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴, we extend the 
future stock performance from period 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + 𝑘, 𝑘 = 2,3, … .12. The following 
equations are estimated: 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑘−1 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                             
(3-8) 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑘−1 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                            
(3-9) 
 
Panel C of Table 3-5 illustrates the regression results when k = 2, 3, 8 and 12 for 
the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 analysis for the 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 analysis, respectively. The dependent variables are 
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LIQ five factors model alphas. 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 positively predicts abnormal return through to 
period 3 (see, Columns (1)-(4)). Columns (5)-(8) shows the results for 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. We 
find 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 only positively affects abnormal returns until period 2. These results 
suggest that the market quickly incorporates the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 into asset prices. 
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Table 3-5. 𝐂𝐏𝐈𝐀 and stock return 
This table presents the regression results of stock return and CPIA. CPIA is the sum of the deviations of all the 
CNSSF portfolios holding weights on a stock and the corresponding fund management companies. CCPIA is the 
quarterly change in CPIA. We use CAPM alpha, CAPM alpha, Fama-French alpha, Carhart alpha and LIQ alpha 
to measure the stock return. We also select some firm characteristics as control variables. Size is the log of 
quarterly market value of a stock. BtM is the book value in the end of previous quarter divided by quarterly 
market value. Turnover is a stock quarterly turnover rate. Age is the log of number of quarters of a stock since the 
listed date. QFII is the shares of a stock held by QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) divided by total 
outstanding shares in a quarter. OF is the shares of a stock held by other institution investors, mainly including 
future firm, insurance firm, bank, security firm, divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. Retail is shares 
of a stock held by retail investors divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. Panel A reports the results of 
regressions of stock return and CPIA. Panel B reports the results of regressions of stock return on CCPIA. Panel 
C extends the prediction period. Panel D sorts the CPIA to four quantiles to compare the portfolio performance. 
*** Statistical significance at 1%. ** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%. 
Panel A. Regressions of stock performance and 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 
  𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Alphas:  CAPM FF Carhart LIQ  CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
CPIA/CCPIA  0.003* 0.006* 0.007** 0.009**  0.036*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 
   (1.860) (1.794) (1.971) (2.463)  (7.195) (7.195) (7.195) (7.195) 
Alpha_lag  -0.001 -0.004** -0.003* -0.004*  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
   (-0.470) (-2.176) (-1.767) (-1.841)  (-4.988) (-4.988) (-4.988) (-4.988) 
Size  -0.042 0.034 0.017 0.038  -1.34*** -13.96*** -13.96*** -13.96*** 
   (-1.170) (1.017) (0.510) (1.105)  (-12.34) (-12.34) (-12.34) (-12.34) 
BtM  -0.07*** -0.01 -0.003 -0.003  -0.022 -0.220 -0.220 -0.220 
   (-3.074) (-0.328) (-0.132) (-0.153)  (-0.236) (-0.236) (-0.236) (-0.236) 
Turnover  -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.003*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
   (-1.770) (-6.062) (-6.021) (-6.066)  (-4.357) (-4.357) (-4.357) (-4.357) 
Age  -0.15*** -0.08** -0.08* -0.10**  0.406** 4.060** 4.060** 4.060** 
   (-3.265) (-1.971) (-1.754) (-2.239)  (2.235) (2.235) (2.235) (2.235) 
QFII  -0.036 0.016 0.025 0.020  0.015 0.153 0.153 0.153 
   (-1.401) (0.649) (1.005) (0.824)  (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) 
OF  -0.011 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006  -0.009 -0.087 -0.087 -0.087 
   (-1.550) (-0.338) (-0.454) (-0.929)  (-0.605) (-0.605) (-0.605) (-0.605) 
Retail  0.037*** 0.004 0.003 0.006  0.029*** 0.293*** 0.293*** 0.293*** 
   (7.328) (0.880) (0.632) (1.229)  (3.720) (3.720) (3.720) (3.720) 
Constant  1.69*** -0.17 0.05 -0.17  18.49*** 184.90*** 184.90*** 184.90*** 
   (3.705) (-0.389) (0.102) (-0.398)  (8.921) (8.921) (8.921) (8.921) 
Obs.  7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280  5,969 5,969 5,969 5,969 
R2  0.014 0.008 0.007 0.009  0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-value  11.17 6.560 6.055 7.025  1.802 1.802 1.802 1.802 
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Panel B. 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨, 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and portfolio performance 
In this panel, we reports results of the portfolio setting. At the beginning of a quarter, we sort all the stocks into 
four quantiles based on the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 values. Then, we calculate the weighted average of the quarterly 
performance of four portfolios from CAPM, Fama-French, Carhart and LIQ models respectively. Weight is stock 
size at the beginning of this quarter. 
 
 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Alphas:  CAPM FF Carhart LIQ  CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
                    
Low  0.048 -0.053 -0.053 -0.065  -0.030 -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
 
 (0.74) (-0.82) (-0.81) (-1.00)  (-1.68) (-6.78) (-5.99) (-6.07) 
2  0.111*** 0.048** 0.056** 0.053**  0.048* -0.010 -0.007 -0.021 
 
 (4.67) (2.07) (2.28) (2.29)  (1.86) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-1.44) 
3  0.105*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.052***  0.139** 0.038 0.045 0.040 
 
 (5.95) (2.85) (3.02) (2.76)  (2.35) (0.59) (0.69) (0.61) 
High  0.129*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.072***  0.232*** 0.156*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 
 
 (6.99) (4.94) (5.51) (6.02)  (7.66) (5.86) (5.98) (5.87) 
H-L  0.081** 0.118* 0.126* 0.137**  0.261*** 0.236*** 0.242*** 0.239*** 
 
 (2.19) (1.79) (1.90) (2.06)  (7.46) (8.11) (7.92) (7.83) 
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Panel C. Regressions of stock multi-period return on 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 
    
  
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴   
  
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Periods   T+2 T+3 T+8 T+12   T+2 T+3 T+8 T+12 
    Dependent Variable: LIQ five factor model Alphas 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴/𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴   0.010*** 0.006* -0.003 -0.001   0.084* -0.028 -0.004 0.073 
    (2.79) (1.69) (-0.86) (-0.13)   (1.67) (-0.56) (-0.07) (1.20) 
Alpha_lag   -0.007 -0.009 -0.026* -0.06***   -0.133*** -0.156*** -0.136*** -0.123*** 
    (-0.55) (-0.70) (-1.93) (-3.65)   (-9.47) (-10.73) (-8.38) (-6.46) 
Size   0.08** 0.03 0.05 -0.02   -16.04*** -14.99*** -17.12*** -16.03*** 
    (2.23) (0.82) (1.10) (-0.50)   (-13.01) (-11.90) (-10.23) (-7.99) 
BtM   0.016 -0.021 0.012 0.007   -3.905*** -3.740*** -6.935*** -6.568** 
    (0.36) (-0.45) (0.18) (0.09)   (-3.09) (-2.97) (-3.25) (-2.42) 
Turnover   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***   -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.015 
    (-5.36) (-5.83) (-3.26) (-3.19)   (-3.74) (-4.22) (-3.13) (-1.60) 
Age   -0.036 -0.002 0.118* 0.125   10.04*** 6.508** 7.916 3.869 
    (-0.77) (-0.04) (1.70) (1.43)   (3.87) (2.13) (1.38) (0.46) 
QFII   -0.001 0.049** 0.09*** 0.055   0.009 0.213 0.313 0.633 
    (-0.06) (1.99) (3.02) (1.49)   (0.03) (0.60) (0.59) (0.91) 
OF   -0.009 0.003 -0.009 0.018   0.001 0.026 -0.075 0.064 
    (-1.39) (0.42) (-0.99) (1.34)   (0.01) (0.18) (-0.43) (0.21) 
Retail   0.003 0.002 0.007 0.003   0.213*** 0.172** 0.248*** -0.031 
    (0.55) (0.47) (1.33) (0.57)   (2.73) (2.19) (2.79) (-0.16) 
Constant   -1.01** -0.39 -1.04* -0.14   203.4*** 193.8*** 196.2*** 234.5*** 
    (-2.17) (-0.80) (-1.72) (-0.19)   (9.24) (8.46) (5.75) (4.90) 
                      
Obs.   6,945 6,615 5,106 4,227   5,657 5,374 4,078 3,307 
R2   0.009 0.008 0.007 0.008   0.278 0.270 0.276 0.271 
Firm FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F   7.180 6.123 4.033 3.675   1.767 1.658 1.612 1.413 
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3.6.2. Policy information advantage and stock synchronicity 
A negative relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and synchronicity means that the participation 
of the CNSSF promotes price discovery and induces more private/inside information 
of a firm to be impounded into its stock price. Following (Hutton et al., 2009), we 
define the quarterly synchronicity of stock 𝑖 as:  
 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2
1−𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 ) (3-10) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2  is the goodness of fit produced by a factor model (e.g. five factor model 
as shown in equation (3-6)). 
We aim to test if the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴) can impact the synchronicity of a stock 𝑖 in 
the next quarter. We run cross-sectional regression as follows:  
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (3-11) 
 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (3-12) 
Table 3-6 (Panel A) summarizes the results of multi-variable regressions. 
Specifically, the independent variable is the synchronicity from CAPM; Fama and 
French; Carhart; and LIQ models. Columns (1) to (4) report the relation between 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and synchronicity. Across all models, there is a robust negative and significant 
relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 in quarter 𝑡 and synchronicity in the next quarter 𝑡 + 1. 
This result implies that the trades of the CNSSF decrease stock synchronicity. High 
synchronicity means that the stock follows the market fluctuations. If a stock has low 
synchronicity, it implies that there is firm specific information reflected in the stock 
price. As such, these results show that the CNSSF improves the information flow into 
the market (Hutton et al., 2009). Columns (5) to (8) display similar results, this time 
with regard to the quarterly change in policy information advantage. Specifically, 
there is a significant negative relation between 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and stock synchronicity. We 
also find a significant positive relation between the stock synchronicity and lagged 
synchronicity, firm size, and turnover. However, the positive relation shows that 
domestic financial investors increase synchronicity. Finally, in Panel B in columns (1) 
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to (4) ((5)-(8)), we sort the stocks in our sample into four CPIA (CCPIA) quantiles to 
compare portfolio synchronicity in the next quarter. We find that the weighted 
average of synchronicity with high 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (CCPIA) is lower than the portfolio with 
low 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴). Moreover, the synchronicity difference between stocks with 
high versus low 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴)  is negative and significant. 
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Table 3-6. 𝐂𝐏𝐈𝐀, 𝐂𝐂𝐏𝐈𝐀 and stock synchronicity 
This table presents the regression results of  𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 on stock synchronicity. The dependent variable is 
the synchronicity from CAPM model, Fama and French three factor model, Carhart four factor model and LIQ 
five factor model. We select some firm characteristics as control variables. Size is the log of quarterly market 
value of a stock. BtM is the book value in the end of previous quarter divided by quarterly market value. 
Turnover is a stock quarterly turnover rate. Age is the log of number of quarters of a stock since the listed date. 
QFII is the shares of a stock held by QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) divided by total outstanding 
shares in a quarter. OF is the shares of a stock held by other institution investors, mainly including future firm, 
insurance firm, bank, security firm, divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. Retail is shares of a stock 
held by retail investors divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. Panel A reports the results of regressions 
of stock synchronicity and 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. Panel B reports the results of regressions of stock synchronicity on 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. 
Panel C sorts all the stocks in our sample to four quantiles by 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴). *** Statistical significance at 1%. 
** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%. 
Panel A. 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨, 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and stock synchronicity 
 
  
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
  
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Syns:   CAPM FF Carhart LIQ   CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
CPIA/CCPIA   -0.106** -0.061* -0.056* -0.056*   -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003** 
    (-2.268) (-1.719) (-1.654) (-1.748)   (-2.634) (-2.547) (-2.801) (-2.568) 
Syn_lag   0.145*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.158***   0.051*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 
    (11.594) (11.925) (12.049) (12.559)   (3.846) (3.607) (3.860) (4.081) 
Size   0.265*** 0.226*** 0.216*** 0.206***   0.055 0.075*** 0.070** 0.072*** 
    (9.777) (11.100) (11.112) (11.093)   (1.479) (2.621) (2.548) (2.742) 
BtM   -0.001 -0.023 -0.021 -0.028   0.046 0.034 0.033 0.025 
    (-0.047) (-1.123) (-1.074) (-1.490)   (1.526) (1.481) (1.498) (1.194) 
Turnover   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
    (5.424) (7.638) (7.700) (7.888)   (4.636) (4.779) (4.958) (5.234) 
Age   -0.338*** -0.191*** -0.184*** -0.180***   0.038 0.102** 0.095** 0.087** 
    (-7.055) (-5.300) (-5.363) (-5.479)   (0.646) (2.218) (2.173) (2.059) 
QFII   0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001   0.019* 0.016* 0.018** 0.018** 
    (0.136) (-0.498) (-0.422) (-0.150)   (1.671) (1.857) (2.156) (2.316) 
OF   0.010** 0.007** 0.006** 0.007**   0.009* 0.004 0.003 0.004 
    (2.203) (2.108) (2.046) (2.214)   (1.837) (0.991) (0.947) (1.081) 
Retail   -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
    (-0.542) (-0.130) (-0.254) (-0.139)   (-0.036) (-0.068) (-0.060) (-0.067) 
Constant   -3.223*** -2.688*** -2.510*** -2.322***   -0.794 -0.784 -0.525 -0.499 
    (-10.385) (-11.504) (-11.283) (-10.909)   (-1.169) (-1.493) (-1.047) (-1.035) 
                      
Obs.   7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280   5,969 5,969 5,969 5,969 
R2   0.046 0.062 0.062 0.065   0.476 0.434 0.440 0.441 
Firm FE   YES YES YES YES   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Value   31.82 43.54 43.62 46.15   4.197 3.539 3.635 3.648 
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Panel B. 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨, 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and portfolio synchronicity. 
In this panel, we reports results of portfolio setting. At the beginning of a quarter, we sort all the stocks into four 
quantiles based on the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 values. Then we calculate the weighted average of the quarterly 
synchronicity of four portfolios from CAPM, Fama-French, Carhart and LIQ models respectively. Weight is 
stock size at the beginning of this quarter. 
 
 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Synchronicity:  CAPM FF Carhart LIQ  CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
                    
Low  -0.78*** -0.16* -0.09 -0.012  -0.68*** -0.19** -0.11 -0.042 
 
 (-7.56) (-1.86) (-1.10) (-0.16)  (-6.99) (-2.39) (-1.52) (-0.58) 
2  -0.79*** -0.26*** -0.19** -0.107  -0.72*** -0.20** -0.13* -0.054 
 
 (-8.25) (-3.41) (-2.55) (-1.53)  (-7.83) (-2.48) (-1.69) (-0.73) 
3  -0.80*** -0.31*** -0.23*** -0.16**  -0.89*** -0.31*** -0.23*** -0.154** 
 
 (-8.33) (-4.10) (-3.260 (-2.26)  (-8.77) (-4.17) (-3.30) (-2.27) 
High  -0.86*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.20***  -0.94*** -0.40*** -0.31*** -0.223*** 
 
 (-9.50) (-5.47) (-4.35) (-3.17)  (-9.50) (-5.58) (-4.58) (-3.40) 
H-L  -0.080 -0.215* -0.193* -0.186*  -0.264* -0.216** -0.198* -0.181* 
 
 (-0.58) (-1.98) (-1.88) (-1.89)  (-1.90) (-2.04) (-1.96) (-1.87) 
 
Panel C. 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨, 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and portfolio systematic risk 
In this panel, we reports results of portfolio setting. At the beginning of a quarter, we sort all the stocks into four 
quantiles based on the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 values. Then we calculate the weighted average of the quarterly 
systematic risk of four portfolios from CAPM, Fama-French, Carhart and LIQ models respectively. Weight is 
stock size at the beginning of this quarter. 
 
  𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴   𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Betas:  MKT SMB HML UMD LIQ  MKT SMB HML UMD LIQ 
                        
Low  1.00*** 3.40*** -0.16 0.08 -0.38  0.98*** 2.94*** -0.25** 0.16 -0.39 
 
 (25.18) (6.90) (-1.42) (0.49) (-1.18)  (25.61) (8.12) (-2.09) (1.41) (-1.09) 
2  0.97*** 2.60*** -0.42*** 0.32*** -0.22  0.97*** 2.74*** -0.33*** 0.23** -0.23 
 
 (45.26) (7.59) (-4.25) (2.75) (-1.01)  (61.13) (6.18) (-3.28) (2.52) (-1.44) 
3  0.95*** 2.14*** -0.36*** 0.41*** -0.02  0.96*** 2.42*** -0.36*** 0.43*** -0.13 
 
 (56.45) (7.55) (-4.91) (3.41) (-0.12)  (48.99) (7.84) (-3.82) (2.84) (-0.67) 
High  0.92*** 1.54*** -0.42*** 0.52*** -0.09  0.93*** 1.50*** -0.42*** 0.51*** 0.06 
 
 (51.06) (5.23) (-4.01) (5.56) (-0.53)  (37.27) (5.62) (-4.90) (4.12) (0.44) 
H-L  -0.08* -1.87*** -0.26* 0.45** 0.29  -0.05** -1.44** -0.16 0.34*** 0.45 
 
 (-1.82) (-3.25) (-1.68) (2.51) (0.79)  (-2.18) (-2.27) (-0.44) (5.15) (0.80) 
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3.6.3. Policy information advantage and systematic risk 
In this section we discuss the relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and stock systematic risk. 
We extract the systematic risk measures 𝛽𝑖,𝑀, 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀, 𝛽𝑖,𝐿𝐼𝑄, from 
Equation (3-6). Substituting these systematic risks into equation (6) as independent 
variable, we have: 
 
𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛽𝑖,𝑀,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (3-13) 
 
𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (3-14) 
 
𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (3-15) 
 
𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (3-16) 
 
𝛽𝑖,𝐿𝐼𝑄,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝛽𝑖,𝐿𝐼𝑄,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (3-17) 
All variables are previously defined. 
 
Table 3-7 presents the results. Panel A shows the relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
and systematic risk. The results are mixed. First, in Columns (1) to (5), we do not find 
a significant relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and MKT and SMB systematic risks. Second, 
we find a negative and significant relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  and HML and LIQ 
systematic risk. Third, there is a positive and significant relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and 
UMD systematic risk. For comparison, we report the relation between 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and 
systematic risk in Columns (6)-(10). The results show that the LIQ systematic risk is 
positively related to 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. Finally, in Panel B (table 3-6), we sort the stocks in our 
sample to four quantiles at the end of the previous quarter based on CPIA (CCPIA) 
and calculate the portfolio systematic risk. Columns (1) to (5) ((6) to (10)) report the 
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results when we sort the stocks by 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴). We find lower MKT, SMB and 
HML systematic risks but higher UMD systematic risk, as 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 rises. We find 
lower MKT, SMB and higher UMD systematic risks in the higher 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 portfolio. 
Our results imply that 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and/or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 significantly increases loadings of a 
stock on the momentum factor. This result is consistent with the findings of Liu and 
Tang (2011). They document that investors tend to herd their trades with the CNSSF. 
As a comparison, the decrease in loadings on market, size and value factors may be 
attributed to more firm-specific information being incorporated in the stock price. 
This result is consistent with our expectations.
76 
 
Table 3-7. 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨, 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and stock systematic risk 
This table presents the results of regressions of systematic risk on 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 or 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. The betas (MKT, SMB, 
HML, UMD and LIQ) are from LIQ five factor models. We select some firm characteristics as control variables. 
Size is the log of quarterly market value of a stock. BtM is the book value in the end of previous quarter divided 
by quarterly market value. Turnover is a stock quarterly turnover rate. Age is the log of number of quarters of a 
stock since the listed date. QFII is the shares of a stock held by QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) 
divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. OF is the shares of a stock held by other institution investors, 
mainly including future firm, insurance firm, bank, security firm, divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. 
Retail is shares of a stock held by retail investors divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. Panel A reports 
the results of regressions of stock systematic risk and 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. Panel B reports the results of regressions of stock 
systematic risk on 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. Panel C sorts all the stocks in our sample to four quantiles by 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴). *** 
Statistical significance at 1%. ** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%. 
Panel A. 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and systematic risk 
 
 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Betas  MKT SMB HML UMD LIQ  MKT SMB HML UMD LIQ 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴/𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  -0.001 0.01 -0.01** 0.01** -0.01**  -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.01* 
 
 (-0.42) (1.24) (-2.08) (2.3) (-2.5)  (-1.10) (-0.40) (-0.93) (-0.2) (1.80) 
Beta_lag  0.002 -0.01
*
 -0.01 -0.02
*
 -0.01  0.07
***
 0.03
***
 0.11
***
 0.1
***
 0.02
***
 
 
 (0.33) (-1.77) (-0.99) (-1.7) (-1.0)  (10.71) (5.45) (10.5) (5.36) (4.36) 
Size  -0.1
***
 -0.3
***
 -0.10
*
 -0.03 -0.3
***
  -0.01
**
 -0.4
***
 0.08
**
 -0.001 -0.29
***
 
 
 (-5.79) (-2.87) (-1.68) (-0.5) (-4.3)  (-2.19) (-7.76) (2.55) (-0.04) (-7.36) 
BtM  -0.003 -0.13 0.11
*
 -0.04 -0.05  0.04
***
 -0.5
***
 0.35
***
 -0.1
***
 0.17
***
 
 
 (-0.34) (-1.21) (1.92) (-0.7) (-0.7)  (6.80) (-7.36) (9.12) (-2.7) (3.33) 
Turnover  0.001
***
 0.002
***
 0.001
***
 -0.001 -0.001  0.001
***
 0.003
***
 0.001
***
 0.001 -0.001
***
 
 
 (4.60) (2.72) (3.36) (-0.6) (-1.5)  (10.50) (4.72) (3.65) (0.12) (-3.01) 
Age  0.07
***
 -0.07 0.13 -0.6
***
 0.31
**
  0.04
***
 -0.88
***
 0.14
***
 -0.2
***
 0.79
***
 
 
 (4.11) (-0.34) (1.30) (-4.9) (2.35)  (6.71) (-11.9) (3.46) (-5.4) (15.31) 
QFII  0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05
*
 -0.04  0.004 -0.03 0.02 0.1
***
 -0.008 
 
 (1.32) (0.93) (0.63) (1.7) (-1.1)  (1.17) (-0.75) (0.79) (3.25) (-0.28) 
OF  0.001 -0.003 0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.002
***
 -0.02
**
 0.01 -0.01 0.02
***
 
 
 (0.66) (-0.17) (1.08) (-0.5) (0.79)  (2.60) (-1.98) (1.03) (-1.4) (3.09) 
Retail  0.002
**
 0.02 -0.01 0.001 -0.002  -0.002
***
 0.05
***
 0.001 -0.002 -0.03
***
 
 
 (2.00) (1.46) (-0.8) (0.2) (-0.3)  (-2.9) (5.89) (0.22) (-0.4) (-5.33) 
Constant  1.36
***
 6.04
***
 0.17 2.5
***
 3.2
***
  0.76
***
 10.4
***
 -2.3
***
 1.1
**
 1.22
**
 
 
 (13.0) (4.88) (0.26) (3.3) (3.75)  (11.6) (13.8) (-5.7) (2.4) (2.33) 
Obs.  7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280  5,969 5,969 5,969 5,969 5,969 
R2  0.013 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.005  0.061 0.096 0.040 0.014 0.060 
Firm FE  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
F-Value  8.738 4.229 4.332 6.986 3.616  42.67 70.16 27.51 9.061 42.61 
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3.7. Policy information advantage and long term firm value 
In this section we discuss the relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴  and firm long term 
performance. We calculate the yearly change in the Return on assets, sales growth, 
Quick ratio, debt to asset ratio and Tobin’s Q over the following one to three years. 
We model the firm long term operation performance on the 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
 (3-18) 
𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
 (3-19) 
𝑄𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
 (3-20) 
𝐷𝑡𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
 (3-21) 
𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
 (3-22) 
 
where, 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is average of quarterly CPIA within a given year 𝑡. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the return on asset. That is net profit divided by the total asset.  
𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 is the sales percentage growth relative to the previous year.  
𝑄𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the quick ratio. That is cash and equivalents divided by current liabilities.  
𝐷𝑡𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the debt to asset ratio. That is total liabilities divided by the total assets. 
𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the Tobin’s Q. That is market value divided by the total assets.  
 
Table 3-8 presents the results. First, from year one to three, we document that 
there is significant negative relation between 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 and ROA and Tobin’s Q. This 
result shows that in the long run, the CNSSF’s political actions decrease long term 
firm value, consistent with Bortolotti (2015). The results also support the political 
agenda hypothesis (PAH) and the passive investor hypothesis (PIH). Our conclusion 
is not consistent with the Superior monitoring hypothesis (SMH). Second, we find the 
CNSSF actions also decreases the firm’s liquidity measured by quick ratio, which is 
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in contrast to the findings of Bortolotti (2015). Third, also different from Bortolotti 
(2015), we find a significant positive relation between CPIA and the debt to asset ratio. 
This relation is consistent with our intuition that where the CNSSF holds the firms’ 
stock it will be helpful for the firm seeking to borrow from state-owned banks in 
China.
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Table 3-8. 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨 and long term firm value 
This table presents the results of regressions of firm long term performance on 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴. 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 is the average of quarterly 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴 within a year. The proxy variables for long term firm value are 
ROA, SG, QR, DtoA and TQ. ROA is the return on the assets. SG is the percentage sales growth relative to the previous sales. QR is the quick ratio that is cash and equivalents divided by 
current liabilities. DtoA is the total debt to toal assets ratio. TQ is the Tobin’s Q that is market valued divided by total assets. Age is the log of number of quarters of a stock since the listed date. 
QFII is the shares of a stock held by QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. OF is the shares of a stock held by other institution investors, 
mainly including future firm, insurance firm, bank, security firm, divided by total outstanding shares in a quarter. Retail is shares of a stock held by retail investors divided by total outstanding 
shares in a quarter. *** Statistical significance at 1%. ** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%.  
    
  
Year 1   
  
Year 2   
  
Year 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Var.   ROA SG QR DtoA TQ   ROA SG QR DtoA TQ 
 
ROA SG QR DtoA TQ 
CPIA   -0.025** -1.394*** -0.768** 0.037** -0.258   -0.040*** -1.594*** -0.880** 0.075*** 0.182  -0.062*** -0.911 -1.152** 0.132*** -0.934** 
    (-2.25) (-3.42) (-2.38) (2.03) (-1.08)   (-2.67) (-3.36) (-2.15) (2.89) (0.64)   (-3.69) (-0.41) (-2.35) (3.84) (-2.32) 
QFII   0.103* 3.085 3.324** -0.057 3.978***   0.092 3.052 4.610** -0.156 1.475   0.013 -2.965 5.551** -0.054 4.016** 
    (1.76) (1.45) (1.96) (-0.60) (3.16)   (1.20) (1.24) (2.17) (-1.16) (1.00)   (0.17) (-0.28) (2.34) (-0.32) (2.06) 
OF   0.004 0.218 0.510 -0.023 0.290   -0.000 0.162 0.339 0.005 0.707   0.008 1.683 0.563 -0.025 0.939 
    (0.23) (0.31) (0.93) (-0.73) (0.71)   (-0.01) (0.19) (0.45) (0.10) (1.37)   (0.26) (0.41) (0.62) (-0.40) (1.26) 
Retail   0.020 0.256 -1.630*** 0.013 -0.283   -0.031 -0.196 -2.984*** 0.071* -0.955**   0.011 1.395 -4.505*** 0.124** -1.296* 
    (1.41) (0.51) (-4.10) (0.59) (-0.96)   (-1.28) (-0.25) (-4.48) (1.68) (-2.07)   (0.36) (0.35) (-5.17) (2.03) (-1.81) 
Age   0.002* -0.08 0.37*** -0.0*** -0.16***   -0.001 -0.089 0.534*** -0.028*** -0.411***   0.001 -0.547* 0.546*** -0.030*** -0.400*** 
    (1.82) (-1.60) (9.95) (-9.12) (-5.59)   (-0.12) (-1.47) (10.37) (-8.71) (-11.53)   (0.54) (-1.91) (8.72) (-6.87) (-7.78) 
Cons.   -0.69** 13.42 -79.58*** 4.39*** 40.04***   -0.46 13.94 -108.9*** 6.44*** 94.07***   -1.05** 115.7* -110.27*** 6.59*** 98.20*** 
    (-2.31) (1.23) (-9.30) (9.08) (6.30)   (-1.07) (1.02) (-9.30) (8.71) (11.59)   (-2.11) (1.77) (-7.74) (6.57) (8.39) 
                                      
Obs.   2,755 2,755 2,761 2,761 2,761   2,219 2,219 2,225 2,225 2,225   1,861 1,861 1,867 1,867 1,867 
R2   0.004 0.006 0.053 0.033 0.016   0.004 0.007 0.070 0.042 0.058   0.008 0.003 0.071 0.038 0.038 
Firm FE   YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES YES 
F-Value   2.332 3.504 30.73 18.99 8.814   1.997 3.026 33.56 19.64 27.56   2.814 0.969 28.27 14.71 14.79 
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3.8. Policy information spillover 
In this section, we examine the policy information spread between mutual funds in 
a given fund management company and the CNSSF. Our work contributes to “firm 
boundary” theory. In the spirit of “word-of-mouth” effects (Ellison and Fudenberg, 
1995; Hong et al., 2005), we expect that the mutual funds, in the information network 
of the CNSSF, will find it easier to capture the valuable policy information. The 
connection between a mutual fund and a CNSSF portfolio may positively affect the 
performance of a mutual fund in the next period. In line with the work of Hong et al., 
(2005), Glode et al., (2012) and Kacperczyk (2014), we model the performance of 
mutual fund 𝑚 in period 𝑡 , (𝐹𝑃𝑚,𝑡), as a function of the CNSSF information 
network: 
𝐹𝑃𝑚,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿1 ∑ 𝑔𝑚,𝑐
𝐼𝑁
𝑐 + 𝛿2 ∑ 𝑔𝑚,𝑐
𝑂𝑈𝑇
𝑐 + 𝛿3𝐹𝑃𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚,𝑡 +
𝛿5𝐹𝑇𝑜𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐹𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑚,𝑡 + +𝛿7𝐹𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛿8𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3-23) 
where,  
𝐹𝑃𝑚,𝑡 is the mutual fund 𝑚 performance in quarter 𝑡, measured using  raw 
quarterly return, CAPM model alpha, Fama-French three factor model alpha, 
Carhart four factor model alpha and LIQ five factor model alpha. 
𝑔𝑚,𝑐  is the connection strength between a mutual fund 𝑚  and a CNSSF 
portfolio 𝑐 , measured using four proxy variables: 𝑂𝑁𝑚𝑐  (equation (3-3)), 
𝑂𝑊𝑚𝑐 (equation (3-4)), 𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑚𝑐 (equation (3-5)).  
𝑔𝑚,𝑐
𝐼𝑁 =𝑔𝑚,𝑐 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑛. 𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 1, if a mutual fund 𝑚 and a CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 are in 
the same fund company; otherwise 𝐼𝑖𝑛 = 0.  
𝑔𝑚,𝑐
𝑂𝑈𝑇=𝑔𝑚,𝑐 ∗ 𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡. 𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 1, if a mutual fund 𝑚 and a CNSSF portfolio 𝑐 are 
not in the same fund company; otherwise 𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 0.  
    𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚,𝑡 is the natural log of total net asset value of a mutual fund 𝑚.  
𝐹𝑇𝑜𝑚,𝑡 is the percentage turnover of the fund 𝑚 in quarter 𝑡. Fund turnover is 
the average of the bought stocks Yuan volume and the sold stocks Yuan volume 
divided by the fund size in the quarter 𝑡. 
𝐹𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑚,𝑡 is the number of quarters since the fund 𝑚 establishment date (log 
transformed).  
 𝐹𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑚,𝑡 is the expenses of the fund 𝑚 divided by the fund size ( percentage). 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑚,𝑡 is the percentage change from quarter 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 in the fund 𝑚 
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total net assets minus the fund quarterly return. 
 
   Table 3-8 reports the results of the regressions of fund performance on the 
connection strength to the CNSSF. Columns (1) to (4), (5)-(8) and (9)-(12) report the 
results where connection strength is measured by  𝑂𝑁𝑚𝑐  , 𝑂𝑊𝑚𝑐  and 𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑚𝑐 , 
respectively. The results are similar. We find that after controlling lagged performance, 
as in Bollen and Busse (2005), there is a significant relation between the connection 
strength and mutual fund performance. This finding implies that the information 
network plays a significant role in the Chinese mutual fund industry. The information 
flows from the CNSSF to connected mutual funds can significantly affect the 
performance of these mutual funds. Our findings complement the studies of 
word-in-mouth effects (Hong et al., 2005). However, they ignore the effects of 
network structure. We divide the connections to inside connection (𝑔𝑚,𝑐
𝐼𝑁 ) and outside 
connections (𝑔𝑚,𝑐
𝑂𝑈𝑇). On one hand, we find there is a positive coefficient associated 
with the inside connections. This result shows that the mutual funds, managed by the 
same fund companies as the CNSSF risk portfolios, can effectively capture the 
CNSSF’s political information. On the other hand, we document negative relations 
between fund abnormal returns (except CAPM alphas) and outside connection 
strength. Hence, even those these funds’ portfolios overlap with the CNSSF, they are 
unable to take advantage of any information flow. We provide empirical findings 
supporting the theoretical work of Stein (2008). The useful information is only 
effective when clustering around the small network. If information spreads far from 
the center it will not work and even worse, as we find, have adverse impacts. We also 
document that fund turnover, and expenses erode the future performance of mutual 
funds. This is consistent with findings of Chen et al., (2004). Fund flows can 
positively affect mutual funds’ performance. 
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Table 3-9. Information spillover 
This table presents the results of regressions of mutual fund performance on the connection strength to the CNSSF. We use three variables to measure the fund quarterly performance. These are 
CAPM model alpha, Fama-French three factor model alpha, Carhart four factor model alpha and LIQ five factor model alpha. In order to measure the connection strength between the CNSSF 
and mutual funds, we use overlapping number of holding stocks (𝑂𝑁), sum of overlapping weights (𝑂𝑊), sum of average of overlapping weights (𝑂𝑊𝐴). We use subscript in or out to represent 
if the CNSSF or mutual funds are in the same fund company (𝑔𝐼𝑁) or not (𝑔𝑂𝑈𝑇). We also select the fund characteristic variables as control variables. Size is the log of total net asset value. 
Turnover is the the average of the bought stocks Yuan volume and the sold stocks Yuan volume divided by the fund size. Age is the log of the number of quarters since the fund establishment. 
Load is the expenses of the fund divided by the fund size. Expense is the expenses of the fund divided by the fund size. Fund flow is the percentage change in the fund total net assets minus the 
fund quarterly return. *** Statistical significance at 1%. ** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%.  
   
𝑂𝑁 
  
𝑂𝑊 
  
𝑂𝑊𝐴 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Alphas CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
 
CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
 
CAPM FF Carhart LIQ 
𝑔𝐼𝑁 
 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
0.003*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.002*** 
  
(3.51) (4.79) (4.39) (4.40) 
 
(4.05) (3.57) (3.24) (3.55) 
 
(3.29) (1.94) (2.08) (2.86) 
𝑔𝑂𝑈𝑇  0.004*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 
0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 
0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  
(7.67) (-2.35) (-3.46) (-2.36) 
 
(7.09) (-5.39) (-6.00) (-2.94) 
 
(2.01) (-9.90) (-8.37) (-3.74) 
Alpha_lag 
 
0.117*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.058*** 
 
0.119*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.058*** 
 
0.125*** 0.111*** 0.107*** 0.060*** 
  
(12.81) (9.55) (10.07) (6.75) 
 
(13.03) (9.77) (10.24) (6.80) 
 
(13.79) (10.83) (10.85) (6.95) 
fundsize 
 
-0.072*** 0.003 0.014** 0.008 
 
-0.079*** -0.001 0.012** 0.009 
 
-0.092*** 0.007 0.020*** 0.012** 
  
(-9.728) (0.419) (2.252) (1.369) 
 
(-10.906) (-0.084) (2.026) (1.477) 
 
(-12.941) (1.172) (3.462) (2.117) 
FTo 
 
0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 
0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 
0.012*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
  
(6.54) (-4.23) (-3.99) (-5.34) 
 
(6.61) (-4.17) (-3.96) (-5.36) 
 
(6.83) (-4.49) (-4.26) (-5.46) 
FAge 
 
-0.001 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 
-0.001 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 
0.000 -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
  
(-0.982) (-2.786) (-3.960) (-3.156) 
 
(-1.002) (-2.112) (-3.372) (-2.989) 
 
(0.353) (-2.449) (-3.968) (-3.303) 
Fexp 
 
-0.035*** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.002 
 
-0.036*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.003 
 
-0.037*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.002 
  
(-12.52) (-2.65) (-2.37) (-1.07) 
 
(-12.62) (-2.86) (-2.53) (-1.09) 
 
(-13.10) (-2.64) (-2.24) (-0.99) 
Fundflow 
 
0.002* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
0.002* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
0.002* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
  
(1.65) (4.17) (4.87) (4.36) 
 
(1.67) (4.25) (4.93) (4.36) 
 
(1.85) (4.32) (4.93) (4.34) 
Cons. 
 
0.119*** 0.003 -0.007 -0.006 
 
0.129*** 0.009 -0.003 -0.006 
 
0.150*** 0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
  
(12.63) (0.33) (-0.91) (-0.80) 
 
(14.27) (1.16) (-0.44) (-0.87) 
 
(17.25) (0.60) (-1.49) (-1.40) 
            
Obs. 7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 
 
7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 
 
7,547 7,547 7,547 7,547 
R2 
 
0.090 0.045 0.051 0.038 
 
0.090 0.046 0.053 0.038 
 
0.083 0.054 0.056 0.038 
Fund FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F  93.50 44.34 50.77 37.40  93.02 45.92 52.65 36.90  85.55 53.81 56.40 37.03 
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3.9. Summary 
Chapter 3 identifies the CNSSF political advantage information by 
distinguishing the CNSSF two roles: first it is an institutional investor; second it 
represents the government. We propose a new measure of the policy information 
advantage available to government backed institutional investors. Further, we assess 
the impact of this policy-linked “information advantage” on stock performance. Our 
results show that there is a positive and significant information advantage-stock 
performance linkage. However, we document the political information advantage 
negatively affects the long-term firm performance. Finally, we demonstrate that 
there is an information network spillover of the information advantage across the 
Chinese mutual fund industry, which also affects mutual fund performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: The CNSSF strategic stocks and non-parametric optimization 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we apply the nonparametric kernel (NPK) estimation method to solve 
safety-first portfolio selection models introduced by Roy (1952). We compare our 
nonparametric method with the empirical distribution (EMD) estimation approach (Haley, 
2008), numerically and empirically, to demonstrate its accuracy and effectiveness. 
The safety-first optimization problem belongs to the class of chance (probabilistic) 
constrained stochastic programs (Charnes and Cooper, 1959; Miller and Wagner, 1965). In 
chance constrained programming, it is required that the objectives be achieved with the 
stochastic constraints holding at least   of probability, where   is provided as an 
appropriate safety margin by the decision maker (Charnes and Cooper, 1959). Probabilistic 
constraints are often used in modeling real-world optimization problems where there is 
uncertainty in the data and parameters. Probabilistic constraints have various applications, 
including portfolio selection (see Li, 1995), supply chain management (see Lejeune and 
Ruszczynski, 2007) and production planning (see Murr and Prékopa, 2000). Optimization 
problems with probabilistic constraints have been extensively studied since the pioneering 
work of Charnes and Cooper (1959), see, for example, Norkin (1993), Ruszczyński (2002), 
Shapiro et al. (2009), Hong et al. (2011), and Zheng et al. (2012). 
The literature includes various applications of safety-first selection models including the 
study of, asset-liability management problems (Chiu et al., 2009; 2012), the behavior 
patterns of investment strategies (Li et al.,1998; Li et al., 2010) and, farming land allocation 
problems (Haley, 2012). Several studies also compare the safety-first portfolio selection 
models with mean-variance portfolio selection models (see, for example, Pyle and Turnovsky, 
1970; Haque and Varela, 2010). Ding and Zhang (2009) investigate risky asset pricing 
models based on the safety-first model. However, these studies show that it is difficult to 
directly solve the safety-first (or chance constrained) formulation. Two key problems are 
identified. First, some scholars investigate the safety-first model under the assumption that 
asset returns follow some special distributional form (for static time case) or stochastic 
process (for dynamic time case). For example, Ding and Zhang (2009) apply an elliptical 
distribution, Ruszczyński (2002) a known discrete distribution and Chiu et al. (2012) a 
geometric Brownian motion. However, such assumptions cannot reflect the real world since 
the financial market is complex, and in most cases we know little about the distributional 
85 
 
form of asset returns. Second, some papers enlarge the loss (truncated) probability to its 
upper bound by applying the Chebyshev inequality, and replace the loss probability by its 
upper bound. A surrogate problem of the safety-first formulation is solved by minimizing this 
upper bound (e.g., Roy, 1952; Chiu and Li, 2009). Other bounds (less conservative than the 
Chebychev ones) have been used to replace also the loss probability (see, for example, 
Bonami and Lejeune, 2009, Lejeune, 2011 and Gotoh and Takeda, 2012). However, these 
bounds are only the approximate value of the loss probability.  
It is well known that the nonparametric estimation methods need not make distribution 
assumptions and the computation results are completely driven by market data (Li and 
Racine, 2007). Recently, a section of literature concentrates on the application of 
nonparametric estimation methods to compute financial risk. For instance, Silvapulle and 
Granger (2001), Chen and Tang (2005), Jeong and Kang (2009), Schaumburg (2012) and 
Alemany et al. (2013) study the nonparametric formula for VaR; Scaillet (2004), Cai and 
Wang (2008), Chen (2008) and Yu et al. (2010) investigate the nonparametric CVaR 
estimator. However, these papers largely ignore optimal portfolio strategy problems. 
Although in Norkin (1993) and Shapiro (2009), the idea of kernel estimations has been used 
to estimate the probability function in chance constrained frameworks, they do not consider 
the portfolio optimization problem. 
In this paper, we apply a nonparametric method, based on smooth kernel estimation, to 
investigate safety-first portfolio selection problems. Notably, in our models, no assumption is 
imposed on the distributional form of the assets’ returns, nor is the Chebyshev inequality 
used. We make two contributions. First, we study two safety-first portfolio optimization 
problems under the nonparametric kernel estimation framework. Second, simulation and 
empirical results show that our NPK approach outperforms the EMD estimation method 
(Haley, 2008). Compared with the EMD estimation method, the main advantage is that our 
NPK portfolio optimization method is smooth, retains convergence properties and is 
computationally tractable. Hence, most smooth optimization techniques can be used to solve 
our models.  
 
4.2. Related literature review 
In the Markowitz (1952) mean-variance framework, risk is measured as the variance of 
returns. Investors seek to minimize (maximize) the level of risk (expected return) given an 
expected return (level of risk). Although variance is the most basic risk measure since the 
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seminal work of Markowitz (1952), drawbacks of such deviation type measures are 
identified in the literature (Gotoh and Takeda, 2012). More recently, theoretical and practical 
papers emphasize new risk measures, especially downside risk measures. 
Risk measure can be broadly classified in two ways. First are deviation measures. Konno 
and Yamazaki (1991) use the absolute deviation instead of variance to measure the risk, and 
study the mean-absolute-deviation model. In further discussion, considering investors dislike 
downside volatility more, the risk is measured by the semi-variance. Mao (1970) discusses 
the mean-semi-variance portfolio selection model. Yan et al. (2007) extend it to the 
multi-period case.  Fishburm (1977) introduces a more general form of downside deviation 
risk measures, lower-partial moment (LPM), to study the portfolio selection and risk 
management problem. Both semi-variance and semi-absolute-deviation are special cases of 
LPM.  
Second, risk measures may be defined from the perspective of controlling the loss 
probability rather than the deviation from the expected return or some other objectives. Roy 
(1952) adopts a safety first criterion focusing on downside risk and defines risk in terms of 
minimizing the probability of loss.
 
Notably, many widely-adopted risk measurement 
instruments show a close relation with the safety-first criterion. For example, Value at Risk 
(VaR, also known as quantile in the literature), inspired by the concept of a safety-first 
criterion (Morgan, 1996), has been adopted by various financial institutions since 1990s. VaR 
is defined as the maximum potential loss over a given time horizon under a specified 
confidence level (Jorion, 1997). Indeed, as shown later, VaR is consistent with one form of 
the safety-first criterion. Artzner et al. (1999) propose a class of coherent risk measures 
satisfying monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance. 
Föllmer and Schied (2002) further put forward convex risk measures (satisfying convexity, 
monotonicity and translation invariance), which include a class of coherent risk measures. 
However, VaR lacks subadditivity and convexity (Artzner et al., 1999). Therefore VaR is not 
a coherent risk measure or a convex risk measure. As a remedy for these deficiencies, 
Rockfeller and Uryasev (2000) develop an alternative risk measure, the Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (CVaR), also called expected shortfall (ES). CVaR refers to the conditional 
expectation of the loss above VaR. Based on VaR, Basel Accords propose the Basel II risk 
measure to calculate the capital requirements for a bank’s trading book (Wen et al., 2013). 
During the financial crisis, the Basel II risk measure was considered to be not sufficiently 
conservative and procyclical (Wen et al., 2013). Hence, Basel Accords revised the Basel II 
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risk measure to the Basel 2.5 risk measure (stressed VaR) in 2009, and further to the Basel 
III (Stressed CVaR) in 2012 (Wen et al., 2013). Recently, alternative downside risk measures, 
such as nonlinearly weighted ES (Chen and Yang, 2011) and generalized quantiles risk 
measures (Bellini et al., 2014), have been identified. 
Haley (2008) introduces the empirical distribution (EMD) estimation for loss probability, 
and studies the corresponding safety-first portfolio selection problem.
29
 However, the 
complementary Heaviside function
30
, used in the EMD estimation, is non-differentiable. 
Therefore, the optimization problem in Haley (2008) becomes a non-smooth optimization 
problem that suffers from the “curse of dimensionality”. As noted by Haley (2008), his 
approach is only suitable in the case where the number of the assets, n , in the optimization 
problem, is small (i.e., 8n  ). However, in most realistic settings, such a small portfolio 
size is far too restrictive for investors, especially for financial institutions such as pension 
funds, banks and mutual funds. The EMD estimation method is also used to study VaR or 
probabilistic constrained optimization problems. For example, based on EMD estimation, 
Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005) adopt a smoothing approximation technique, and Benati and 
Rizzi (2007) use a mixed integer linear programming method, to study VaR portfolio 
optimization problems. Zheng et al. (2012) use a Lagrangian decomposition and 
mixed-integer quadratic programming method to examine the probabilistically constrained 
quadratic optimization problems where the random vector has a finite discrete EMD. 
Yao et al. (2013) investigate the mean–CVaR portfolio selection problem based on the 
smooth kernel estimation (also a nonparametric estimation) framework where smooth 
optimization methods can be used.
 
Via Monte Carlo simulations, they show that the proposed 
nonparametric approach outperforms the popular linear programming method first 
introduced by Rockfeller and Uryasev (2000). Although the CVaR is a coherent and convex 
risk measure, Kou et al. (2013) argue that the requirement of sub-additivity may not be 
robust to underlying models and data, thus it is unsuitable for risk monitoring purposes. In 
effect, they show that VaR is a kind of natural risk statistic, and is more robust than CVaR. In 
addition, because of its intuitive appeal, VaR remains the most popular downside risk 
measure enforced by financial regulators (Zymler et al., 2013). Therefore, safety-first and/or 
VaR are still attractive risk measures. 
 
                                                        
29 We point out that shortfall in Haley (2008) is indeed the meaning of loss (truncated) probability but not the same 
meaning of expected shortfall (CVaR) as in many papers. Haley (2008) in fact considers the safety-first portfolio selection 
problem but not the expected shortfall (CVaR) portfolio selection problem. 
30 For the definition of complementary Heaviside function, please see Equation (4-4). 
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4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Definition of Safety-First portfolio selection model 
   Suppose that there are n  assets (that may include or exclude a riskless asset) in the 
finance market. Denote their random return vector by 1 2( , , )n     , where A  denotes 
the transpose of a matrix or vector A . Denote by 0  and 1  the zero column vector of 
order n  and the n - dimension column vector with every component equal to 1, 
respectively. Let 1 2( , , , ) E[ ]nR r r r  =  be the corresponding expected return vector and 
1 2( , , , )nW w w w   be the portfolio of these assets. Then the return of portfolio is 
:
n
p i i
i
w W    . 
For given disaster level d  and confidence level 1   ( 0 0.5  ), three forms of 
the safety-first principle are defined as follows (Pyle and Turnovsky, 1970) 
 (I)：min Pr( )p
W X
d

 ; 
(II)：max E[ ] . . Pr( )p p
W X
s t d  

  ; 
(III)：max . . Pr( )p
W X
d s t d 

  . 
where X  is the set of feasible portfolios. Similar to Markowitz’s mean-variance model, (II) 
is equivalent to minimizing the loss probability when the expected return is not less than u , 
in the sense that they share the same optimal solution, 
(II’)： min Pr( ) . . E[ ]p p
W X
d s t W R u 

   . 
    We take Pr( )p d   as a risk measure and denote Pr( )pTSF d  , where TSF refers 
to Telser Safety First.
31
 On the other hand, let z d  , then (III) is equivalent to  
(III’)：min . . Pr( )p
W X
z s t z 

   .  
In fact, z  is indeed VaR for given confidence level (1 )  (Jorion, 1997). Therefore, 
we use VaR  instead of z  for expression, i.e., VaR z d   . 
To study the safety-first portfolio optimization problem, the first task is to provide or 
estimate the specific computational formula for the following loss probability 
Pr( ) ( ) ( ),
p p
x
p x p x dx F x 

                            (4-1) 
where ( )
p
p x  and ( )pF x  are the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative 
                                                        
31 The safety first rule was first proposed by Telser (1956) 
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distribution function (CDF) of 
p , respectively. Let { 1 2, , , TR R R } denote the sample set of 
 , then 1 2{ , , , }TW R W R W R    is the corresponding sample set for p W  . Since 
Pr( ) E[ ( )]p px I x    , where ( )I   is the indicator function, that is, when p x   is true, 
( ) 1pI x   , otherwise, ( ) 0pI x   . A natural method extensively adopted in the 
literature to estimate Pr( )p x   
is the empirical distribution (i.e., EMD) (Li and Racine, 
2007; Haley, 2012; Alemany et al., 2013). 
1
1
Pr( ) ( ) : ( ).
p
T
p i
i
x F x I W R x
T


                        (4-2) 
Haley (2008) suggests replacing the indicator function ( )I   by the complementary 
Heaviside function ( )H  , i.e., 
1
1
Pr( ) ( ) : ( ),
p
T
p i
i
x F x H W R x
T


                        (4-3) 
where 
1, ,
1
( ) , ,
2
0, .
i
i i
i
when W R x
H W R x when W R x
when W R x
 


   

 
                     (4-4) 
The only the difference between ( )iI W R x   and ( )iH W R x   is that when iW R x  , 
1
( )
2
iH W R x   , while ( ) 1iI W R x   . The difference in the computational results 
between (4-2) and (4-3) can be ignored since in most cases the probability that iW R  exactly 
equals x  is almost zero. So we take both (4-2) and (4-3) as the EMD of p .  
 
4.3.2 Nonparametric kernel estimation formula of loss probability 
Although the EMD estimation (4-2) or (4-3) is very simple, it comes from the 
assumption that   is a discrete random vector with realizations iR , probabilities 
1
T
 or ip  
(exogenous variables), 1,2, ,i T . However in most cases,   is a continuous random 
vector. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, both ( )
p
F x  and ( )pF x  are not 
differentiable (even not continuous) with respect to investment strategy W , which results in 
the difficulty in solving the optimal portfolios.  
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In this paper, we adopt the nonparametric kernel (NPK) method to estimate the loss 
probability in (4-1). Following Li and Racine (2007), the NPK estimations of PDF ( )p x  
and CDF ( )F x  of the univariate random variable X  with sample set { 1 2, , , TX X X } are  
1
1
1
ˆ ( ) ,
1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ,
T
i
i
Tx
i
i
X x
p x k
Th h
x X
F x p x dx G
T h



  
  
  

       


                 (4-5)                                        
where T is the sample size, ( )k   is a kernel function, which, for example, can be chosen as 
Gaussian kernel 
2
2
1
( ) ( ) :
2
v
k v v e


  , ( )G v  is the CDF corresponding to ( )k v , i.e., 
( ) ( )
v
G v k t dt

  , and ( )h h T  is a smoothing parameter, called the bandwidth, that 
depends on the sample size T .  
Since, this paper uses only the NPK estimation ˆ ( )F x  of CDF ( )F x , in the following, we 
provide some statistical properties, namely Theorem 1, about estimator ˆ ( )F x  (Li and 
Racine, 2007).
 
                                   
   Theorem 1: Suppose that ( )k v  is nonnegative and bounded, and satisfying 
( ) 1k v dv


  and ( ) ( )k v k v  , ( )F x  is twice continuously differentiable and 
0 h CT   , where C  and   are some constant satisfying 
1
0,0
8
C    . Then as 
T  , we have 
(i) 
2
1 1 4 4 1
0 1 2
ˆ ˆMSE( ( )) E ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F x F x F x c x T c x hT c x h o h T           , 
(ii) 
2
1 1 4 4 1
0 1 2
ˆ ˆIMSE( ( )) E ( ) ( ) ( )F x F x F x dx C T C hT C h o h T

  

         , 
(iii) ˆ( ( ) ( )) (0, ( ))T F x F x N F x  , 
where, 
4 1( )o h T   denotes the higher order infinitesimal of 4 1h T  . (0, ( ))N F x  denotes 
the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance ( )F x , and 
2
(1)2
0 1 0 0 2( )(1 ( )), ( ) ( ), 2 ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ,
2
c F x F x c x p x vG v k v dv c x p x

 


 
      
 
   
2
2 (1)
2 2
( ) ( )
( ) , ( ) , ( ) , 0,1,2.j j
dp x d F x
v k v dv p x C c x dx j
dx dx

 
 
        
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Remark 1: The conditions ( ) 1k v dv


  and ( ) ( )k v k v   mean that ( )k v  is a PDF 
of some symmetric distribution. 0 h CT    means that h  is nonnegative and is 
convergent to 0 with a rate not less than CT  , where 
1
0,0
8
C    . We point out that in 
our simulation and empirical applications, we choose the Gaussian kernel function and 
Cauchy kernel function, and use the rule-of-thumb for selection bandwidth h  (see formula 
(4-9)).  
Theorem 1 shows that the kernel estimator ˆ ( )F x  of ( )F x  possesses some good 
statistical properties, such as consistent convergence and asymptotic distribution: as T  , 
ˆMSE( ( ))F x , ˆIMSE( ( )) 0F x  , then ˆ ( )F x  converges to ( )F x  with convergence rate 
1
2T

, and ˆ( ( ) ( ))T F x F x  is an asymptotic normal distribution. This guarantees the 
consistency and effectiveness of kernel estimator ˆ ( )F x . 
 
4.3.3 Safety-first portfolio selection model based on nonparametric kernel 
estimation 
With the sample set 1 2{ , , , }TW R W R W R    of p , adopting the method of NPK 
estimation introduced above, we can obtain the NPK estimator of the CDF ( )
p
F x  of p  
as follows:  
1
1ˆ ( ) .
p
T
i
i
x W R
F x G
T h


 
  
 
                              (4-6) 
Then for given disaster levels d  and  VaR , the corresponding loss probabilities can be 
estimated respectively as follows:   
1
1
1ˆ ˆPr( ) ( ) ,
1ˆ ˆPr( ) ( ) .
p
p
T
i
p
i
T
i
p
i
d W R
d F d G
T h
VaR W R
VaR F VaR G
T h






  
    
  

           


                (4-7) 
In both theoretical and practical settings, the NPK estimation is insensitive to the choice 
of kernel function, but the choice of bandwidth is critical, as under or over smoothing can 
substantially reduce precision (Li and Racine, 2007). In the following, we introduce the 
commonly used rule-of-thumb method for selecting bandwidth. 
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For the choice of ( )h  , we try to find the optimal bandwidth 
opth  that can minimize 
ˆIMSE( ( ))F x  defined in Theorem 1. Ignore the term of higher order infinitesimal 
4 1( )o h T  , then we have 1 1 40 1 2
ˆ( ) IMSE( ( ))L h F x C T C hT C h     . Since 
2
2( ) 12 0L h C h   , ( )L h  is a convex function of bandwidth h . Hence, the first-order 
condition 1 31 2( ) 4 0L h C T C h
      yields the optimal bandwidth 
1
13
1 3
2
.
4
opt
C
h T
C
 
  
 
                             (4-8) 
It is known from Theorem 1 that the calculation of 1C  and 2C  depend on the unknown 
CDF ( )F x  and PDF ( )p x . A simple choice is to let ( )F x  and ( )p x  be the CDF and 
PDF of the normal distribution (0, )N  (Hansen, 2004). Substituting into (4-8) we can 
obtain the rule-of-thumb for selection bandwidth h  as follows
 
(Hansen, 2004): 
1
3 ˆ1.59h T 

 ,                             (4-9) 
where 2
1
1
ˆ ( )
1
T
i
i
X X
T


 

  is the sample standard deviation of X , 
1
1 T
i
i
X X
T 
  . 
  with the samples 1 2{ , , , }TW R W R W R    of p , the sample standard deviation of p  is  
2
1
1
ˆ ( ) .
1
T
p i
i
W R W R
T


  

  
Let 1 2( , , , )TR R R   , 1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( , , , )T TW R W R W R R R R W W        , T  
is identity matrix of order T , 0
1
1 1TM
T
    , 0
1
M
T
 
 

. Then ˆ p  can be expressed 
as  
0 0ˆ .
1 1
p
M W M W
W W
T T

     
   
 
              (4-10) 
Set 
1
31.59b T

 , thus, if we adopt the rule-of-thumb suggested above to select 
bandwidth, it should be 
1
3 ˆ1.59 .ph T b W W

                             (4-11) 
According to the analysis in the previous section, (II’) and (III’) forms of safety-first 
criterion export two risk measures: TSF and VaR. Similar to the classical mean-variance 
model, we can construct two safety-first portfolio selection models: mean-TSF and 
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mean-VaR models. These two models are used to find an optimal portfolio to minimize 
respectively TSF and VaR when the expected return of portfolio is given by u , i.e., 
min Pr( )
. . , ,
p
W
TSF d
s t W X W R u
 

 
                          (4-12) 
and 
,
min
. . , ,
Pr( ) ,
W VaR
p
VaR
s t W X W R u
VaR 


 
   

                         (4-13) 
where,  | 1 1nX W W     when short-selling is allowed, and 
 | 1 1, 0nX W W W     when short-selling is forbidden. 
For simplicity, we can unify the two risk measure ( )pTSF   and ( )pVaR   as ( )p   
for given portfolio returns p , similar to the mean-variance model. In the following, we 
outline some related concepts. 
Definition 1: A portfolio 
*W  is called an efficient portfolio if it minimizes ( )p   
under the condition that the expected return of the portfolio is not less than a predetermined 
level u , i.e., 
*W  is the solution of Problems (4-12) or (4-13). The set of all points ( *( )p  ,
*E[ ]p ) in the coordinate plane  - E  is called the efficient frontier, where 
*
p  is a return 
of portfolio corresponding to the efficient portfolio 
*W . 
However, from a practical point of view, Models (4-12) and (4-13) are deficient, since 
both the probability distribution function ( ) Pr( )
p p
F x x    and the expected return vector 
R  are unknown. With the sample set 1 2{ , , , }TR R R  of  , we can obtain the estimated 
value of R  as 
1
1
:
T
i
i
R R
T 
  . For the estimation of ( ) Pr( )p pF x x   , we introduce the 
NPK estimation ˆ ( )
p
F x  defined in (4-6). Then, according to (4-7), (4-11)-(4-13), mean-TSF 
and mean-VaR models can be formulated as follows 
1
1
min
. . , ,
T
i
W
i
d W R
TSF G
T b W W
s t W X W R u

  
  
 
  

                      (4-14) 
and 
94 
 
,
1
min
. . , ,
1
.
W VaR
T
i
i
VaR
s t W X W R u
VaR W R
G
T b W W





 
     
  

                       (4-15) 
where X  is the same as in model (4-12) and (4-13). 
Because models (4-14) and (4-15) are nonlinear constrained optimization problems, 
they cannot be solved explicitly. In addition, Problems (4-14) and (4-15) may be nonconvex 
because VaR and TSF do not satisfy the sub-additivity and convexity (Kou et al., 2013)
32
. 
Numerical methods are needed to solve these two problems. In this paper, we adopt the 
Scatter search global search method (Hendrix and G.-Toth, 2010) and the Sequential 
Quadratic Programming (Nocedal and Wright, 2000) local optimization algorithm to solve 
Problems (4-14) and (4-15).
33
  
 
4.4. Monte Carlo simulation 
In this section, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation analysis to explore the accuracy 
and effectiveness of the NPK method, introduced in this paper, for the mean-TSF model and 
mean-VaR portfolio optimization models. We compare our NPK method with the newly 
developed EMD estimation method (Haley, 2008).  
4.4.1. Data simulations 
To generate the samples of asset returns in Monte Carlo simulations, we use two 
distributions: normal distribution and t -distribution (Cui et al., 2013). Accordingly, we have 
two data generating processes, described in Appendix 1.We use these two distributions for 
the following reasons: 
1) they are the most commonly used elliptical distributions to describe asset returns; 
2) only under elliptical distribution we can get the analytic (true) expression for the 
efficient portfolio and the efficient frontier of the mean-TSF and the mean-VaR 
model; 
3) we need to obtain the true expression for the efficient portfolio and the efficient 
                                                        
32 For the smoothness, we note that when the kernel functions are smooth (e.g., Gaussian kernel function and Cauchy 
kernel function, as used in our numerical simulation and empirical analysis), our nonparametric portfolio optimization 
formulations are smooth. However, the convexity of our formulation is not relevant with the selection of the kernel function, 
but is determined by the risk measure method we choose. Because VaR and TSF do not satisfy the convexity (Föllmer and 
Schied, 2002), in the general case, our nonparametric portfolio optimization formulations are not convex. 
33
 We use MATLAB 7.0 (GlobalSearch Solver and fmincon Solver) and the commercial optimization software CPLEX 
12.0 for programming. 
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frontier of the mean-TSF and the mean-VaR model, so that, we can estimate the 
errors for the NPK method and the EMD estimation method, and further compare the 
accuracy and effectiveness of the two methods using the true expression as a 
benchmark. 
 
4.4.2. True mean-TSF and mean-VaR efficient frontiers for the two distributions 
In order to compare our NPK estimation method with the EMD estimation approach, in 
this subsection, we derive the true mean-TSF efficient frontiers and the mean-VaR efficient 
frontiers for the normal distribution and the t - distribution, respectively. 
When ( , )N R  , it follows that ( , )p W N W R W W      and (0,1)
p W R
N
W W
 

. 
Then 
Pr( ) Pr( ) ( ),
p
p
W R d W R d W R
d
W W W W W W


   
    
    
               (4-16) 
where ( )   is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.  
When ( , , )t R v  , it follows that ( , , )p W t W R W W v      and 
(0,1, )
p W R
t v
W W
 

. Then 
Pr( ) Pr( ) ( ),
p
p v
W R d W R d W R
d
W W W W W W


   
    
    
               (4-17) 
where ( )v   is the CDF of the classical univariate t - distribution with degree of freedom 
v .  
    For simplicity, in this numerical example, we only consider the case without 
short-selling. It is known from the previous section that  6 | 1 1, 0X W W W     
when short-selling is forbidden. When ( , )N R  , by (4-16), the mean-TSF model can be 
formulated as 
min ( ) ( ),
. . 1 1, , 0.
W
d W R d u
TSF
W W W W
s t W W R u W
 
   
  
    
 
                    (4-18)
 
When ( , , )t R v  , by (4-17), the mean-TSF model can be formulated as 
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min ( ) ( ),
. . 1 1, , 0.
v v
W
d W R d u
TSF
W W W W
s t W W R u W
 
   
  
    
 
                    (4-19)
 
Both Problems (4-18) and (4-19) are equivalent to the following optimization problem in 
the sense that they share the same optimal solution. 
min , . . 1 1, , 0.
W
d u
s t W W R u W
W W

   
  
                (4-20)
 
Let min 1 2 6min{ , , , }u r r r and max 1 2 6max{ , , , }u r r r . Denote by 
6{ | , } { | 1 1, 0, }W W X W R u W W W W R u            the feasible solution set of 
Problem (4-20).  Then   is nonempty if and only if min max[ , ]u u u . Note that, in most 
cases, all portfolios with expected return u  larger than the serious disaster level d  are 
preferred by rational investors to all portfolios with expected return u  smaller than d  
(Bawa, 1976). So we assume that 0d u  , which is accordance with our reality and model 
designs of minimizing risk. Otherwise, there exists no optimal solution to Problem (4-20). In 
this example, 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5d      , min max=0.0316, =0.2290u u
34
, we must have that 
0d u   for any min max[ , ]u u u . Then, Problem (4-20) is further equivalent to 
min , . . 1 1, , 0.
W
W W s t W W R u W                          (4-21) 
Since   is a positive semi-definite matrix, the optimization Problem (4-21) is a standard 
convex quadratic programming problem and there are many efficient methods to solve it. For 
example, we can use Active-Set method (Nocedal and Wright, 2000) to solve Problem (4-21). 
For every given expected return min max[ , ]u u u , there must exists an optimal solution 
*W  
to Problem (4-21). Let ( )u  be the corresponding minimum standard deviation, then 
* *( ) ( )u W W   . Denote by ( )NtrueTSF u  and ( )
t
trueTSF u the minimum TSFs of Problems 
(4-18) and (4-19) respectively, then we have ( ) ( )
( )
pN
true
d u
TSF u
u

   and 
( ) ( )
( )
pt
true v
d u
TSF u
u

  . 
   On the other hand, when   is normally distributed, for a given min max[ , ]u u u , we can 
also find an analytic expression of the minimized VaR (denoted by ( )NtrueVaR u ) (Alexander 
                                                        
34 See Appendix 1 for details. 
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and Baptista, 2004) as follows: 
1( ) ( ) ,
N
trueVaR u z u u                       (4-22) 
where 11 (1 )z  

   , and ( )u  is the minimized standard deviation obtained from 
Problem (4-21) as stated above; similarly, when ( , , )t R v  , the analytic expression of the 
minimized VaR (denoted by ttrueVaR ) is obtained as follows: 
1( ) ( ) ,
t
trueVaR u k u u                           (4-23) 
where 11 (1 )vk  

   , and ( )u  is the same as in (4-22). 
 
4.4.3. Simulation results and analysis 
Assume that we do not know the distribution type of  . We can use the EMD function 
(4-3) to estimate Pr( )p x  , and then turn to solve the following optimization Problems  
 1
1
min ( )
. . 1 1, , 0,
T
emd i
W
i
TSF H W R d
T
s t W W R u W


 

    

                      (4-24) 
and 
,
1
min
. . 1 1, , 0,
1
( ) .
emd
emd
W VaR
T
i emd
i
VaR
s t W W R u W
H W R VaR
T





   

    


                       (4-25) 
Conversely, we can use the NPK estimation methods introduced in this paper to solve the 
optimization Problems (4-14) and (4-15) respectively. To apply the NPK method to 
minimize TSF and VaR, we select the Gaussian kernel function 
2
2
1
( ) ( ) :
2
v
k v v e


  . 
Then we have 
2
2
1
( ) ( ).
2
t
v
G v e dt v



                           (4-26) 
For given u , let ( )emdTSF u  and ( )npkTSF u  denote the minimized TSF by solving 
Problems (4-24) and (4-14) respectively, and let ( )emdVaR u  and ( )npkVaR u  denote the 
minimized VaR by solving Problem (4-25) and (4-15), respectively.  
For given sample size T , disaster level d  and/or confidence level 1  , we choose 20 
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different expected returns iu ( 1,2,...,20)i  , and use the following three methods to obtain 
the minimized TSF and VaR. 
1) For any given iu , solving Problem (4-21), we can compute the minimum standard 
deviation ( )iu . Then, applying (4-18) and (4-19), we can obtain the true 
minimized TSF for normal distribution and t -distribution, denoted by ( )
N
true iTSF u  
and ( )ttrue iTSF u  respectively, collectively referred to as ( )true iuTSF . Similarly, 
applying (4-22) and (4-23), we calculate the true minimized VaR for normal 
distribution and t -distribution, denoted by ( )
N
true iVaR u  and ( )
t
true iVaR u , 
collectively referred to as ( )true iuVaR . 
2) Based on NPK model (4-14) and (4-15), we solve the minimized TSF ( ( )npk iuTSF ) 
and VaR ( ( )npk iuVaR ) for any given iu ； 
3) Adopting the EMD models (4-24) and (4-25), we obtain the minimized TSF 
( ( )emd iuTSF ) and VaR ( ( )emd iuVaR ) for any given iu . 
To compare the two methods, we define the sum of squared errors of npkTSF  and 
emdTSF  respectively as 
30 30
2 2
1 1
( ( ) ( )) , ( ( ) ( )) ,npk npk i true i emd emd i true i
i i
TSSE TSF u TSF u TSSE TSF u TSF u
 
      
and similarly for the cases of npkVaR  and emdVaR , i.e.,  
30 30
2 2
1 1
( ( ) ( )) , ( ( ) ( )) .npk npk i true i emd emd i true i
i i
VSSE VaR u VaR u VSSE VaR u VaR u
 
      
We define emd
npk
TSSE
Tra
TSSE
  and emd
npk
VSSE
Vra
VSSE
 . For different parameter settings and 
distribution assumptions, the computational results are presented in Tables 1-4, respectively; 
and the efficient frontiers are illustrated in Figures 1-4, respectively. 
99 
 
Table 4-1. Computational results for mean-TSF model under Normal Distribution 
This table shows the computational results for the mean-TSF model under Normal Distribution. Given different expected 
returns iu , npkTSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between npkTSF  and trueTSF , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))npk npk i true i
i
TSSE TSF u TSF u

  . emdTSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between emdTSF  and 
trueTSF , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))emd emd i true i
i
TSSE TSF u TSF u

  . To compare our NPK method with EMD method, 
we define emd npkTra TSSE TSSE .We set the disaster level ( d ) from -4 to -5.5.  
d  npkTSSE  emdTSSE  Tra  d  npkTSSE  emdTSSE  Tra  
-4 0.1175 0.1208 1.0281 -5 0.1567 0.164 1.0464 
-4.5 0.1487 0.1662 1.1183 -5.5 0.0803 0.0659 0.8199 
 
 
Table 4-2. Computational results for mean-TSF model under t -Distribution  
This table shows the computational results for the mean-TSF model under t -Distribution. Given different expected returns 
iu , npkTSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between npkTSF  and trueTSF , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))npk npk i true i
i
TSSE TSF u TSF u

  . emdTSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between emdTSF  and 
trueTSF , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))emd emd i true i
i
TSSE TSF u TSF u

  . To compare our NPK method with EMD method, 
we define emd npkTra TSSE TSSE .We set the freedom degree ( v ) of t -Distribution from 3 to 10. We choose the 
disaster level ( d ) is -4.5.  
v  npkTSSE  emdTSSE  Tra  v  npkTSSE  emdTSSE  Tra  
3 0.0775 0.1112 1.4353 8 0.0616 0.0877 1.4233 
5 0.1714 0.1852 1.0808 10 0.1178 0.1391 1.18 
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Table 4-3. Computational results for mean-VaR model under Normal Distribution 
This table shows the computational results for the mean-VaR model under Normal Distribution for different confidence 
level (1 ) . Given different expected returns iu , npkVSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between npkVaR  and 
trueVaR , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))npk npk i true i
i
VSSE VaR u VaR u

  . emdVSSE  is the sum of squared errors of 
between emdVaR  and trueVaR , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))emd emd i true i
i
VSSE VaR u VaR u

  . To compare our NPD 
method with EMD method, we define emd npkVra VSSE VSSE . In this table, we set the   from 1% to 10%.  
  npkVSSE  emdVSSE  Vra    npkVSSE  emdVSSE  Vra  
1% 1.2143 1.4537 1.1971 5% 0.385 1.1095 2.882 
3% 0.9444 1.2661 1.3407 10% 0.7332 0.8160 1.1130 
 
Table 4-4. Computational results for mean-VaR model under t -Distribution 
This table shows the computational results for the mean-VaR model under t -Distribution. Given different expected returns 
iu , npkVSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between npkVaR  and trueVaR , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))npk npk i true i
i
VSSE VaR u VaR u

  . emdVSSE  is the sum of squared errors of between emdVaR  
and trueVaR  , i.e., 
30
2
1
( ( ) ( ))emd emd i true i
i
VSSE VaR u VaR u

  . To compare our NPD method with EMD 
method, we define emd npkVra VSSE VSSE .We set the freedom degree of the t -Distribution from 3 to 10. We 
choose the   is 5%.  
v  npkVSSE  emdVSSE  Vra  v  npkVSSE  emdVSSE  Vra  
3 1.4852 1.6401 1.1043 8 0.5537 0.9946 1.7961 
5 1.1121 1.2943 1.1639 10 0.7409 0.8891 1.2000 
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Figure 4-1．Mean-TSF efficient frontiers under Normal Distribution 
This figure plots the mean-TSF efficient frontiers under Normal Distribution. We set the disaster level of the Normal 
Distribution from -4 to -5.5.  
 
 
Normal Distribution with d=-4 
 
Normal Distribution with d=-4.5 
 
Normal Distribution with d=-5 
 
Normal Distribution with d=-5.5 
 
  
0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055 0.06
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
TSF
M
e
a
n
 
 
Mean-TSF
true
Mean-TSF
npk
Mean-TSF
emd
0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
TSF
M
e
a
n
 
 
Mean-TSF
true
Mean-TSF
npk
Mean-TSF
emd
0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.024
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
TSF
M
e
a
n
 
 
Mean-TSF
true
Mean-TSF
npk
Mean-TSF
emd
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
x 10
-3
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
TSF
M
e
a
n
 
 
Mean-TSF
true
Mean-TSF
npk
Mean-TSF
emd
102 
 
Figure 4-2．Mean-TSF efficient frontiers under t -Distribution  
This figure plots the mean-TSF efficient frontiers under t -Distribution. We set the freedom degree ( v ) of t -Distribution 
from 3 to 10. We choose the disaster level ( d ) is -4.5. 
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Figure 4-3．Mean-VaR efficient frontiers under Normal Distribution 
This figure plots the mean-VaR efficient frontiers under Normal Distribution. We set the   from 1% to 10%.  
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Figure 4-4．Mean-VaR efficient frontiers under t -Distribution 
This figure plots the mean-VaR efficient frontiers under t -Distribution. We set the freedom degree of the t -Distribution 
from 3 to 10. We choose the   is 5%. 
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From Figures 4-1 to 4-4 we conclude that, for different parameter settings and 
distribution assumptions, the minimized TSF (
npkTSF ) and VaR ( npkVaR ) obtained by the 
NPK estimation method is closer to the true minimized TSF ( trueTSF ) and VaR ( trueVaR ) than 
those ( emdTSF  and emdVaR ) estimated using the EMD method, respectively. Tables 4-1 to 
4-4 show that, for every case, npkTSSE  is less than emdTSSE , npkVSSE  is less than emdVSSE , 
and both Tra  and Vra  are bigger than 1. These results show that our proposed NPK 
approach outperforms the EMD estimation method. Moreover, from Figures 4-1 and 4-2, we 
find that the mean- emdVaR  and mean- emdTSF  efficient frontiers are not smooth, while the 
mean- npkVaR  and mean- npkTSF  efficient frontiers are smooth. The reason is that the EMD 
estimation  
1
1
( )
T
i
i
H W R x
T 
   is non-differentiable with respect to W , while the NPK 
estimation i
d W R
b W W
 
 
 
 is differentiable with respect to W  on its domain. 
In addition, we also perform a Monte Carlo simulation analysis for the case when 
short-selling is allowed. Computational results also support the above conclusions.
35
  
      
4.5. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we report the empirical analysis of the NPK method and the EMD method. 
In the spirit of Cui et al. (2013), we compare the effectiveness of the two methods by 
in-sample analysis and display dynamic process by out-of-sample analysis. In addition, we 
make use of the NPK method to identify the risk-return characteristics based on our sample.  
4.5.1. Data Description 
We choose two data sets to construct mean-TSF and mean-VaR portfolio models. One is 
China National Social Security Fund (CNSSF) strategic assets and the other is Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) 50 Index Components. 
The period of all data sets is from 4
th
 January 2006 to 30
th
 December 2011. We divide 
this period into three parts covering different market states. The first sub-period is prior to 
the crisis from 4
th
 January 2006 to 9
th
 July 2007. The second is the subprime crisis, which 
begins from the ‘Quant Meltdown’ on 10th July of 2007 (Khandanian and Lo, 2007) and ends 
with the trough in the stock market in October 2009. The third is European debt crisis. On 
20
th
 October 2009, the Greek government announced a revised 2009 budget deficit that put 
                                                        
35 We omit the detailed numerical results here to save space. The results are available upon request. 
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the sovereign debt crisis on the stage (Shambaugh, 2012). We use different frequency (daily, 
weekly and monthly) data sets to conduct our empirical analysis. The data are obtained from 
CSMAR
36
 data base.  
CNSSF strategic assets: The China National Social Security Fund (CNSSF) is referred to 
as the strategic reserve fund designed to meet a range of social security needs for the ageing 
population.
37
 As the leading institutional investor, its stock holdings are the bellwether for 
the market (Leckie and Pan, 2006; Duan et al., 2010). We focus on its strategic stock asset as 
our research objective. Blake et al. (1999) state that, for pension funds, strategic assets 
allocation (long-run allocation of funds) accounts for most of the time series variation in 
portfolio returns, while market timing and asset selection appear to be far less important.
 
In 
this paper, strategic stock assets refer to those stocks that CNSSF never sold during the 
financial crisis. We refer to information from the top 10 shareholders of listed companies to 
capture the trace of CNSSF.
38
 Statistics show that 13 stocks as strategic assets have become 
an important tool for CNSSF to minimize risk. Trying to detect the characteristics of the 
strategic stocks is helpful when exploring the risk management motive of CNSSF. One of the 
stated objectives of the CNSSF is to ensure safety and liquidity. Given the high level of risk 
aversion adopted by the CNSSF, the safety first portfolio selection model provides a 
powerful tool to study portfolio optimization in the financial crisis.  
Table 4-5 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the 13 CNSSF strategic stocks. Panel A 
shows that the average daily return decreased from 0.499% to 0.098% when the subprime 
lending crisis began. At the same time the volume decreased showing a lack of market 
liquidity. However, when the market entered the European debt crisis, the volume rebounded 
from 6.87 to 7.32 million shares, in contrast, the return continued to fall to 0.02%. The 
volatility of the return and volume consecutively slumped together during the financial crisis. 
Weekly data (Panel B) and Monthly data (Panel C) show similar results.
                                                        
36 CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting Research) Database is the comprehensive database for Chinese business 
research. CSMAR covers data on the Chinese stock market, financial statements and China Corporate Governance of 
Chinese Listed Firms. 
37 A detailed introduction of the CNSSF is provided in Leckie and Pan (2006). 
38 Although almost 40 percent of total assets under management of CNSSF are invested in the Chinese stock market, the 
detailed investment information is not published by the National Council for Social Security Fund. 
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Table 4-5. Descriptive statistics of CNSSF strategic stocks during the financial crisis 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the CNSSF strategic stocks over different time periods and using different data 
frequencies. We define strategic stock as those stocks that CNSSF never sold during the financial crisis Return figures 
presented are percentages and volume is in millions. Before crisis represents the period from 4 January 2006 to 9 July 2008, 
subprime lending crisis from 10 July 2007 to October 2009 and Europe debt crisis from 20 October 2009 to 30 December 
2011.  
 
Panel A. Daily Data 
 N Variable Mean Std Min Max 
Before crisis 4151 
Return 0.499 3.831 -27.810 87.570 
Volume 9.131 14.937 0.078 172.571 
Subprime 
Lending crisis 
6919 
Return 0.098 3.581 -10.050 10.110 
Volume 6.870 10.046 0.040 133.209 
Europe debt 
crisis 
6839 
Return 0.020 2.455 -10.030 10.060 
Volume 7.317 8.784 0.099 101.001 
Full Sample 17921 
Return 0.160 3.269 -27.810 87.570 
Volume 7.567 11.001 0.040 172.571 
Panel B. Weekly Data 
 N Variable Mean Std Min Max 
Before crisis 889 
return 2.372 8.752 -28.816 87.570 
volume 4299.040 6671.930 46.213 45919.730 
Subprime Lending crisis 1460 
return 0.431 7.902 -23.803 36.936 
volume 3234.200 4487.930 5.840 37829.550 
Europe debt crisis 1455 
return 0.125 5.510 -18.647 20.778 
volume 3447.680 3841.930 39.316 31337.220 
Full Sample 3804 
return 0.767 7.366 -28.816 87.570 
volume 3564.710 4892.640 5.840 45919.730 
 
Panel C. Monthly Data 
 N Variable Mean Std Min Max 
Before crisis 218 
Return 9.651 18.125 -34.241 102.002 
volume 171.353 262.981 4.809 1494.700 
Subprime 
Lending crisis 
357 
Return 2.245 16.985 -49.588 63.627 
volume 138.010 179.879 3.258 1191.840 
Europe debt 
crisis 
337 
Return 0.229 10.877 -23.586 37.665 
volume 145.332 145.230 0.393 949.065 
Full Sample 912 
Return 3.270 15.754 -49.588 102.002 
volume 148.686 192.533 0.393 1494.700 
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SSE 50 Index components: We choose the 50 stocks that comprise the SSE 50 Index as 
representative of market. The Shanghai Stock Exchange published SSE 50 Index on 2
rd
 
January 2004, representing the 50 largest stocks of ‘good liquidity and representativeness’ 
from the Shanghai security market. The objective of this Index is to reflect the complete 
picture of those good quality large enterprises, which are most influential in Shanghai 
security market.
39
  
Table 4-6 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the SSE 50 Index Components. Panel A 
shows that the average daily return slumped from 0.399% (before crisis) to -0.034% (Euro 
debt crisis).  The daily average volume fell from 43.288 to 33.593 million shares. Weekly 
data (Panel B) and Monthly data (Panel C) show similar results.
                                                        
39 For further details please see http://biz.sse.com.cn/sseportal/index/en/singleIndex/000016/intro/intro.shtml 
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Table 4-6. Descriptive statistics of SSE 50 Index Components during the financial crisis 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the SSE 50 Index components over different time periods and using different 
data frequencies. Return figures presented are percentages and volume is in millions. Before crisis represents the period from 
4 January 2006 to 9 July 2008, subprime lending crisis from 10 July 2007 to October 2009 and Europe debt crisis from 20 
October 2009 to 30 December 2011.  
 
Panel A. Daily Data 
 N Variable Mean Std Min Max 
Before 
crisis 
17176 
return 0.399 3.219 -28.000 59.390 
volume 43.288 79.316 0.000 2582.540 
Subprime 
Lending 
crisis 
26395 
return 0.028 3.480 -11.670 10.180 
volume 41.908 62.845 0.236 1375.370 
Europe debt 
crisis 
25457 
return -0.034 2.125 -10.060 10.140 
volume 33.593 44.198 0.640 906.296 
Full Sample 69028 
return 0.096 2.985 -28.000 59.390 
volume 39.164 61.651 0.000 2582.540 
 
Panel B. Weekly Data 
 N Variable Mean Std Min Max 
Before crisis 3569 
return 1.912 7.089 -27.280 54.888 
volume 204.945 338.970 0.0005 3552.750 
Subprime 
Lending 
crisis 
5549 
return 0.102 7.603 -34.278 38.858 
volume 198.308 281.039 1.251 3263.820 
Europe debt 
crisis 
5410 
return -0.142 4.622 -23.826 39.546 
volume 158.458 193.804 2.752 2001.010 
Full Sample 14528 
return 0.456 6.563 -34.278 54.888 
volume 185.099 269.811 0.0005 3552.750 
 
Panel C. Monthly Data 
 N Variable Mean Std Min Max 
Before crisis 859 
return 8.133 14.842 -29.302 78.113 
volume 831.787 1323.440 0.003 10461.190 
Subprime 
Lending 
crisis 
1357 
return 0.615 16.182 -49.726 60.413 
volume 838.495 1113.960 9.317 9835.180 
Europe debt 
crisis 
1249 
return -0.684 9.586 -31.550 60.149 
volume 669.959 746.654 26.453 5538.400 
Full Sample 3465 
return 2.011 14.242 -49.726 78.113 
volume 776.081 1061.500 0.003 10461.190 
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4.5.2. Model Effectiveness 
We use the full data sets to show the effectiveness of our NPK method and some intuitive 
findings. We assume the distributions of the CNSSF strategic stocks and SSE 50 Index 
stocks are unknown, therefore we adopt our proposed NPK estimation framework (4-14) and 
(4-15) to study the mean-TSF and mean-VaR portfolio optimization problems respectively. 
We adopt the Cauchy kernel function, i.e., 
 2
1
( )
1
k v
x


, then 
2
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) arctan .
1 2
x x
G x k v dv dv x
v  
   
 
                (4-27) 
Given different expected returns iu , we draw the efficient frontiers of mean-TSF and 
mean-VaR models by calculating the minimum TSF and VaR based on Models (4-14) and 
(4-15), respectively. In China, securities margin trading started in March 2010 and the scale 
is limited, hence, we only consider the case when short-selling is forbidden. 
Figure 5 shows different efficient frontiers under different confidence and disaster levels. 
For the sake of saving space, we only report CNSSF and SSE daily data sets results. When 
the   increases from 0.05 to 0.07, the corresponding efficient frontier moves to the upper 
left given the same expected return. VaR becomes smaller. This result is consistent with our 
intuition. Similarly, the corresponding frontier moves to the upper left when d  decreases 
from -4.5 to -5.5, which shows as a crisis develops, the Pˆr( )pTSF d   will decrease for 
the same expected return. In fact, in Figure 5, VaR shown in the Panel A is just the d  in the 
Panel B, while the TSF in the Panel B is the   in the Panel A. This relation is evident from 
the construction of the models and can be found from the definition and relationship for the 
three forms of the safety-first principle.
111 
 
Figure 4-5. Mean-VaR and Mean-TSF efficient frontier  
This figure plots the mean-VaR and mean-TSF efficient frontiers based on CNSSF strategic stocks and SSE 50 Index 
components. We set the   from 5% to 7% in mean-VaR model. We choose the disaster level ( d ) from -4.5 to -5.5 in the 
mean-TSF model. We adopt daily data from 4 January 2006 to 30 December 2011.  
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4.5.3. In-sample Analysis 
In this subsection, we conduct in-sample analysis to compare the performance of NPK 
method and EMD method. Given different return levels, we can solve different optimal 
mean-VaR and mean-TSF portfolios using different frequency data sets. For each given 
optimal portfolio, we adopt the Monte Carlo Simulation method to estimate VaR (95% 
confidence level, i.e., 5%  ), TSF (-4.5 disaster level) and the expected returns in the 
5000 samples.  
Corresponding to the out-of-sample test in the next subsection, we choose 4
th
 January 
2006 to 9
th
 July 2007 (before crisis) as the in-sample test period. Figure 6 displays the 
mean-VaR and mean-TSF efficient frontiers generated by two methods using different 
frequency (daily, weekly and monthly) data sets. Panel A illustrates the efficient frontiers of 
the CNSSF strategic stocks. We can see the efficient frontiers from the NPK method stay to 
the left of, and dominate those from, the EMD method. However, the result from the 
mean-TSF model, using daily data, is an exception. The two efficient frontiers intersect 
showing that the EMD method in part dominates the NPK method for some expectations. 
Similarly, Panel B displays the efficient frontiers of the SSE 50 Index component stocks. In 
most cases, the NPK method performs better than the EMD method, except for the 
mean-VaR model using weekly data sets. Moreover, in-sample analysis shows our NPK 
method exhibits better smooth characteristics. This result is consistent with our expectation. 
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Figure 4-6. Mean-VaR and Mean-TSF In-Sample Test 
This figure displays the in-sample test results of the NPK and EMD methods adopted in the mean-VaR and mean-TSF 
models for CNSSF strategic stocks (Panel A) and SSE 50 Index components (Panel B). Given different return levels, we can 
solve different optimal mean-VaR and mean-TSF portfolios using different frequency data sets. The training period is from 
4 January 2006 to 9 July 2008. For each portfolio, we adopt the Monte Carlo Simulation method to estimate VaR (95% 
confidence level), TSF (-4.5 disaster level) and the expected returns in the 5000 samples.  
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Panel B. SSE 50 Index Component Stocks 
Mean-VaR In-Sample Test Mean-TSF In-Sample Test 
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4.5.4. Out-sample Analysis 
In the out-of-sample tests, we attempt to dynamically compare the effectiveness of NPK 
and EMD methods. By adopting a rebalance strategy, we display the portfolio value 
evolution during the financial crisis. We assume the initial portfolio value is 1 and calculate 
the portfolio value at the end of the period (daily, weekly and monthly). This kind of rolling 
horizon is known as back testing. We update optimal portfolio weights from mean-VaR and 
mean-TSF models using NPK method and EMD method. The target is the average return of 
data sets in the previous rolling period. To be consistent with the in-sample testing, we set 
the training period to before the crisis (from 4
th
 January 2006 to 9
th
 July 2007) and the testing 
period to cover both subprime lending crisis and Euro debt crisis (from 10
th
 July of 2007 to 
30
th
 December 2011). The confidence level is 95% in the mean-VaR model and disaster level 
is -4.5 in the mean-TSF model.  
Figure 4-7 dynamically compares the efficiency of the two estimation methods in the 
mean-VaR and mean-TSF models based on different frequency (daily, weekly and monthly) 
data sets. Panel A plots the process of the CNSSF strategic stocks. In the mean-VaR model, 
we find the portfolio value from the NPK method is higher than the EMD method. 
Interestingly, in the mean-TSF model, results from the weekly data set show that, at the 
beginning, the EMD method performs better. However, with the development of the financial 
crisis, the portfolio value from the NPK method gradually catches up with, and surpasses, 
that from the EMD method. We can also see similar results in Panel B. Panel B displays the 
process of the SSE 50 Index stocks. In the mean-TSF model, daily, weekly and monthly data 
sets illustrate how the portfolio value from NPK method overtakes that from the EMD 
method. In the mean-VaR model, we can also find that in most case the NPK method 
outperforms during the out-of-sample period. 
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Figure 4-7 Mean-VaR and Mean-TSF Out-Sample Test 
This figure displays the out-sample test results of the NPK and EMD methods adopted in the mean-VaR and mean-TSF 
models for CNSSF strategic stocks (Panel A) and SSE 50 Index components (Panel B).. By adopting a rebalance strategy, 
we display the portfolio value evolution during the financial crisis. We assume the initial portfolio value is 1 and calculate 
the portfolio value at the end of the period (daily, weekly and monthly) of the CNSSF and SSE data sets. We update optimal 
portfolio weights from mean-VaR and mean-TSF models using NPK method and EMD method. The target is the average 
return of data sets in the previous rolling period. To be consistent with the in-sample testing, we set the training period to 
before the crisis (from 4th January 2006 to 9th July 2007) and the testing period to cover both subprime lending crisis and 
Euro debt crisis (from 10th July of 2007 to 30th December 2011). The confidence level is 95% in mean-VaR model and 
disaster level is -4.5 in the mean-TSF model.  
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Panel B. SSE 50 Index Component Stocks 
Mean-VaR Out-Sample Test Mean-TSF Out-Sample Test 
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4.5.5. Risk and Return Character 
In the spirit of Best and Grauer (1991) and Mencía (2012), using NPK method, we 
illustrate the risk and return characteristics and transitory nature of the CNSSF strategic 
stocks and SSE 50 Index stock during the financial crisis. The CNSSF adopts a long-term, 
value-oriented investment and rebalance strategy. We expect the CNSSF will show more 
cautious attitudes to strategic stocks during the financial crisis. As a comparison, we also 
illustrate the characteristics of the market using SSE 50 Index stocks. For the sake of brevity, 
we only report the results using daily data sets. 
Figure 4-8 shows that for the CNSSF strategic stocks, the efficient frontiers move down 
when the subprime lending crisis occurs, and the expected return of the portfolio decreases 
for the same risk level. This period is characterized by a relatively flat efficient frontier 
indicating investors would need to take on larger amounts of risk for relatively small 
increases in the expected return (Maher et al., 2011). Note that the flatter the curve, the 
higher the sensitivity of risk relative to the return. However, the efficient frontiers of SSE 50 
index stocks go upward in the Euro debt crisis compared with that in the subprime lending 
crisis. This result reflects that the market confidence recovered after the heavy shock of the 
crisis. 
When the crisis develops, in response to the European debt crisis, the efficient frontier 
moves down to the left. Both CNSSF and the market show a more cautious attitude towards 
risk and positively optimize the portfolio to reduce the risk. 
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Figure 4-8. Risk and Return trade-off character during Financial Crisis 
This figure plots the mean-VaR and mean-TSF efficient frontiers based on CNSSF strategic stocks and SSE 50 Index 
components daily data sets. The confidence level is 95% in mean-VaR model and disaster level is -4.5 in the mean-TSF 
model. Before crisis represents the period from 4 January 2006 to 9 July 2008, subprime lending crisis from 10 July 2007 to 
October 2009 and Europe debt crisis from 20 October 2009 to 30 December 2011. 
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4.6. Summary 
In Chapter 4, we adopt a smooth nonparametric estimation to explore the safety-first 
portfolio optimization problem. We obtain a nonparametric estimation calculation formula 
for loss (truncated) probability using the kernel estimator of the portfolio returns’ cumulative 
distribution function, and embed it into two types of safety-first portfolio selection models. 
We numerically and empirically test our nonparametric method to demonstrate its accuracy 
and efficiency. Cross validation results show that our nonparametric kernel estimation 
method outperforms the empirical distribution method. As an empirical application, we 
simulate optimal portfolios and display return-risk characteristics using China Social 
Security Fund (CNSSF) strategic stocks and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 50 Index 
components. 
There are still many interesting questions with our proposed nonparametric estimation 
framework. First, we can make further efforts to study other mean-risk portfolio optimization 
problems using the nonparametric method, where the risk is measured by other methods, 
such as semi-variance and/or lower partial moment. Second, in this paper, we only consider 
the static cases. However, it would be helpful to study the risk-return portfolio optimization 
in a multi-period setting based on the NPK framework. Third, noting that CVaR at level is 
equal to the normalized value of the Lorenz curve at that level (Ogryczak and Ruszczynski, 
2002), Dentcheva and Penev (2010) construct a continuous, convex estimator of the Lorenz 
curve, and use it to estimate CVaR. Appling the estimation of the Lorenz function to study 
the safety-first and VaR portfolio optimization problems is another topic for future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
5.1. Thesis overview 
In this thesis, we aim to identify the financial economic behavior and consequences of 
political actions of the CNSSF. Three key areas are covered. First, in Chapter 2, we examine 
the trading motives and bail-out-like behavior of the CNSSF. Next, in Chapter 3, we focus on 
the political information advantage of the CNSSF. Finally, in Chapter 4, we propose a 
smooth non-parametric optimization method for the CNSSF’s strategic stocks in adopting the 
so-called “safety-first” framework. 
5.1.1. Chapter 2 
Focusing on the trading behavior of the CNSSF, we analyze the portfolio management 
motive before and during the financial crisis and the relation with mutual funds in distress. 
We provide evidence supporting the view that the CNSSF adopts valuation-oriented, 
principally rebalanced and safety-first strategies. The CNSSF sold high risk stocks to 
decrease portfolio risk before the financial crisis and held high volatility stocks during the 
crisis to rebalance the portfolio with growth stocks. Moreover, the CNSSF delays selling 
liquid stocks to maintain portfolio liquidity. There is no evidence supporting the view that the 
CNSSF hastily dumps undervalued stocks, however, the CNSSF locks in profits during 
active and fire sale quarters. 
As a social liquidity provider, the CNSSF positively supports the liquidity of mutual 
funds in distress. We find direct and indirect evidence showing that liquidity provision 
trading by the CNSSF for mutual funds positively affects the CNSSF’s performance. In 
addition, this liquidity provision can significantly improve the performance of mutual funds 
in distress. Further, liquidity provision trading is significantly affected by public information. 
Removing the effects of public information, we show liquidity provision trading, based on 
private information and research ability, positively affects the performance of the CNSSF. 
Collectively, these findings help explain the apparent timing ability of the CNSSF. 
5.1.2. Chapter 3 
With regard to the political information advantage of the CNSSF, we establish a network 
of domestic mutual funds associated with the CNSSF. The portfolio differences between the 
portfolio holdings of network funds and the CNSSF are analyzed to identify the policy 
information advantage. Our work directly reconciles three contradictory hypotheses on 
state-sponsored investors affecting targeted firm values: superior monitoring hypothesis, 
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political agenda hypothesis and passive investor hypothesis. 
Consistent with superior monitoring hypothesis, we find, in the short term, that there is a 
positive relation between the political information advantage and the future performance of 
abnormal stock returns. In addition, the CNSSF positively promotes the inside information 
absorbed into asset prices. The political information advantage also significantly affects 
systematic risk. In the long run, the political information advantage is negatively related to 
the firm operation performance over the future three years. The political information 
advantage decreases the targeted firms’ return on performance, sales growth, Tobin’s Q and 
quick ratio; however, political information advantage increases debt to asset ratio. These 
findings support the political agenda hypothesis and passive investor hypothesis.We look 
deep into the network in which the CNSSF is the centre. Our analysis shows that the policy 
information advantage crosses the information network in the Chinese mutual fund industry 
and significantly affects mutual fund performance. The political information advantage 
positively affects the connected mutual funds that are managed by the fund companies that 
also manage the CNSSF portfolios. In contrast, the political information advantage 
negatively impacts the mutual funds not directly connected with the CNSSF. 
5.1.3. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 provides a nonparametric kernel (NPK) framework to compute two safety-first 
portfolio selection models. We obtain a nonparametric estimation calculation formula for loss 
(truncated) probability using a kernel estimator of the portfolio return’s cumulative 
distribution function, and embed it into two kinds of safety-first portfolio selection models. 
In contrast to the previous literature, our method depends neither on the distributional 
assumptions of asset returns, nor on the Chebyshev inequality. In addition, our proposed 
nonparametric safety-first portfolio optimization models are smooth optimization problems 
that can be numerically solved by many efficient smooth optimization techniques. 
Monte Carlo simulation is presented to demonstrate our NPK method. The computational 
results show that our proposed NPK approach outperforms the EMD estimation method. The 
errors obtained by our NPK method are smaller than those obtained by the EMD estimation 
method. Efficient frontiers based on our NPK method are smooth, while those based on the 
EMD estimation method are non-smooth.  
We conduct further empirical analysis on CNSSF strategic assets and SSE 50 Index 
components. Both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis shows that our NPK estimation 
method performs better, than the EMD estimation method, in terms of accuracy and 
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efficiency. We also provide an empirical application for our nonparametric mean-TSF and 
mean-VaR portfolio selection models. We display the return-risk tradeoff characteristics 
during different stages of the financial crisis.  
5.2. Over-arching conclusions  
Collectively, the analysis presented in this thesis allows us to better understand a number 
of financial impacts that result from the investment activities and trading behaviors of the 
CNSSF. The CNNSF invests 40% of its 140 billion dollar portfolio in the risky assets traded 
in the Chinese stock market. We learn that the CNSSF trades in a manner that reflects its 
political role in the market structure.  
As a government-backed fund it actively engages in bailout strategies in times of crisis. 
We document that the CNSSF actively provides liquidity to mutual funds in distress. The 
CNSSF does use its information advantage to profit and assist distressed mutual funds. In 
addition, this bailout-like behavior is not speculative and can positively improve the 
performance of the distressed mutual funds. 
We find there is a positive and significant information advantage-stock performance 
linkage. In contrast, we document the political information advantage negatively affects 
long-term firm performance. Moreover, we demonstrate that there is a network spillover of 
the information advantage across the Chinese mutual fund industry, which also affects 
mutual fund performance. 
We explore the safety-first portfolio optimization problem and obtain a nonparametric 
estimation calculation formula for loss (truncated) probability. As an empirical application, 
we simulate optimal portfolios and display return-risk characteristics using China Social 
Security Fund (CNSSF) strategic stocks and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 50 Index 
components. We define strategic stock as those stocks that CNSSF never sold during the 
financial crisis. When the crisis develops, the efficient frontier moves down to the left. The 
CNSSF shows a more cautious attitude towards risk and positively optimize the portfolio to 
reduce the risk. 
 
5.3. Directions for future research 
This thesis directly relates to the research on the state-sponsored or policy-related 
institutional investors, such as sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds. However, in 
this area, the data are notoriously opaque. Hence, we encourage researchers to keep on the 
lookout for more granular data to test similar hypotheses and further develop this area.  
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We document that the CNSSF implements bail-out strategies for distressed mutual funds, 
specifically the open-end mutual funds. However, the closed end funds are important 
investment targets of the CNSSF. Future research could examine the relation between the 
CNSSF and the closed end fund discount puzzle.  
We show contradictory effects of the CNSSF’s political information. In the short-run, the 
CNSSF’s political information positively affects stocks’ performance, but in contrast, in the 
long-run, the CNSSF’s political information adversely affects firms’ operational performance. 
The analysis could be expanded to include other types of investors as a benchmark. It is an 
interesting and open question to compare the effects of the CNSSF with other types of 
investors, especially with qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) and/or with other 
government backed investors such as state-owned banks.  
Finally, there remain many interesting unresolved questions relating to our proposed 
nonparametric estimation framework. First, we can make further effort to study other 
mean-risk portfolio optimization problems using the nonparametric method, where the risk is 
measured by other approaches, such as semi-variance and/or lower partial moment. Second, 
in this thesis, we only consider the static cases. However, it would be insightful to study the 
risk-return portfolio optimization in a multi-period setting based on the NPK framework. 
Third, noting that CVaR at a given level is equal to the normalized value of the Lorenz curve 
at that level (Ogryczak and Ruszczynski, 2002), Dentcheva and Penev (2010) construct a 
continuous, convex estimator of the Lorenz curve, and use it to estimate CVaR. Accordingly, 
applying the estimation of the Lorenz function to study the safety-first and VaR portfolio 
optimization problems is another topic for future research. 
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Appendix 1. Data generating Process in Chapter 4 
One data generating process is ( , )iR N R  , 1,2, ,i T , where ( , )N R   denotes a 
multivariate normal distribution with mean vector R  and covariance matrix  ; the other 
generating process is ( , , )iP t R v , 1,2, ,i T , where ( , , )t R v  denotes a multivariate t
- distribution with mean vector R , dispersion matrix   and degree of freedom v . In our 
test, the parameters are set as follows 
1 2 6( , , , ) (0.1610, 0.1526, 0.2290, 0.0882, 0.0316, 0.1463) ,R r r r  =  
9.2021    3.9973    3.9130    2.8204    2.8388    3.8527
3.9973   10.7749    4.1237    2.6610    2.4098    4.5907
3.9130    4.1237    8.4006    2.5536    2.3799    3.8285
2.8204    2.6610    2.5536    
  ,
9.2200    6.0187    2.8934
2.8388    2.4098    2.3799    6.0187    7.4659    2.7386
3.8527    4.5907    3.8285    2.8934    2.7386    8.5693
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
3, 5,8,10v  , 1%, 3%, 5%,10%   and 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5d      . For any group 
parameters, we generate 1000T  samples under the multivariate normal distribution and 
the multivariate t - distribution, respectively. We can use the special command “mvnrnd” of 
MATLAB to directly generate the random numbers ( , )iR N R   , 1,2, ,i T . The 
procedures generating samples of multivariate t - distribution ( , , )t R v  are stated as 
follows. 
Procedure 1  
(i) Use the command “mvnrnd” of MATLAB to generate a random vector 
1 2 6( , , , )i i i iZ Z Z Z  (0, )N  , 1,2, ,i T . 
(ii) Use the command “chi2rnd” of MATLAB to generate a random number iy  
chi-squared distribution 
2 ( )v  with degree of freedom v , 1,2, ,i T . 
(iii) Setting i i
i
v
P Z R
y
  , then ( , , )iP t R v . 
 
